Southeast Asian perceptions of U.S. security policy in the post-Cold War era by Chiaravallotti, Joseph R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-06
Southeast Asian perceptions of U.S. security policy
in the post-Cold War era
Chiaravallotti, Joseph R.








SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S.




Thesis Advisor: Claude A. Buss




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Ia. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. R-STRICTIVE MARKINGS
Unclassified Unclassified
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABIL1TY OF REPORT
__________________I__________________________LE_ Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.2b. DECLASSIIFICATI ON/DOW~NGRADING SCHEDULE
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S, 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School 7 i3 Apphcable Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS fcity, state, and 2 coe 7b. ADDRESS (c7y, na, and ZIP code)
Monterey. CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943,5000
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NU.MBER
ORGANIZATION d f Apphiablel
c. ADDRESS kci. state, and ZIP codel 10 SOURCE OF FMNDING NIUMBERS
PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK L NITELEMENT NO. NO. NO. ACESSION NO.
11. 1-I LE (Include Secunrz Classification) IHE RUSSIANS DEBATE THE KURIL ISL ANDS TERRIT ORIA DISPFIT.:
SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
12. PERSONAL AL THOR(S)
CHIARAVALLOTI-'I. JOSEPH R.
13a. TYPEOFREPORI 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DAIE OF REPI(year. month,da) 15. PAGE COLNT
Master's Thesis IFROM () June 1993 190
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the offiial policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (contnue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP S( )UTHEAST ASIA
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and adentg•i bhi lock number)
The end of the Cold War has changed the political environment in Southeast Asia and the parameters in which United
States policy makers previously worked within are no longer the same. The United States' strategies are based on
assumptions of how the rest of the world perceives it. but the views of other nations may not concur with the United States
policy maker's assumptions. This thesis is concerned with the United States policy in Southeast Asia and brings to light the
Southeast Asians' perceptions of the issues in which the United States is formulatiad its national security policies' how the
negative perceptions differ from American assumptions: and offer suggestions on how to deal with the differences.
The aim of this thesis is to provide security policy makers with information that could be used in exercising judgment to
find solutions to current, and prospective. policv problems in Southeast Asia. It produces policy-relevant information that
may be used to resolve specific policy problem, and pursue preferable courses of action in the region. This thesis shows a
single policy towards Southeast Asia is misguided. Each state in the region has its own interests, and American policies
must be formulated with each individual states. one by one.
20. DISTRIBUI.ONiAVAILABILIFY Of- ABSTRACT :1 ABSTRACT SECU RIIN CLASSIFI-CATION
S UNCLASSIFIED/UNUMITED L SAME AS Unclassified
RPT. lIDTIC USERS
.NAME OF REPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Z, b. IELEPHONE (Include Area 22c OF1-ICE SYIMBOL
Claude A. Buss Code) Code NS/Buss)
DD FORMI 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR ,liitin niaý he used untl exhausted SECURITF CLASSIFICATION OF IlI PAGE
UNCLSSIFIED
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
by
Joseph R. Chiaravallotti
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A. Stockton State College 1985
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of







Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor
David Winterford, gecond Reader
Thomas Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
ii
ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War has changed the political environment in
Southeast Asia and the parameters in which United States policy makers
previously worked within are no longer the same. The United States'
strategies are based on assumptions of how the rest of the world perceives it,
but the views of other nations may not concur with the United States policy
makers' assumptions. This thesis is concerned with the United States policy
in Southeast Asia and brings to light the Southeast Asians' perceptions of the
issues in which the United States is formulating its national security policies;
how the negative perceptions differ from American assumptions; and offer
suggestions on how to deal with the differences.
'The aim of this thesis is to provide security policy makers with
information that could be used in exercising judgment to find solutions to
current, and prospective, policy problems in Southeast Asia. It produces
policy-relevant information that may be used to resolve specific policy
problems and pursue preferable courses of action in the region. This thesis
shows a single policy towards Southeast Asia is misguided. Each state in the
region has its own interests, and American policies must be formulated with
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War has changed the political environment in
Southeast Asia and the parameters in which United States policy makers
previously worked within are no longer the same. The United States'
strategies are based on assumptions of how the rest of the world perceives it,
but the views of other nations may not concur with the United States policy
makers' assumptions. This thesis is concerned with the United States policy
in Southeast Asia and brings to light the Southeast Asians' perceptions of the
issues in which the United States is formulating its national security policies;
how the negative perceptions differ from American assumptions; and offer
suggestions on how to deal with the differences.
The aim of this thesis is to provide security policy makers with
information that could be used in exercising judgment to find solutions to
current, and prospective, policy problems in Southeast Asia. It produces
policy-relevant information that may be used to resolve specific policy
problems and pursue preferable courses of action in the region. This thesis
shows a single policy towards Southeast Asia is misguided. Each state in the
region has its own interests, and American policies must be formulated with
each individual state, one by one.
Post-Cold War U.S. security policy documents stress that in modern
history no democratic governments have ever gone to war with each other.
This may be true, but it should not be assumed that democratic governments
vii
will never resort to using military force against each other in the future. A
more sound policy assumption is: a government will be more reluctant to
use military force against another government with which it shares common
national interests.
In the post-Cold War era, all of the Southeast Asian states have declared
that economic success is their number one priority. Southeast Asia already is
one of the most economically successful regions in the world. This region-
wide concentration on economic prosperity should be of interest to U.S.
policy makers, because it is making the national interests of individual
Southeast Asian countries more aligned with each other. American security
policy makers should focus on this aspect of regional concerns to implement
U.S. policy in the region. Bringing the non-ASEAN states into the Southeast
Asian economic design will do more for regional stability than overthrowing
the remaining communist governments in the region. The post-Cold War
trend in Southeast Asia of placing economic concerns above all others should
indicate to American security policy makers that the United States should
place more emphasis on economic involvement in the region, and less
emphasis on a dominant military presence and the consideration of forming
security alliances within the region.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has changed the political environment in
Southeast Asia, and the parameters in which United States policy makers
previously worked within are no longer the same. The United States'
strategies are based on assumptions of how the rest of the world perceives it,
but the views of other nations may not concur with the United States policy
makers' assumptions. This thesis is concerned with the United States policy
in Southeast Asia and will bring to light the Southeast Asians' perceptions of
the issues in which the United States is formulating its national security
policies; how the their differ from American assumptions; and offer
suggestions on how to deal with the differences.
The United States' national security strategy is broken down into the
categories of military, economic, and political assumptions. The first military
assumption is that the U.S. military presence provides stability in East Asia.
U.S. security policy makers maintain that "our engagement in the Asia-pacific
region is critical to the security and stability of the region."'
The second military assumption is that nondemocratic regimes may pose
a potential threat to U.S. interests. Defense policy makers state: "....we have
not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force
or intimidation to achieve their ends."' 2
'Department of Defense, A Strate,,'ic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, November
1992, p. 28.
2 Secretary of Defense, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy,
January 1993, p. 2.
One aspect of the United States post-Cold War strategy is to maintain
forward deployed forces throuL' ,out the regions of the world. The United
States is assuming that these deployments will be welcomed by our friends
and allies.3 Thus, the third military assumption is that a "strong" United
States military position is welcomed by leaders throughout the Southeast
Asian region.'
The fourth military assumption concerns the "power vacuum" concept.
The assumption is that if the United States were to completely withdraw its
military presence from East Asia, then a vacuum could be created and
another power could take the United States' place. Therefore, a U.S. military
withdrawal from Southeast Asia may produce conditions conducive for a
"power vacuum."'
The United States' national security economic assumptions concern U.S.
economic involvement, economic influence and nondemocratic economic
performance. The first economic assumption is that United States economic
involvement in Southeast Asia enhances the United States' influence in the
region.6 The second economic assumption is that Southeast Asians are drawn
to the United States by economic ties.7 The third economic assumption is that
'The United States' "friends and allies" in Southeast Asia are: Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
'Secretary of Defense, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, p.
22.
Ibid., p. 5.
'Department of Defense, A Strategic Framneuwork for the Asian Pacific Rim, p. 4.
?Ibid., p. 2 .
2
nondemocratic regimes are incapable of sustained economic reform without
moving towards political pluralism.'
The United States' national security political assumptions concern
alliances, American leadership, and human rights and democracy issues. The
first political assumption is that the United States will be able to strengthen
and expand its system of alliances. U.S. policy makers state that alliances are
"integral" to the United States' post-Cold War strategy! "In the long run,
preserving and expanding these alliances and friendships will be as important
as the successful containment of the former Soviet Union or the Coalition
defeat of Iraq."'" This strategy is dependent on the United States' friends and
allies willingness to have their alliances and defense arrangements with the
United States strengthened.
The second political assumption is based on the objective of building an
international environment conducive to American values. The United
States' post-Cold War strategy is to, together with our allies, "work to build an
international environment conducive to our values."" This objective
assumes that the United States' friends and allies will want to build an
international environment conducive to American values.
The third political assumption is that democratic countries in East Asia
will support the United States in providing leadership for encouraging




"Secretary of Defense, Defens, Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, p.
1.
3
opportunity to "show the leadership necessary to encourage sustained
cooperation among democratic powers.""2 This United States' strategy
assumes that the United States' friends and allies desire the United States to
"provide the leadership needed to promote global peace and security."'3
U.S. security policy stresses the advance of "democracy, freedom, and
human rights in the countries of the region that lack them.""' The fourth
political assumption is that Southeast Asian countries share the United
States' objectives of democratization and the protection of human rights.5
The question posed by this thesis is: Is the United States' post-Cold War
security strategy in Southeast Asia based on correct assumptions?
The hypothesis of this thesis is: if Southeast Asian perceptions are
different from what American policy makers believe them to be, then the
assumptions that the United States' is basing its post-Cold War security
strategy on are incorrect.
The methodology to be used is normative. The level of analysis is the
nation-state level with in Southeast Asia. The United States' assumptions
listed above will be compared to the concerns and perceptions of each
Southeast Asian country to which each assumption applies. The aim of this
thesis is to provide policy makers with information that could be used in
exercising judgment to find solutions to current, and prospective, policy
"12 Ibid., p. 3.
"3Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States,
January 1992, p. 6.
"Secretary of Defense, Defens( Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, p.
22.
'Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, p. 6.
4
problems in Southeast Asia. It will produce policy-relevant information that
may be used to resolve specific policy problems and pursue preferable courses
of action in the region.
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II. MILITARY CONCERNS
An American military presence is still desired by most East Asian
governments as insurance against instability in the region (Bosworth, 1993:
107; Neher, 1991: chap. 2; Oxnam, 1993: 58). However, many leaders in the
region feel that a dominant American military presence is no longer
necessary. Some Americans believe East Asians view the United States as the
only power that can provide a stabilizing force in the region because United
States military presence relieves others of the burden of establishing a
regional hegemony (Crowe and Romberg, 1991: 124). This belief has
overtones of Cold War polic, making. The spread of communism was the
monolithic threat for Southeast Asians during the Cold War. The threat of
communism presented itself in two forms-regional penetration by the Soviet
Union and by externally sponsored communist insurgency. The Soviet
Union no longer exists as a political entity, and with the exception of the
Philippines, the countries of ASEAN face a minimal insurgency problem,
mostly because of their economic achievements (Stubbs, 1992).
Most Southeast Asian security concerns are linked to economic
considerations. Countries in the region are focused on insuring that the
ability to conduct external trade is maintained by keeping open the Sea Lines
of Communications (SLOCs) in the South China Sea, and protecting their
economic interests in their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The
trends in the types of arms build up characterizes the shift by countries in the
6
region from counterinsurgency to convenional warfare. Many countries are
upgrading their naval and air forces and paying less attention to ground
forces (Johnston, 1992: 105).
East Asians are worried that a sudden withdrawal of United States military
forces would create a power vacuum in the region (Bosworth, 1993: 107;
Crowe and Romberg, 1991; Oxnam, 1993: 62). The countries in Southeast
Asia that are the strongest advocates of the power, or security, vacuum
concept are also the smallest or least militarily capable countries in the region.
The ASEAN country geographically closest to China, Thailand, is one that
most opposes the power vacuum concept.
Power vacuum proponents also point to Japan as a source of instability. A
common theory is that if the United States was to no longer protect the SLOCs
between the Middle East and Japan, then Japan's national interests would be
threatened. This, in turn, would prompt Japan to break from its self-imposed
deployment limit on the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) of
1,000 nautical miles from Japan. Japan would have to patrol the SLOCs in the
South China Sea, which would be perceived as a threat by the Chinese. Then
the Chinese would expand their military buildup, which would create an
arms race and inmtability in the region. Thus, it is perceived that a withdrawal
of American forces from the Western Pacific would cause instability in East
Asia. For this reason many state--. in the region are building up their
defensive capabilities, which is already inspiring an arms race (Johnston,
1992). East Asians want a continued American-Japanese security relationship
to prevent the possibility that Japan would build up its military power and
begin deploying it to protect Japanese nationai interests (Bosworth, 1993: 107).
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The United States' security agreement with Japan is viewed as vital to stability
in the region (Johnston, 1992: 105).
A dilemma facing United States policy makers is whether the United
States, as the lone surviving superpower of the Cold War, should assume the
role of international policeman. Global security concerns of the Cold War
overshadowed long-lasting regional conflicts. The Cold War made regional
security concerns in East Asia secondary to the superpower rivalry. In the
post-Cold War era these secondary security concerns have become the
primary security challenges (Baker, 1991). It would be rather presumptuous
for American policy makers to believe that American military power can
solve regional conflicts that have been going on long before the origins of the
Cold War. Some Americans believe that the United States' contribution to
stability in the region can only come in the form of a military presence
(Crowe and Romberg, 1991: 130). This view is myopic and sells short the
United States' diplomatic capabilities.
A. BRUNEIAN MILITARY CONCERNS
If one were to compare East Asia to the Middle East, one would see
similarities between the security concerns of Kuwait and those of Brunei.
Both countries are very small, rich in oil reserves, and surrounded by large,
and sometimes hostile neighbors. Brunei's total land area is 5,270 square
kilometers, which is slightly larger than the state of Delaware. The only
country smaller than Brunei in Southeast Asia is Singapore with a land area
of 622.6 square kilometers. Brunei received its independence from Britain in
1984, but the sultan of Brunei was hesitant in accepting this independence.
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The sultan feared that without the British to protect it, Brunei's security
would be threatened by its neighbors. Brunei believed that Malaysia and
Indonesia would pose direct external threats, and that both of these countries
would support domestic insurgencies within Brunei's borders (Neher, 1991:
chap. 8).
Brunei has the highest per capita income in Southeast Asia and has a fully
developed welfare system that is adequate to meet the basic needs of its
citizens, so there is little threat to the sultan's rule by internal dissent (Neher,
1991: chap. 8). The last insurgency Brunei experienced occurred in 1962. The
Azahari revolt was the result of an anti-Malaysia and anti-British socialist
party winning Brunei's first election. This directly threatened the Bruneian
monarchy and the party was prevented from taking power. A rebellion
ensued but was quickly put down by British forces.
There are currently no external threats to Brunei's national security
(Menon, 1989: 194; Neher, 1991: 137). However, China's expansionist
tendencies in the South China Sea do pose a potential threat to Brunei. The
conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands pose the greatest external threat to
Bruneian national interest. Though Brunei does not claim any of the islands
or reefs in the Spratlys as sovereign Bruneian territory, other claimants pose a
threat to Bruneian waters, where much of the country's oil and all of its
natural gas is located. Brunei fully supports ASEAN's July 1992 South China
Sea Declaration. This declaration insists that all claimants not use military
force to solve territorial disputes in the South China Sea and use diplomacy
to coordinate joint exploration until the sovereignty issues are settled.
9
Brunei's maritime claims consist of a 12 nautical mile (NM) territorial sea
and a 200 NM Exclusive fishing zone. Within Brunei's Exclusive fishing
zone is Louisa Reef which is part of the Spratly Islands. All of the Spratlys are
claimed by China, including Louisa Reef. Thus far Brunei has not publicly
claimed the reef.
Brunei's defense expenditures are approximately $233 million annually."6
This is the smallest military budget in absolute terms among the ASEAN
states. The second smallest military budget in ASEAN is the Philippines' at
$915 million. Brunei's defense expenditures, as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), are approximately 20.3 percent, which is the largest
in ASEAN. Malaysia ranks second in ASEAN with 8.2 percent of its GDP
going to military expenditures.
The Royal Brunei Armed Forces' (RBAF) available manpower is the
smallest in all of Southeast Asia. Brunei's population between the ages of 15-
49 is 75,330 people, of which 43,969 are fit for military service.'7 The RBAF
consist of 4,450 active duty personnel, and a reserve force of 900 personnel is
being developed."8 Table 1 shows that the next smallest military in Southeast
Asia is the Laotian military with 37,000 personnel. The RBAF is augmented
by a battalion of British Gurkhas, which is paid for from Brunei's national
budget.
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah desires to modernize the capabilities of the RBAF
to protect Brunei's maritime interests. Brunei is planning to purchase 16
16 All dollar figures presented in this thesis are U.S. dollar values.
"Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, Washington D.C.: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1992, p. 51.
"Asia 1993 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1993), p. 227.
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Hawk fighter aircraft from British Aerospace and wants three 1,000 ton
offshore patrol craft. The Hawk fighters will be Brunei's first fixed wing
aircraft. Brunei's navy currently consists of three missile craft and three
patrol boats. The RBAF does not have the capability to adequately defend
against an external attack aimed at taking control of the country's oil wells.
Brunei would have to depend on friendly nations to come to its "rescue"
(Menon, 1989: 193).
Brunei joined ASEAN only one week after the British granted Brunei its
independence. This move was for more pragmatic than ideological reasons.
Brunei felt it needed membership in ASEAN to enhance Brunei's national
security and international legitimacy (Menon, 1989: 199; Neher 1991: 138).
The Bruneian government has adopted a pro-Western foreign policy and is
supportive of United States foreign policy.
The government of Brunt-i believes that a U.S. military presence in
SoutheastAsia is necessary for the maintenance of stability in the region. In
April 1992, Alimin Wahab, a senior official in the Brunei Prime Minister's
office, expressed support for a continuing U.S. military presence in Southeast
Asia. Alimin said Brunei still needs the U.S. presence to bridge the gap until
Brunei could make long term arrangements to enhance its own security.
Brunei has the perception that an absence of U.S. military presence in the
region would create a power vacuum in Southeast Asia. Alimin stated that
11
TABLE 1.
MILITARY BALANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Brun Burm Cam Indo Laos Mala Phil Sing Thai Viet
Active Personnel* 4.4 286 135 283 37 127.5 106.5 55.5 283 857
Reserve Personnel* 0.9 0 0 400 0 44.3 131 262 500 0
Army Personnel* 3.6 265 80 215 33 105 68 45 190 700
Main Battle Tanks 0 26 150 0 30 0 0 0 253 1,300
Light Tankst 16 30 0 235 25 26 41 350 310 600
Artillery over 100mmt 0 96 20 170 75 159 392 168 527 2,330
Navy Personnel* 0.5 12 4 44 0.5 10.5 23 4.5 50 42
Naval Infantry* 0 0.8 0 12 0 0 8.5 0 @ 30
Submarines 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Frigates 0 0 0 17 0 4 1 0 8 7
Corvettes 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0
Missile Craft 3 0 0 4 0 8 0 6 6 8
Torpedo Craft 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 19
Offshore Patrol Boats 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 0
Coastal Patrol Boats 3 29 12 42 8 27 34 18 54 28
Mine Warfare Vessels 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 1 7 11
Amphibious Vessels 2 5 0 16 0 2 7 5 8 7
Support Vessels 0 4 0 18 0 3 12 1 7 19
Naval Aircraft 0 0 0 33 0 6 5 0 34 0
Air Force Personnel* 0.3 9 0 24 3.5 12 15.5 6 70 15
Attack Aircraft 0 0 0 40 29 33 0 107 £ 60
Fighter Aircraft 0 12 17 14 0 13 9 38 400 125
Attack Helicopters 7 10 0 0 0 0 94 6 0 20
Other helicopters 10 49 11 40 12 12 72 44 23 230
* in thousands
t includes naval infantry and marine corps equipn, :nt.
@ included in total navy personnel.
£ included in fighter aircraft.
Source: "The Military Balance," Asia 1993 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,
1993), pp. 225-240.
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Brunei is concerned that other ambitious regional powers will attempt to fill
the "vacuum" left by the U.S. military pullout from the Philippines."
Alimin announced that Brunei will provide access to United States
military forces.
We are now planning to enter into a memorandum of understanding with
the United States to facilitate increased visits (by United States naval
vessels). But it will not be in the way Singapore has done because we do not
have the facilities to offer.'
Singapore is providing the United States Navy with repair facilities and
allowing a U.S. Navy logistics detachment of over 100 personnel to be
stationed in Singapore. Alimin's statement came the day following
Malaysia's Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak had also declared Kuala
Lumpur's support for a continued U.S. military presence in the region.
Alimin said "We regard Malaysia's stand as significant and we fully support
Najib's Statement.""1
Brunei can be placed in the group of Southeast Asian countries that
believes that a "security vacuum" will be created if the United States does not
maintain a military presence in the region. It clearly wants the United States,
as a benign power, to act as "security broker" for the region.
Brunei's security interests are now less concerned with insurgency or
protecting its sovereignty from Malaysia or Indonesia, and more concerned
with protecting its maritime assets. China, Indonesia, and Malaysia does not
' "Regionai U.S. Military Presence Supported," Hong Kong AFP, April 30, 1992. Published




pose any threat of invading Brunei, but Chinese claims in the South China
Sea do pose a threat to Brunei's maritime interests. From Brunei's
standpoint, a withdrawal of United States military forces from the region may
lift the deterrent that held back other countries' maritime ambitions in the
Spratly's, which Brunei has little means of countering. This does not
constitute a power vacuum in the geopolitical sense, but from a small
country's perspective like Brunei's, it does appear to be one.
Brunei's shift from counterinsurgency to conventional weapons to protect
maritime interests clearly illustrates its changing national security concerns.
In the post-Cold War era, Brunei is no longer worried with externally
sponsored insurgency. Its ambitions to acquire fixed wing aircraft and
increase the size of its navy show that Brunei's security concerns are now
focused on protecting its maritime interests.
B. INDONESIAN MILITARY CONCERNS
The Indonesian government is one that has always opposed foreign
intervention in the region. It supports the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which was formulated to keep Southeast Asia from
being embroiled in a conflict between the superpowers. Indonesia has viewed
China as the primary threat to the region, and its traditional mistrust of the
Chinese continues (Simon, 1993: 7). In the 1980's, China and Indonesia
gradually improved their relations, and in 1990 Indonesia normalized
diplomatic relations with China. However, China's increase in its naval
capability, especially in its South China Fleet, does pose a potential threat to
an archipelagic state like Indonesia (Stubbs, 1992: 400).
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Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975. The Indonesian government
annexed East Timor because it felt the former Portuguese colony would be a
base for communist insurgency. Insurgency remains active in East Timor and
this presents a security concern for the Indonesian government.
Indonesia is the largest state in Southeast Asia. It covers an area of over
1.9 million square kilometers. Indonesia claims a 200 NM EEZ and a 12 NM
territorial sea, measured from its claimed archipelagic baselines. Indonesia
does not have any claims to the disputed Spratly Islands. However, the
disputed area's EEZs overlap with Indonesia's EEZ at Natuna Island. This
factor is causing Indonesia to focus its security concerns on the protection of
its maritime interests.
Indonesia has no security treaties with the United States. However,
Indonesia has offered to grant access to American military forces.
Indonesia's defense expenditures for 1991 were in the order of $1.7 billion,
which was only two percent of its GDP In absolute terms, only two countries
in Southeast Asia spent more on defense that year. In terms of percent of
GDP, Indonesia had the second lowest defense expenditures of all the ASEAN
states.
Indonesia's available manpower for military service is the largest in all of
Southeast Asia. Indonesia's population between the ages of 15-49 is 51.9
million, of which 30.6 million are fit for military service.' Indonesia's
military consist of 283,000 active duty personnel and a reserve force of 400,000
personnel." The only country in Southeast Asia with more military
"
2Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 159.
"a3Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 231.
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personnel is Thailand with 283,000 active duty personnel and a reserve force
of 500,000 personnel.
Indonesia has the largest navy of all the Southeast Asian states. It is the
only Southeast Asian country that has submarines, and it has twice as many
frigates as Thailand, which has the second largest Southeast Asian navy. Only
Singapore and Vietnam have more attack aircraft than Indonesia, but
Indonesia's number of fighter aircraft ranks fifth in Southeast Asia. The
Indonesian army is tne largest in ASEAN and third largest in Southeast Asia,
behind Vietnam and Burma
Indonesia wants to acquire two more submarines and 19 more frigates.24
Indonesia has agreed to buy naval vessels from the former East German Navy
that will apparently not be disarmed.' The package consists of 16 corvettes,
nine minesweepers, 12 landing ships, and two combat support ships.
Indonesia was considering purchasing 144 Hawk aircraft from British
Aerospace, but the plan was shelved in April 1993 for lack of funds.
Indonesia still has plans to buy 24 more Hawk aircraft for $770 million.16
The Indonesian government believes that a United States presence is
necessary to maintain stability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia wants a U.S.
presence in the Asia-Pacific region but believes the U.S. presence should not
necessarily be in the form of military bases, but should be in the from of
" Jane's Fighting Ships 1992-93 ed. Richard Sharpe (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1992),
p. 282.
"25 Norman Friedman, "World Navies in Review," Proceedings, March 1993, p. 112.
"
2
"Aircraft Deal Cut Back," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 29, 1993, p. 14.
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economic and trade cooperation.27 Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has said the
concept of international security should not be interpreted in a narrow way
form the military and security point of view only. I The Indonesian
government feels that the U.S. presence should be a presence that will
facilitate the establishment and accelerate the transformation of countries in
this region into industrialized ones.2"
Referring to the January 1992 Bush-Goh agreement that allowed United
States air and naval forces extensive access in Singapore for repair, resupply
and training exercises, Admiral Soebidyo said: "We understand the need for
this kind of thing since the presence of American forces, to be quite honest, is
needed to maintain stability in this part of the world."'
Indonesia recognizes that some countries in the region feel that a U.S.
military disengagement from the region would cause a security vacuum.
Foreign Minister Alatas said countries in the region are fearful of the possible
withdrawal of the United States from the region because of the absence of the
Soviet threat and domestic economic problems, and if that happens, there
will be new uncertainty as to which country, China or Japan, will replace the
United States. Indonesians feel this is the reason why there is a strong desire
in this region for a continued United States military presence, because it
would ensure the smooth process of establishing a new political
"2, "Alatas Says Trade Preferred Over U.S. Bases," Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia




2e"What Kind of U.S. Presence Continues To Be Needed in Asia," Kompas, May 1, 1992, p. 4.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, May 26, 1992, pp. 30-31.
30 Ibid.
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configuration. However, the Indonesians feel an American military presence
will be effective only if it is supported by an economic one.,
Even though Indonesia feels a United States presence in the region is
beneficial and the Indonesian Government is allowing United States military
forces access in its country, the Indonesians do not want United States to have
bases in Southeast Asia. The Indonesians, at first, showed apprehension
towards the Bush-Goh agreement. Singapore had not informed Indonesia
before President Bush had made the announcement. On January 6, 1992,
Foreign Minister Alatas stated that the Indonesian government was still
waiting for explanations from Singapore on its agreement with the United
States concerning the establishment of a U.S. Naval Logistics Command in
Singapore.2 He said that this matter should be jointly discussed in accordance
with ASEAN's joint agreement, and along with Malaysia, Indonesia was
waiting for an explanation from Singapore.3 In addition to the Singapore-
U.S. agreement, Malaysia had offered the use of the Royal Malaysian Naval
Base in Lumut as a maintenance and repair depot for U.S. warships two
months earlier. Indonesia thinks that it is ironic that the Southeast Asian
countries which adamantly advocate the creation of a ZOPFAN during the
Cold War, were now offering their territories to the U.S. military.'
3, Ibid.
"3 "Government Awaits Singapore's Explanation on Base," Antara, January 7, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report. Januan, 7, 1992, p. 50.
3 Ibid.
" "Dynamism in the Pacific Region," Suara Peinbaruan, January 14, 1992, p. 2. Translated
and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 24, 1992, pp. 56-57.
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Indonesians initially feared that Singapore's agreement with the United
States was the first step toward a U.S. military base in Singapore. Jakarta
Radio Republik Indonesia aired a broadcast which said:
In accordance with the memorandum of understanding signed in 1990,
ASEAN countries have agreed not to allow their territories to be turned into
foreign military bases. Against this background, it is normal for Indonesia
and Malaysia to have questioned Singapore's decision. While the Singapore
government is trying hard to convince its neighbors that the military
facilities it provides to the U.S. Navy will not lead to the creation of a
military base in that country, it is not clear to what extent its neighbors are
convinced.3"
Foreign Minister Alatas, after being officially informed by Singapore's
ambassador to Indonesia of the matter, said the Singapore-U.S. agreement to
expand the existing U.S. logistic element in Singapore was fully within the
framework of the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1990
between the two countries and is not meant for the establishment of a
military base.' He stated: "The accord is fully within the framework of the
MOU and would not lead to the establishment of a base or the partial
removal of the U.S. base in Subic, the Philippines, to Singapore."'
The Indonesian government does not want a dominant U.S. military
presence in Southeast Asia, but it does want the United States to remained
engaged in the region. Indonesia feels that the United States presence should
""Singapore's Facilities to U.S. Navy Questioned," Jakarta Radio Republic Indonesia
Network, January 10, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January
10, 1992, p. 51.
" "No Base Agreement Established," Antara, January 7, 1992. Published in FBIS East




be more of an economic presence than a military one. Indonesia's security
concerns, with the exception of East Timor, are now focused on maintaining
regional stability to allow countries in the region to develop their economies.
Indonesia recognizes that other countries in the region are fearful of a
power -'icuum and these fears alone could present difficulties that would
affect regional stability. For this reason, it would only prove beneficial for
Indonesia to encourage the U.S. to maintain its presence in the region so that
regional insecurities could be kept to a minimum. Indonesia recognizes that
as long as the U.S. maintains its security agreement with Japan, other
countries will be more at ease about regional security. Also, Indonesia does
perceive China's expansion into the South China Sea as a threat to
Indonesia's maritime interests. The Indonesian navy may be large by
Southeast Asian standards, but it is no match for China's navy or Japan's
MSDF. The United States naval presence can ensure that the SLOCs remain
accessible for regional trade. Indonesia's endeavors to increase its naval
capabilities and its offering of access to the U.S. Navy illustrates that its
security concerns are shifting to the protection of Indonesian maritime
interests, and that it sees the United States military presence as useful, if not
indispensable, in upholding freedom of the seas.
C. MALAYSIAN MILITARY CONCERNS
Since Malaysia gained its independence in 1957, it has concentrated more
of its assets on economic development, than on building a large military
force. Malaysia has a noninterventionist foreign policy and is a strong
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supporter of ASEAN, to promote its economic and national security goals.
Also, Malaysia is the originator of the ZOPFAN for Southeast Asia.
The prominent threat to Malaysia in the post-Cold War era is Chinese
adventurism in Southeast Asian waters. Malaysia has grown very wary of
China's naval expansion and force projection in the South China Sea (Stubbs,
1992: 401). China's territorial claim of all the Spratly Islands conflicts with
Malaysia's claims in the Spratlys. Malaysia currently occupies three islands in
the Spratlys: Mariveles Reef, Swallow Reef, and Ardasier Bank. Malaysia's
interests center on the Spratly Islands' rich mineral and marine resources.
Also, Chinese territorial claims extend into Malaysia's EEZ. Malaysia claims a
12 NM territorial sea, a 200 NM Exclusive fishing zone, and a 200 NM EEZ. It
has an ambitious defense procurement program to enable it to protect its EEZ
and its access to SLOCs (Buszynski, 1992: 842).
Malaysia has three other territorial disputes besides those in the Spratlys.
Malaysia occupies Sipadan and Ligitan, two islands off Sabah which are also
claimed by Indonesia. In 1992, the dispute lead to an increase in naval activity
in the region, but both sides have agreed to study the legal status of the
claims." Malaysia also has a dispute with Singapore over Pedra Branca Island,
and a dispute with the Philippines over Sabah.
Malaysia has no defense treaties or security arrangements with the United
States. However, Malaysia has agreed to allow U.S. military forces accessto
that country.
Malaysia's 1992 defense budget was $2.4 billion, which was five percent of
its GDP Malaysia's defense expenditures were the second largest in ASEAN
"
3Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 162.
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in both absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. Malaysia's Sixth Economic
Plan increased defense spending to 11 percent of the budget, which is a
significant change from the Fifth Plan that limited defense spending to 4.2
percent.39
In terms of personnel, the Malaysian armed forces is the fourth largest in
Southeast Asia with 127,500 on active duty and 44,300 re,-- -v.,. The Royal
Malaysian Navy (RMN) has iour frigates and 37 patrol boats, which makes it
the forth largest naval force among the Southeast Asian countries. The Royal
Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) has 33 attack aircraft and 13 fighter aircraft,
making it the fourth largest air force in the region. The Royal Malaysian
Army (RMA) consists of 105,000 personnel, which is the fifth largest army in
Southeast Asia.
Malaysia's military has been specializing in counterinsurgency for so long
than it will take some time for it to reconfigure its resources to adjust to the
growing maritime threats in the region (Stubbs, 1992: 409). Malaysia is
shifting its emphasis from land warfare to maritime warfare (Simon, 1993:
11). It intends to purchase enough air superiority aircraft to equip two new
squadrons of either Russian MiG-29s, American F-16s and F/A-18s, or French
Mirage 2000s.' In 1992, Malaysia ordered two British frigates, which will be
capable of carrying Exocet anti-ship missiles.4" Also, Malaysia has reached a
3 Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," p. 842.
'0 Ibid.
"Norman Friedman, "World N]avies in Review," Proceedings, March 1993, p. 112.
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tentative agreement Sweden for two submarines.' Malaysia is planning to
build 18 offshore patrol vessels in the next 15 years for EEZ protection.
Like the Indonesians, the Malaysians think the U.S. presence in the region
must be broader than military concerns. Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk
Sri Mohamed Najib Razak has said: "The question of security should not be
viewed from a narrow perspective, such as touching on conflicts, but should
be linked to the question of the well-being as well as the social and economic
development of the region.""
In November 1991, Defense Minister Najib Razak offered the use of the
Royal Malaysian Naval Base in Lumut as a maintenance and repair depot for
U.S. warships. The Defense Minister stated:
We are now waiting for an official reply from the United States Government
as Admiral Larson is expected to convey our offer. However, the offer to use
the Lumut naval base is only for maintenance and repairs. We will not
allow the base to be used for military purposes."
He also stated that his government's offer to the U.S. to use the RMN
facilities at Lumut was a "commercial proposition." He said that the reason
for this offer was to help create jobs and business opportunities, and allow the
RMN to acquire defense technology.4 5
"2Sheldon W. Simon, Regional Issues in Southeast Asian Security. A paper prepared for the
The National Bureau of Asian Research and the Defense Intelligence College Research Support
Program Third Annual Workshop on Asian Politics, Monterey, California, March 1993, p. 11.
"43 "No Major Threat In Sight," New Straits Times, January 21, 1992, p. 10. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, Januaryv 23, 1992, p. 42.
""Minister Offers Base as Depot to U.S. Warships," New Straits Times, November 1, 1991,
p. 12. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 4, 1991, p. 27.
"4 "Lumut Base Offer to U.S. Explained," New Straits Times, December 6, 1991, p. 5.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, December 9, 1991, p. 30.
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After the announcement of the 1992 Bush-Goh agreement, Malaysian
Deputy Foreign Minister Datuk Dr. Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan said that
Malaysia and other ASEAN countries would oppose any attempts to establish
a new United States naval base in Singapore. He said the establishment of
such a naval base runs counter to the ASEAN concept of ZOPFAN.'
-Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed said he did not see the
necessity for an American military base in the region.' Defense Minister
Najib Razak said the leaders of ASEAN object to a strong, direct United States
military presence in Southeast Asia, but they acknowledged a need for a
United States presence in Southeast Asia."8
The Malaysian government objects to a strong U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia and does not subscribe to the power vacuum theory. Defense
Minister Najib Razak has said:
I do not see a change in the political situation. Now, I do not see regional
powers asserting themselves, either."'
The Defense Minister said although Malaysia supported United States
presence in the region, he did not think regional security would be threatened
by a United States withdrawal from the Philippines.' He stated:
" "Vice Minister on New U.S. Base in Singapore," Radio Malaysia Network, January 5,
1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 6, 1992,p. 45.
"Mahathir: U.S. Disrespectful of Others' Rights," Bernama, January 6, 1992. Published
in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 6, 1992, p. 45.
" "No Major Threat In Sight," p. 42.
" "More on Najib's Remarks," Hong Kong AFP, September 11, 1991. Published from FBIS
East Asia Daily Report, September 12, 1991, p. 41.
"s "Bases Facilities Ruled Out," Bernarna, September 12, 1991. Published from FBIS East
Asia Daily Report, September 12, 1Q91, p. 40.
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The Cold War is history. Defense budgets worldwide are shrinking and I
don't think the pull-out, if it happens, will encourage any regional power to
try to fill the vacuum. 1
The Malaysians, along with Indonesia and other ASEAN members, feel
that having an American military presence in the region will defuse any of
Japan's anxiety concerning the protection of its maritime trade routes and
access to the oil in the Gulfs5
Although Malaysia does not want a dominant American military presence
in Southeast Asia, it does want to see the U.S. military remain engaged in the
region. Even though it has no fear of a power vacuum, the Malaysian
government is concerned about a maritime security problem. Malaysia's
program to build up the RMN and the RMAF is an indication that its security
concerns are shifting from counterinsurgency to protection of its maritime
claims, EEZ, and access to the SLOCs.
D. PHILIPPINE MILITARY CONCERNS
The greatest threat to the Philippines' national security in the post-Cold
War era is from insurgency. Post-Cold War emerging trends in regional
security are having limited influence on the Philippine government's
thinking about defense issues because it is preoccupied with its domestic
security problems posed by insurgency (Stubbs, 1992: 398). The rebel forces in
the Philippines are not externally sponsored, but are a result of years of
internal dissent with the Philippine government. This dissent has also
infiltrated the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Reform the
"s, Ibid.
""No Major Threat In Sight," p. 42.
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Armed Forces Movement (RAM) was formed by a group of soldiers who were
adamantly against the increase politicization and the decrease in
professionalism of the AFP during the later part of Marcos administration.
RAM still presents an insurgency problem for the AFP and the Ramas
administration.
The greatest threat to the Philippines is to its claims in the Spratly Islands.
The Philippines occupies the most islands and has the largest military
presence in the disputed area. There are over 1,000 AFP personnel stationed
on the eight Philippine occupied islands. The primary reason the Philippines
is so committed to its claims in the Spratlys and the protection of its EEZ is
economically based. The Philippines has been dependent on imported oil for
about 95 percent of its energy needs, but oil discoveries off of Palawan are
estimated to have reduced the Philippines reliance on imported oil to 85
percent. 3 The Philippines claims a 200 NM EEZ. It is also estimated that the
Philippine's EEZ and its claims in the Spratlys are rich in other mineral and
marine resources. The Philippines is not only taking military steps to protect
its maritime interests in the South China Sea, but it is also using diplomatic
attempts. At the annual ASEAN foreign minister's meeting in July 1992, the
Philippines initiated the "South China Sea Declaration," concerning peaceful
resolution of the Spratly Island conflict.
The Philippines has two formal security arrangements with the United
States: the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty. The MDT was signed in 1951 and is the basis of the United
States' security commitment to the Philippines. Article IV of the treaty states:
Nayan Chanrda, "Treacherouw Shoals," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 13, 1992, p.
16.
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"...each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it
would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional
processes." The 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, ib a
multilateral agreement between Australia, France, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. This treaty commits the United
States to aid the Philippines, within the United States' "constitutional
processes," if Philippines were to come under armed attack.
The U.S. base leases agreement, which was another formal agreement, is
no longer in effect. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate voted to
end the United States' leases. By November 1992, the U.S. had totally
departed from its bases in the Philippines and had withdrawn all of its
military personnel from the country. The loss of the base leases has severely
dampened military relations between the two countries and has resulted in a
significant decrease in U.S. foreign aid to the Philippines.
The Philippines' defense expenditures are only 6.5 percent of its national
budget, which is the smallest among the ASEAN states.' The AFP's budget in
1991 was $915 million, 1.9 percent of the Philippines' GDP. In absolute terms,
the Philippines' defense expenditures are the second lowest in ASEAN, and
as a percentage of GDP it is the lowest in ASEAN.
The AFP consists of 106,500 active duty personnel and 131,000 reservists,
making it the second smallest military in ASEAN. Also, only Singapore and
Brunei have smaller armies and navies than the Philippines, and the only
ASEAN air force smaller than the Philippines' is Brunei's.
•' Sheldon W. Simon, Regional Issues in Southeast Asian Security. p. 12.
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The large decrease of military aid from the United States has severely
hampered Philippine efforts to modernize of its armed forces. However, the
Philippine government has tormulated a ten year modernization plan. In an
effort to protect Filipino interests in its South China Sea EEZ, the Philippine
government wants to acquire six patrol craft, six fast attack missile vessels,
minesweepers, coastguard cutters, Israeli KFIR fighter aircraft, and Czech L-39
air superiority aircraft.' The Philippines has also found aid in the form of
training for its air force. Singapore has offered to provide advance training
for AFP pilo.s in exchange for Singapore's use of the former American Crow
Valley target range in the Philippines.'
After the Philippine Senate rejected the base leases agreement, it appeared
that the Philippine government did not hold much value to its security
alliance with the United States. However, the Philippine government still
values the security alliance. The AFP is in poor condition and the Philippine
government remains greatly dependent on the United States to provide for
Philippine external security. Also, the Philippines relies greatly on any
remaining U.S. military aid for modernization.
The most prominent external threat to the Philippines is an armed
conflict in the Spratlys. There have been several attempts by Filipinos to
convince the United States that it is obligated to defend Philippine claims in
the Spratlys. In April 1992, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul
Manglapus stated that it was the United States' obligation to defend and
protect Philippine ships, which are an extension of Philippine territory. "If
" Leszek Buszynski, "Southea'-t Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," p. 842.
"SeAsia 1993 Yearbook, p. 193.
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the U.S. does not defend our ships, it would be violating the Mutual Defense
Treaty."57 Again, in July 1992, Secretary Manglapus stated that the Philippines
might invoke the MDT to get the United States to help the Philippines in case
a war breaks out in the Spratly Islands. Manglapus held firm in his position
that the United States must help the Philippines in case of a foreign invasion
of the Philippine controlled islands in the Spratlys.'
Philippine Congressman Eduardo Ermita describes his government's
perception of the Spratlys "as a potential flash point in the region, the Spratlys
must now be placed under a two-tiered diplomatic effort, one directed
towards a regional agreement, and the other towards a superpower (U.S.)
agreement."' 9 He added that the Philippines could not realistically invoke the
MDT in bolstering its claim over the Spratlys because the treaty had been
premised on the Cold War.'
The Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary for the Ramos Administration,
Roberto Romulo, said that on January 6, 1979, former United States Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance "reaffirmed" the United States' "obligation to defend"
the Philippines in case of an armed attack. He quoted Vance's promise to the
Foreign Affairs Secretary for the Marcos administration, Carlos P. Romulo: "I
should like to reaffirm our obligation to act to meet the common dangers in
accordance with our constitutional processes in the event of armed attack in
7' "Manglapus: U.S. Must Protect Ships in Spratlys," Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH, April 13, 1992. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, April 14, 1992, p. 34.
""U.S. Defense Pact May Be Invoked Over Spratlys." Published in FBIS East Asia Daily
Report, July 15, 1992, p. 27.
"' "U.S., Japan Urged To Intenene in Spratlvs Issue." Published in FBIS East Asia Daily
Report, July 10, 1992, pp. 23-24.
0 Ibid.
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the Pacific area of the Republic of the Philippines."' Americans feel that the
Vance statement does not mean the same as "obligated to defend."
The Philippine government does feel that a continued U.S. military
presence provides stability in region. It believes that threats do remain
within the region even though Cold War is over. In April 1993, Secretary
Romulo stated:
I am extremely concerned about regional stability. We welcome a U.S.
presence in the region which contributes to that.'2
Filipinos welcomed Washington's decision to transfer forces to Singapore
after the announcement of the Bush-Goh agreement was made.' Secretary
Manglapus said: "The Bush-Goh agreement clearly shows the reality we have
always pointed out, that the present situation in the Southeast Asian region
underscores the need to work cooperatively with the U.S. to better share the
responsibility of promoting stability in the region."" Also, Philippine Defense
Secretary Renato de Villa said the consensus among Southeast Asian leaders
indicates that "while the threat from the Soviet Union has almost
" "Romulo Cites U.S. Pledge To defend Country," Manila Bulletin, November 11, 1992, p. 12.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 12, 1992, p. 48.
"Jose G. Ebro, "Romulo Says U.S. Forces Have Access to Bases," Business World, April 6,
1993, p. 10. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, April 6, 1993, pp. 47-48.
"6 "Manila Welcomes Transfer of U.S. Forces," DWIZ Voice of the Filipino People's Radio,
January 5, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 6, 1992, p.
58.
"Ric Baliao, "Continued Military Pact With U.S. Urged," Manila Bulletin, January 6,
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disappeared, the small countries in the region still need a protective umbrella
because there are still continuing threats to regional security and stability."61
Defense Secretary De Villa has said that despite the United States'
withdrawal, Washington's commitment to maintain its military presence in
the Pacific "continues to provide cover and a sense of security to the entire
region."" Philippine President Fidel Ramos stated that he felt a need for a
continued presence by the United States to maintain stability in the region.
He feels it is important for the U.S. to maintain a credible presence in the
Pacific even without the special bilateral relations that existed between the
Philippines and the United States in the past.' In his speech at the closing
ceremony of the Subic Bay U.S. Naval Base, Ramos Stated: "...From the
welfare of various views on the future of U.S. involvement in regional
affairs, our region of Asia and the Pacific, one consistent reality emerges, and
that is that the member-nations of ASEAN uniformly hold the view that
American power and influence continue to be essential to the preservation of
peace and stability in Asia and pacific region.""
Secretary Romulo best describes the Philippine government's dichotomy
towards the United States military presence in the region. "We welcome an
American presence, not necessarily within the shores of the Philippines, but
"Ibid.
""Ramos Approves 'New Relationship' With U.S.," Hong Kong AFP, October 2, 1992.
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an American presence in the region to make sure there is meaningful balance
in the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific"' In a later statement, Secretary
Romulo said: "although the continued presence of U.S. forces may be
beneficial to the country with respect to providing a stabilizing force in
Southeast Asia, this fact does not automatically translate into allowing the
United States to continue maintaining their bases here in the country."'"
National Security Advisor for the Ramos administration, Jose Almonte, said
the Philippines still considered the United States as an extremely important
factor in East Asian stability, even though Filipinos had rejected the United
States' bases in the Philippines. Almonte also said that the United States is
not only a huge influence, but also a restraint for Japan, Chinese, and North
Korean military ambitions.'1
The Philippine government wants the U.S. to act as a deterrent to
aggression in the region. It wants the U.S. to react with military force when
needed. The Philippine government also has said that it will allow the U.S.
to use Subic if another Gulf War erupts.' Secretary Romulo has stated the
importance the Philippine government holds for the role the United States'
alliance plays in contributing to the security of the region.
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The U.S. military role in the Asia-Pacific region should be one of deterrence
and of participation in United Nations sanctioned action when the need
arises. The U.S. technological edge in 'smart' weapons should be coupled
with the U.S. government assurance that it will act when there is a need to
do so... The U.S. should remain committed in defending the sea lanes in the
Pacific and in the Southeast Asia Lake.'
The Philippine government feels that a strong American military
presence is necessary in Southeast Asia. The Philippines is clearly concerned
that another hegemonic power may attempt to exert its influence in the
region. This is not surprising when considering the Philippines lack of
military ability to protect its national interests.
E. SINGAPOREAN MILITARY CONCERNS
Singapore's security concerns are very similar to those of Brunei. Like
Brunei, Singapore is relatively small compared to its neighbors. Singapore
has a very limited military capability, mostly because it has limited area where
it can base and train military forces. It has looked to the west to provide a
balance of power in the region. Singapore has adopted an anti-communist
foreign policy, but has avoided being involved in conflicts between the major
powers. Singapore's policy of "neutrality" is based on its national interest of
survival (Neher, 1991: chap. 7). ASEAN plays an important role for
Singapore in terms of security.
Singapore's total land area is 622.6 square kilometers, which is about three
times the size of Washington, DC. It is the smallest country in Southeast
Asia. Singapore claims a 12 NM Exclusive fishing zone, a three NM
territorial sea, and no EEZ. Singapore's only territorial dispute is with
"Jose G. Ebro, "Romulo: U.S. Militan' 'Should Remain Committed,"' Business World,
January 19, 1993, p. 1. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 7, 1992, p. 55.
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Malaysia over Pedra Branca Island. The island is 55 kilometers northeast of
Singapore and is little more than a rock with a lighthouse on it. Singapore
has been administering to it for the last 150 years, and Malaysia claims the
island because it is located within Malaysian territorial waters.
Singapore has no formal alliances with the United States, but in January
.1992 President Bush and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong reached an
agreement where in the U.S. Navy's logistic command at Subic Bay would be
moved to Singapore. Also, in 1990 the two countries signed a memorandum
of understanding that made provisions for Singapore to provide facilities for
the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy.
Singapore's defense budget in 1991 was $1.7 billion, which was four
percent of its GDP that year. In absolute terms, Singapore's defense
expenditures were the third largest in Southeast Asia, spending just as much
as Indonesia, but with a fraction of the population. Singapore ranks third in
ASEAN in defense spending as a percentage of GDP.
Oa-ly Laos and Brunei have less available manpower for military service
than Singapore. Singapore's population between the ages of 15-49 is 847,435
people, of which 626,914 are estimated to be fit for military service.7' The
Singaporean military has 55,500 active duty personnel, the third smallest in
Southeast Asia. However, Singapore's has a reserve force of 262,000
personnel. When combining active duty and reserve personnel, Singapore
has the fourth largest military in Southeast Asia.
The only ASEAN navy smaller than Singapore's is Brunei's. The same
holds true for the Singaporean army. However, Singapore's air force has the
"Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 308.
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most attack aircraft and the second most fighter aircraft in Southeast Asia.
Singapore is planning on purchasing another squadron of American F-16s
and upgrading the avionics and other systems on its A-4s.'r
The government of Singapore feels a United States military presence is
vital to stability in the region. It views the United States as a benign power
that plays the leading role in trying to bring about a stable world order,
including Southeast Asia. Singapore believes the American military presence
in the Asia-Pacific region provides a security umbrella that enables nations in
the area to devote a bulk of their resources and energies to economic
development.76
Singapore's Minister of Defense, Yeo Ning Hong, pointed out that one of
the ways with which ASEAN must respond to the end of the Cold War is that
it must help the United States to remain in the region. Yeo said a sharp U.S.
military pullout from the Asia-Pacific may compel Japan to rearm. This
could prompt the Chinese and Koreans to rearm, which would cause a chain
reaction of destabilization in the region.'
Singapore's Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, said the United States must
stay engaged in the Asia-Pacific to secure its own interests in the region. He
warned that there was a danger of slower growth and the rise of militarism
among the bigger players, such as Japan and China, if the United States was
71 Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," p. 842.
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cut off from the region.' Wong stated: "The inescapable conclusion is no
alternative balance in the Asia-Pacific can be as comfortable as the present one
with the U.S. as the major player."7' He also warned that the United States'
withdrawal of its security umbrella or Japan's loss of confidence in it could
trigger an East Asian arms race.
Defense Minister Yeo has said that a continued United States military
presence in the Asia-Pacific region was vital to maintain stability while a new
regional order evolved, and any sharp reduction in U.S. military presence
would be interpreted as a weakening of United States' commitment.' He
said:
...with the Cold War over, the challenge in the Asia-Pacific was to maintain
stability and a measure of predictability while a new regional order
evolved... Ultimately, U.S. leaders must convince Americans that a weak
U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific is not in the interest of the Americans
themselves, both strategic and economic... Japan, with its new economic
superpower status, naturally aspired to play a greater international political
role, thus arousing some nervousness among its neighbors, in particular
China and Korea.8"
The Singaporean government believes that an absence of United States
forces from the region would create a "power vacuum" in Southeast Asia.
Singapore's Minister of Information and Arts, Brigadier General George Yeo
Yong Boon, said a sharp pull-back of United States military forces from Asia
would result in Japan being forced to rearm, China and Korea would oppose
""Minister Urges U.S. to 'Stay Engaged' in Asia," The Straits 7imes, October 2, 1992, p. 13.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, October 5, 1992, pp. 18-19.
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Japan, and a whole chain reaction of destabilization would be triggered in the
region.'2 Defense Minister Yeo stated:
... any sharp and significant withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from
the region would create a vacuum that a number of other regional powers
would seek to fill, and fill very rapidly. Japan is one country that will
obviously be very concerned if the U.S. were to quietly pull out in large
numbers.'
Yeo said a severe strain in the Japan-United States defense relationship would
spark a region-wide concern over how Japan would seek to ensure its security.
This would cause great concern in China, on the Korean peninsula, and
Russia."
Defense Minister Yeo has said increased defense expenditures and
procurements by the ASEAN countries does not constitute participation in a
regional arms race. However, he did say that if an arms race was to be
avoided, the Clinton Administration should remain committed to
maintaining a strong U.S. military presence. Yeo said ASEAN members are
concerned over the prospect of U.S. isolationism and China's power
projection in the South China Sea.i
Although the Singaporean government has allowed U.S. forces to be
stationed in the republic, it does not want a U.S. military base in Singapore.
Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, has said he has ruled out the
""2,"Continued U.S. Presence in Asia Sought," Bernama, January 16, 1992. Published in FBIS
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possibility of setting up a United States military base in Singapore, and the
American presence in Singapore would be limited to a naval logistics
element within the terms of the 1990 memorandum of understanding."
Singapore does feel that a United States military presence is necessary to
provide stability in the region, and it is very fearful of a "power vacuum."
However, Singapore's policy strategy is one of survival and it sees the United
States as a benign power willing to ensure Singapore's protection. Singapore
has no maritime concerns in protecting an EEZ, but its survival economically
and as a nation-state is dependent on access to SLOCs. Singapore has very
little natural resources and has no capability of being an autarky. Also,
Singapore is extremely concerned with the United States' security agreement
with Japan. Singapore believes that the agreement is vital to stability in the
region.
F. THAI MILITARY CONCERNS
During the Cold War, Thailand's major regional threat was Vietnam, but
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has taken away
Vietnam's economic and military backing, making it very weak. Thailand
does not perceive China as a security threat because Thailand has no
conflicting territorial or maritime claims with China, and both countries
have had an implied alliance against Vietnamese expansionism in recent
history (Simon, 1993: 10). As a result of Thai army helping China supply the
Khmer Rouge during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, Beijing and
Bangkok have built strong ties (Stubbs, 1992: 401). Even though Thailand has
""U.S. Military Facilities in Singapore," Utusan Malaysia, January 6, 1992, p. 47.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 27, 1992, p. 47.
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not specifically identified India as a security threat, Thailand's security
concerns are focused on building its defenses westward, specifically giving the
Thai navy greater emphasis (Simon, 1993: 10).
The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia has had its side
affects on Thai security concerns, causing a resurgence of Khmer Rouge
.guerrilla activity on the Thai-Cambodian border. This has made the border
region one of the Thai military's top concern (Stubbs, 1992: 399; Suchit, 1993:
223). Of the ASEAN states, Thailand's borders are the most vulnerable. Its
has a 1,125 mile border with Burma; a 502 mile border with Cambodia; a 1,096
mile border with Laos; and 316 mile border with Malaysia. Thailand has an
unresolved boundary dispute with Laos and Burma. Thailand is preoccupied
with settling its border dispute with Laos, and instability on its Cambodian
border (Stubbs, 1992: 401).
In the post-Cold War period, Thailand has adjusted its foreign policy to
lessen its security dependence on the United States. As Cold War
considerations decreased, so did Thai security concerns, diminishing the
importance of U.S. security contributions to Thailand (Neher, 1991: chap. 3).
Thailand and the United States do have a formal security agreement that
was established during the Cold War. The 1954 Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty is a multilateral agreement between Australia, France, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. This treaty
commits the United States to aid Thailand, within the United States'
"constitutional processes," if Thailand were to come under armed attack. In
1962, the United States and Thailand issued the Rusk-Thanat Communique
which stated that in the event of communist aggression against Thailand, the
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U.S. would invoke the treatN without waiting for the other members of the
pact to reach an agreement.
Thailand's 1992 military budget was $2.7 billion, which was three percent
of its GDP. This was the ASEAN's largest military budget in absolute terms,
but it ranked third as a percentage of GDP.
Of the Southeast Asian military forces, Thailand's is second only to
Vietnam's in the number of military personnel. The Thai military has
283,000 people on active duty and 500,000 reservists. The Royal Thai Army is
the fourth largest in the region with 190,000 soldiers. The Royal Thai Navy is
the second strongest in Southeast Asia. It has eight frigates and 65 patrol
vessels. The Royal Thai Air Force has 22 attack aircraft and 38 fighter aircraft,
which ranks fifth in Southeast Asia.
Thailand is showing increasing green water ambitions by recently
acquiring six Chinese frigates and it is planning to obtain a Spanish built
aircraft carrier capable of supporting AV-8 Harriers." The Thai navy as taken
the prominent role away front the Thai army as Thailand has shifted its
interests away from Indochina (Simon, 1993: 10). Thailand is also planning to
upgrade its air capabilities. It is intending to purchase an additional squadron
of American F-16s," and the Thai air force is hoping to buy tankers capable of
in-flight refueling to extend the range of its F-16s. Thailand has also signed a
$680 million order for three E-2C air-early warning aircraft."'
Sheldon W. Simon, Regional Issuws in Southeast Asian Security. p. 10.
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The Thai government has mixed feelings concerning the United States
military presence providing stability for the region. Thai Foreign Ministry
spokesman Sakthip Krairock said:
Thailand use to want the U.S. to keep its bases in the neighboring countries,
for example in the Philippines. But now it cannot say what it wants as the
world situation has already changed, including the political development in
the Soviet Union.'
Referring to the United States' departure from its military bases in the
Philippines, Sakthip said: "To move the U.S. bases here would be very
difficult as the Thai people would not accept it.""
In March 1992, the Thai Foreign Ministry made it be known that it felt the
U.S. security umbrella is both unnecessary and an illusion. The Ministry
believes Thailand is not under threat from its neighbors, particularly
Vietnam, both because of the end of the Cold War and because Vietnam is
economically in no position to fight. The Ministry also mentions that when
there was intense, fighting along the Cambodian border, Thailand asked for
United States military assistance, which was rejected by Washington.
However, the Thai military believes the United States security assistance
should still be sought and that it could be forthcoming in times of genuine
need .2
"""Bases Said To Be Manila's Affair," The Nation, September 17,1991, p Al. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, September 17, 1991, p. 57.
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Former Thai Foreign Minister Asa Sarasin has said that the problem of
threats in the region no longer exists.' Thai National Security Council
Secretary Suwit Suthanukun said it would be "most unlikely" that the Thai
government would allow United States military bases to be set up in
Thailand.' His statement was in reference to the Philippine Senate's
rejection of the Philippine-United States Bases Treaty. Suwit said that his
country would not offer its territory as a base for foreign military forces under
any circumstances. He said: "The world is fighting only economic wars."5
Thailand will allow United States military forces to use facilities in
Thailand for refueling and "rest and relaxation." Foreign Minister Asa said:
"A military base must not be established in Thailand and our country will
never allow that to happen. "" In the same statement he did say, however,
that it would be no problem to allow the U.S. military refuel in Thailand.'
The Thai Foreign and Commerce Ministries felt that the end of the Cold War
and the increase in trade pressure from Washington justified serious
adjustments of the Thai-United States relationship. They reasoned that a
bargaining chip they could use might be that if the United States continued its
aggression on trade issues, Thailand could show reluctance to grant the
Americans access to military facilities, and this could be done without
" "Foreign Minister on U.S. Base in Singapore," Bangkok Radio Thailand Network, January
9, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 9, 1992, p. 58.
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damaging Thailand's own security interests because they felt the U.S. would
probably not help if Thailand were attacked by a neighbor."
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai said he expected the Clinton
administration to pursue close ties with Asia and the Pacific, support for
democracy, domestic economic recovery and support for free trade. Chuan
waits to see the United States maintain its close political, economic and
military ties with countries in Asia and the Pacific." Thai Defense Minister
General Wichit Sukmak said he believes the change in the United States'
Presidential leadership would not have much impact on Thailand's Armed
Forces because Thailand and the United States have exchanged cooperation
and assistance for a long time.""• He said:
The United States has t)een assisting Thailand in national development, in
training of personnel, and in other forms, especially in development of the
Armed Forces. We have benefited from U.S. cooperation and assistance for a
long time... I don't think Thailand will be affected much by any problems in
the United States.'0 1
The end of the Cold War has brought about changes in Thai security
concerns. Its most prominent threat, Vietnam, seems to be less capable of
infringing on Thailand's national interests. Even so, Thailand is still
"*. "Ministries Want To 'Restructure' U.S. Ties," Bangkok Post, March 10, 1992, p. 4.
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concentrating on maintaining a strong defense to protect it from potential
threats from the Indian Ocean and East Asia.
G. BURMESE MILITAKY CONCERNS
Burma is being ruled by a military government called the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which is insecure about its own security
and legitimacy. The martial law government faces potential threats from
outside its borders and real threats from within. The government's primary
security concern is ethnic insurgency. Burma also is geographically situated
between countries that have much greater military capabilities. It is
surrounded by India, China, and Thailand. Burmese-Thai relations have
always been strained because of their history of conflict with one another.
China has supported Burma's rebels in the past. The Indian government
denounced the Burmese gover.iment's massacre of pro-democracy
demonstrators in 1988, and India openly supports the opposition movement
in Burma. Due to its vulnerability, Rangoon has adopted a foreign policy of
nonalignment that has transformed into isolationism (Neher, 1991: chap. 9).
Burma's military expenditures for 1991 were $1.28 billion. It was the third
lowest military budget in Southeast Asia, ahead of Brunei's and the
Philippines' defense budget. However, Burma's defense expenditures were 35
percent of its national budget, the largest in East Asia.
Burma's active duty military force is the second largest in Southeast Asia,
but Burma does not have a reserve force. Overall, Burma has the fifth largest
military in Southeast Asia. Burma's army consists of 265,000 soldiers. It is the
second largest army in Southeast Asia. The Burmese navy has no frigates or
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submarines, but it does have 2 corvettes and 58 patrol boats. The Burmese air
force consists of 12 fighter aircraft and 10 armed helicopters.
Burma has had ethnic insurgencies since it gained its independence from
Britain in 1948. There are non-Burmese ethnic groups that want autonomy
from the Burmese government because they do not feel they belong to the
Burmese nation-state. When China and Burma signed a border trade
agreement in 1988, China ceased supporting insurgencies in Burma. The first
rebel faction to be effected by this was the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
After being cut off from Chinese supplies, the CPB was forced into a truce
with Rangoon. Rangoon agreed to supply the CPB with food, gasoline and
kerosene in exchange for a ceasefire. The CPB broke up into four ethnic
armies after a mutiny erupted against the CPB's aging Maoist leaders.
Rangoon allowed the four groups to keep their weapons and their control
over their respective areas.
The arrangement between Rangoon and the CPB became a design for
future negotiations with other Burmese rebels. Rangoon has made similar
deals with the Shan State Army, the Pa-O National Army, the Palaung State
Liberation Army, and the 4th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA). The other three brigades of the KIA are under great pressure from
China to negotiate with Rangoon. The KIA controls most of the countryside
of north Kachin.'"
A collective organization exists in that represents twenty ethnic rebel
armies and underground groups. It is called the Democratic Alliance of
Burma (DAB). It has been Rangoon's policy not to negotiate with DAB since
1
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1988. Some rebel groups, such as the Karen National Union (KNU), refuse to
recognize individual agreements made outside of DAB. Rangoon has been
able to make progress in negotiations without going through DAB. In
February 1993, secret peace talks were conducted between Rangoon and the
Kachins. These talks were held in Myitkyina, the Kachin state capital. The
Kachins has asked for a nationwide ceasefire and that follow on negotiations
include other rebel groups."
Burma is ruled by an authoritarian military government which represses
its people. SLORC's military concerns are centered around keeping its
autocratic government in power. Its military is primarily designed for
counterinsurgency. SLORC is determined to keep the United States and the
United Nations from interfering in Burmese internal affairs. In May 1989,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan criticized SLORC's intensified offensive
against the Karen rebels. He issued a statement urging international
mediation to halt what he referred to as a civil war. The Burmese
government objected to Senator Moynihan calling Burma's insurgency a civil
war, and made it clear it thought the United States had no grounds to
interfere in the internal affairs of Burma."W Similarly, Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher's proposal to provide funds to aid to fleeing Burmese students
was interpreted by SLORC as an attempt by the United States to aid Burma's
insurgents."°
",'Burmese Maze," Far E.-sterv Economic Review, March 18, 1993, p. 9.
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China's ties with Burma are growing increasingly stronger. In 1989, China
and Burma signed a $1.2-1.4 billion arms deal. In October 1992, Chinese
engineers completed a bridge over the Shweli River on the Sino-Burmese
border. This bridge has been primarily used to transfer light infantry
weapons, mortars and rocket launchers from China to Burma. China is also
planning on improving northern Burma's infrastructure. China's interests
in Burma have shifted from supporting rebels against the Burmese
government to gaining control over SLORC through economic, military, and
political means."
The U.S. military presence is not welcomed by the Burmese government
because it does not want interference from the United States in the region.
Burma has accused the United States Navy operating in the Andal an Sea of
intruding into Burmese territorial waters with the objective of blatant
interference in the internal affairs of Burma."°
H. CAMBODIAN MILITARY CONCERNS
Cambodia is struggling to survive as a nation-state. It is the weakest state
in Southeast Asia. The current conflict in Cambodia can be traced back to the
1960's, during the Vietnam war. Cambodia's head of state, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, allowed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces to enter
Cambodia, against the advice of the Cambodian army. The Vietnamese
presence became so great that it occupied almost one quarter of the
We Bertil Linter, "Rangoon's Rubicon: Infrastructure aid tightens Peking's Control," Far
Eastern Economic Review, Februar\ 11, 1993, p. 28.
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Cambodian territory." When Sihanouk traveled to Moscow in 1970, he was
ousted by the Cambodian National Assembly and replaced by General Lon
Nol. The Lon Nol regime was incapable of expelling the Vietnamese and
incapable of governing the country. The exiled Sihanouk supported rebels
that opposed the Lon Nol government, and Cambodia fell into civil war.
The Khmer Rouge, a nationalist group, overturned the Lon Nol
government. The leader of one of the Khmer factions, Pol Pot, became the
leader of Cambodia. He was an authoritarian who ran the country with
brutal policies. Pol Pot attempted to purify Cambodia for socialism by
executing, starving, or working to death many Cambodians. In December
1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge fled to the
Cambodian mountains. Vietnam began its occupation of Cambodia, and the
Vietnamese-installed Cambodian government was constantly fighting Khmer
Rouge forces.
Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. In 1990, the U.N.
Security Council agreed to allow the transfer of temporary control of
Cambodia to the U.N. in an attempt to end the civil war. In this transitional
period Cambodia is represented by a Supreme National Council (SNC), with
the four Cambodian factions having equal representation. The four factions
are the Khmer Rouge (KR), State of Cambodia (SOC), Khmer People's
National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the United National Front for an
Independent, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).
"'Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 178.
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An election for Cambodia was held in May 1993. FUNCINPEC won the
majority of the votes for the 120 member constituent assembly. This elected
government is planned to replace the SNC and UNTAC by the end of 1993.
Cambodia is being torn in shreds by its civil war. Until Cambodia can
resolve its internal conflict and establish a functional government that
represents the entire state, it will be difficult to determine the official
Cambodian stance on U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It is
doubtful that Cambodian leaders have given much thought to regional or
global power vacuums when their own state is experiencing internal security
vacuums. It is safe to say that the Cambodian factions, with the possible
exception of the Khmer Rouge, want the United States to continue its support
of the U.N.'s peace efforts in Cambodia.
I. LAOTIAN MILITARY CONCERNS
Laos is a weak state, both economically and militarily. The Laotian
government has been further weakened by the fact that it has lost its
economic and military support from the Soviet Union and Vietnam
(Johnson, 1993). China, the strongest remaining communist country, seems
reluctant to replace the Soviet Union as the protector of communism in
Laos." Laos' most pressing security concern is not external, but internal. The
Laotian government has had an insurgency problem from the Hmong
highlanders since the communists took control of the government in 1975.
However, the Hmong only present a rural security problem and do not
threaten the continued rule of the party (Johnson, 1993: 79). The Laotian
'10 9Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 153.
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government believes that the Hmong may be Thai supported. Also, during
the Vietnam War the United States supported the Hmong rebels and some
Hmong are U.S. citizens.
The United States poses a threat to the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary
Party (LPRP). The LPRP sees the United States as the world leader in the
movement to overthrow the remaining socialist countries (Johnson, 1993:
81). The United States has a history of intervening in Laotian political arena
on the side of the right-wing. In the 1950's, the United States went so far as to
sponsor a coup against the Laotian head-of-state, because he was too much of
a "neutralist.'"10
Laos also has a border dispute with Thailand that has resulted in an
ongoing military stand-off between the two countries. This dispute included
a three month war between Laos and Thailand in 1988. The tensions have
greatly eased since 1991 when Thai officials proposed that both sides withdraw
troops from the disputed area. Laotiat-r still fear that Thailand, with its
history of aggression against its smaller neighbors, might attempt to decimate
Laos (Neher, 1991: 207).
In Southeast Asia, only Brunei has less available manpower that is fit for
military service. Laos's population between the ages of 15-49 is 946,289, of
which 509,931 are fit for military service. The actual size of the Lao military is
37,000 personnel, the second smallest in Southeast Asia. The Lao People's
Army (LPA) has 33,000 soldiers and the air force has 29 MiG-21s. Most of the
military hardware in Laos is from the Eastern Bloc. Laos has lost the support
of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, so Laos' military equipment is most
"1 Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, p. 198.
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likely suffering from lack of spare parts and poor maintenance. China does
provide Laos with some military assistance.
The Lao government does not want a United States military presence
anywhere in Southeast Asia. It feels the U.S. presence does not bring stability
to the region. Laotians feel that the United States' military presence in
Southeast Asia is an obstruction in the path that would bring peace and
stability to the region."' Laos does not want the United States to play the role
of policeman in the region. In fact, the Lao government questions the true
motive behind the United States' presence in Southeast. Laotians believe that
the Americans have been using Southeast Asia as a "springboard" to defend
the United States' national interests and to suppress the people of Laos,
Vietnam, and Cambodia.",
J. VIETNAMESE MILITARY CONCERNS
The communist government of Vietnam is being drawn towards ASEAN
because both ASEAN and Vietnam are defending against threat of Chinese
expansionism in the South China Sea (Simon, 1993: 14). Vietnam's major
security threat comes from China. China and Vietnam have a disputed
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, and China invaded and still
occupies the Vietnamese claimed Paracel Islands. The largest threat to
Vietnamese interests is posed by Chinese expansionism in the Spratly Islands.
Vietnamese claims in the Spratlys could provide this country with a source of
"' "Southeast Asia-the Path to Establishment of Lasting Security," Vientiane Domestic
Service, November 14, 1989. Transiited and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report,
November 15, 1989, pp. 4041.
1,2 Ibid.
51
off-shore oil. Vietnam currently occupies twenty of the Spratly Islands, most
of which are little more than surfaced reefs.
In 1988, China took control of six Vietnamese islands in the Spratlys and
sunk three Vietnamese transport ships in the process. Since then China has
been fortifying its military presence on the islands. In February 1992, the
Chinese National Assembly passed a law that stated that all the Spratly
Islands were Chinese territory. In June China signed a contract with Crestone
Energy Corporation, a U.S. company, for oil exploration in the area of the
Spratly Islands that is claimed by Vietnam. In July Chinese military forces
occupied another of the Vietnamese claimed islands in the Spratlys. Chinese
patrol boats had also been intercepting Vietnamese cargo vessels leaving
Hong Kong. Vietnam charged China with stepping up pressure on the
smaller Southeast Asian countries because the Soviet and United States naval
presence in the region has greatly diminished."3 The decrease in aid from the
Soviet Union to Vietnam has made Vietnam very vulnerable to Chinese
aggression (Neher, 1991: chap. 10).
Vietnam's domination of Indochina has dissipated. Cambodia and Laos
have been the cornerstones of Vietnamese security policy, but in the post-Cold
War period their importance to Vietnamese security has diminished (Avery,
1993: 73). Vietnam's national interests are moving away from subregional
domination, and toward its own economic prosperity.
Vietnam's defense expenditures in 1992 were 4.4 percent of its GDP and 16
percent of its national budget. Compared to other Southeast Asian countries,
"1 Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 222.
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Vietnam ranks third in defense spending as a percentage of its national
budget, and ranks forth in defense spending as a percentage of GDP
Vietnam has the largest military in Southeast Asia. It consists of 857,000
active duty personnel. The next largest military in Southeast Asia is
Thailand's, which consists of 283,000 active duty personnel and 500,000
reservist. Vietnam has the third largest navy in Southeast Asia, consisting of
7 frigates and 55 patrol boats The Vietnamese air force has 60 attack aircraft
and 125 fighter aircraft, making it the largest air force in Southeast Asia.
However, the aircraft in this air force are made up older Soviet made planes
that require considerable maintenance. A democratic Russia has little interest
in supporting Vietnam militarily, so it is probable that the Vietnamese navy
and air force are deteriorating due to lack of maintenance and spare parts
(Simon, 1993: 8). The Vietnamese army, with 700,000 soldiers, is the largest in
Southeast Asia. The next largest army in Southeast Asia is Burma's 265,000
personnel army.
The Vietnamese government does not want a U.S. military base in
Southeast Asia. In September 1991, the Vietnamese government stated that it
opposed the renewal of the lease on the United States military base at Subic
Bay."' A Vietnamese official said; "Whatever the result of the upcoming
vote, the political climate.. .ir the region and in the world has created a
situation that is not favorable to maintaining or reinforcing the U.S. military
presence in the country.0f1 •
""'Daily Opposes U.S. Forces in Philippines," Hong Kong AFP, September 13, 1991.




Most Southeast Asian security concerns are now linked to maritime
considerations such as SLOC and EEZ protection. The shift from
counterinsurgency to conventional weapons to protect maritime interests
shows that externally sponsored communist insurgency is a minimal concern
to the Southeast Asian states, and the protection of maritime interests is
becoming a priority.
Although countries in the region are generally calling for a reduced
presence of U.S. military forces, they still feel that the United States should
remained engaged in East Asia. By maintaining a military presence, the
United States may alleviate any suspicions and fears of a regional hegemon
appearing. In this context, many Southeast Asian countries feel that the
United States' security agreement with Japan is vital to stability in the region.
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MI. ECONOMIC CONCERNS
American security policy makers are assuming that the United States'
economic involvement in Southeast Asia enhances United States influence
in the region. These policy makers hold the view that East Asian countries
are very dependent on access to the American market for their export
oriented economies. It is true that in the 1970s and 1980s the East Asians
benefited from American investment to build their own economies. In the
1990s however, states in the region have become less dependent on the
American market and Americans have become more dependent on East
Asian markets (Bosworth, 1993). East Asians continually look to each other
for growing proportions of their markets. The United States' friends and
allies in Southeast Asia are not bound to the United States by economic ties
alone. The United States is becoming a relatively small player in intra-Asian
trade and investment (Oxnam, 1993: 60). The shortcoming of national
security policy is that the current United States' security strategy in East Asia
does not fully integrate economic policy (Ellings and Olsen, 1992: 127).
Another security assumption made by American policy makers is that
nondemocratic regimes are incompatible with market economies. American
strategists believe political pluralism is eventually the partner of market
economies and economic growth tends to promote democratization, and
sustained economic reform is not possible without political pluralism (Baker,
1991: 8). If one were to examine the civil rights records of our friends and
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allies in the East Asian region and then compare that to the economic
achievements of those countries, it would become apparent that political
pluralism and economic reform may not be so closely bound together.
A. BRUNEIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Brunei has an entrepreneurial based market economy. Its natural
resources are crude oil, natural gas and timber, and its economy is almost
totally supported by its export of oil and natural gas. Oil and gas accounts for
over 50 percent of the Brunei's GDP"6 Brunei has a labor force of only 89,000
people, including the military. Its major industries are petroleum, petroleum
refining, liquefied natural gas, and construction.
Brunei's GDP is the smallest in ASEAN and ranks third lowest in all of
Southeast Asia. Brunei's GDP real growth rate was approximately five
percent in 1990, which was the seventh largest in Southeast Asia. However,
Brunei has the highest per capita income in all of Southeast Asia, and in 1990
it had a $500 million trade surplus. Also, Brunei's foreign reserve holdings of
$27 billion is the second largest in Southeast Asia."7
Brunei's 1990 exports were estimated to be $2.2 billion of crude oil,
liquefied natural gas and petroleum products. Japan accounted for 53 percent
of Brunei's exports in 1990; Britain 12 percent; South Korea nine percent;
Thailand seven percent; and Singapore five percent. Brunei imported
approximately $1.7 billion of machinery, transportation equipment,
"'Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 51.
"' All economic data presented in this thesis was compiled from Regional Outlook:
Southeast Asia 1993-94 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); the CIA The
World Factbook 1992; and the Asia 1993 Yearbook.
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manufactured goods, food, and chemicals in 1990. Singapore accounted for 35
percent of Brunei's imports; Britain 26 percent; Switzerland nine percent; the
United States nine percent; and Japan five percent.
Brunei is a country dependent on exports of oil and gas. These natural
resources are estimated last for another 20-25 years. Brunei's stated goal is to
become less dependent on its oil exports by diversifying its economy. The
government announced its Sixth National Development plan in mid-1992.
This plan calls for establishing industrial projects to develop a manufacturing
base and developing the agricultural, fishing and fisheries sector.
Brunei has integrated its economic policy with its national security policy.
The country's wealth is used as an instrument of foreign policy to buy
political influence, such as providing foreign aid in return for being allowed
to acquire sophisticated weaponry (Menon, 1989: 199). Brunei's strategy is to
build diplomatic links and participate in ASEAN to attract f' lure foreign
investment (Neher, 1991: 138).
Democracy does not exist in Brunei (Neher, 1991: 135). Its government is a
constitutional sultanate, which is an absolute monarchy. The sultan is
supreme; he can integrate policies as he sees fit. Since Brunei gained its
independence from Britain in 1984, all provisions of its constitution have
been banned. Brunei's legal system is based on Islamic Law. The political
parties in Brunei are the Brunei United National Party, which is inactive, and
the Brunei National Democratic Party, which has been banned. The last
legislative election in Brunei was held in 1962. However, Brunei is second
only to Japan in per capita income in all of East Asia. Even though the
monarchy guarantees its people no civil rights what so ever, it remains
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determined to provide a comfortable life for its people. The government
provides all medical services and subsidized food and housing for the
populace.
U.S. economic involvement in Southeast Asia has little affect on Brunei.
The United States' imports from Brunei are minimal, accounting for only
.nine percent of all Brunei's exports. The United States' economic
involvement with Brunei does little to enhance U.S. influence in the region,
and Brunei is not economically bound to the the United States.
Brunei, as one of the United States' "friends" in Southeast Asia, has a
government that runs counter to U.S. ideals for the region. Its has no
political pluralism whatsoever, but yet it has the largest per capita income in
Southeast Asia. It should be pointed out that Brunei is growing increasingly
closer to the Philippines, and American ideas of civil rights are filtering into
Bruncli through the Filipinos. Brunei contradicts the U.S. policy makers'
assumption that political pluralism and economic reform are closely bound
together.
B. INDONESIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Indonesia's has a market economy with some degree of government
planning, but the government has recently placed an emphasis on
deregulation and private enterprise."'l Indonesia's natural resources are crude
oil, tin, natural gas, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal, gold, and
silver. It has a labor force of 67 million people. Indonesia's major industries
"aCentral Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 158.
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are petroleum, textiles, mining, cement, chemical fertilizers, plywood, food
and rubber.
Indonesia's 1991 GDP of $116.16 billion was the largest in Southeast Asia.
Its 6.8 percent GDP real growth rate in 1991 was the third largest in Southeast
Asia. Indonesia's 1991 GDP was down from its 7.4 percent growth in 1990, but
its average over the last three years is 7.1 percent. Indonesia had the fifth
largest Southeast Asian per capita income in 1991.
In 1990, Indonesia's exported $25.7 billion in goods: 40 percent in
petroleum and liquefied natural gas; 15 percent in timber; seven percent in
textiles; five percent in rubber; and three percent in coffee. The Japanese
market accounted for 40 percent of these exports; the United States 14 percent;
Singapore seven percent; and the European market accounted for 16 percent.
Indonesia's export performance is determined to a large extent by the
economies of Japan, the United States, and the European Community (EC)."'
Indonesia's 1990 imports totaled $21.8 billion in goods and services: 39
percent in machinery; 19 percent in chemical products; and 16 percent in
manufactured goods. Japan accounted for 23 percent of Indonesia's imports
and the United States 13 percent.
Japanese new foreign investment in Indonesia in 1991 totaled $929
million, which accounted for 10.6 percent of Indonesia's foreign investment.
American new foreign investment in Indonesia in 1991 totaled $276 million,
which accounted for 3.1 percent of Indonesia's foreign investment.
President Sukarno, the first leader of Indonesia, developed a
"revolutionary" economic system that was isolationist and was manipulated
"'United States National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, Pacific Economic
Economic Outlook 1992-93 (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 1992), p. 26.
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to meet ideological goals. Indonesia's second and current leader, President
Suharto, replaced this economic system with a more rational economic
system so that economic developr.kent would become the "yardstick" by
which the legitimacy of his regime would be measured (Neher, 1991: 95).
Suharto's ambitions are to to diversify Indonesia's economy away from its
dependence on oil exports and develop a strong manufacturing base.
In the 1980's, Indonesia changed its economic policy from import
substitution to an export based policy that promoted foreign investment in
Indonesia. In the past, Indonesia has imposed stiff restrictions on all foreign
investors. The Indonesian government's move in April 1991, to allow 100
percent foreign-owned operations to be set up in Indonesia signifies that it is
adjusting to the fact that Indonesia can not continue to rely so heavily on its
cheap labor force to attract overseas capital (MacIntyre, 1993: 208). The
government's ease in foreign investment regulations applies to projects
valued above $50 million and to those in designated areas in eastern
Indonesia.
One of Indonesia's economic goals is to reduce its national debt. In
September 1992, Indonesia's former Finance Minister Ali Wardhana
estimated his countries foreign debt to be $78 billion."2 ' Private commercial
loans are the fastest growing segment, making up approximately 30 percent of
the debt. The Indonesian government has formed the Commercial Overseas
Loan Team to regulate state enterprises' foreign borrowing. Japan provides
120 Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 134.
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about 75 percent of Indonesia's offshore borrowing, and Singapore is another
major source of funds for Indonesia."2'
A major problem facing Indonesia is its infrastructure. Its infrastructure is
not developing fast enough to keep up with the economy. There is a shortage
of electrical power grids and telecommunication networks that is hampering
.the growth of Indonesia's industrial base.
The government of Indonesia is more authoritarian than it is democratic.
It is a country seeking to balance an open political and economic society with
the advantages of an authoritarian system. Indonesia is an example of a
country whose economic performance is greatly responsible for its regime's
legitimacy (Neher, 1991; chap. 5).
Indonesia has a significant human rights problem. The most recent
incident occurred on November 12, 1991, in Dili, the capital of East Timor.
Indonesian troops fired upon separatist demonstrators. Indonesia annexed
East Timor in 1976, and the United Nations, many Western countries, and
East Timorese do not recognize Indonesia as East Timors' administrator.
President Suharto's own investigation commission stated that the soldiers
had killed 50 demonstrators, injured 91, and 90 people are still missing. Trials
for East Timorese demonstrators were held throughout 1992, with sentences
ranging from six months to life. Jakarta has taken a stand that it will refuse
any foreign aid that is tied to human rights. This is meant to send a message
to Westerners that aid will not be used as a "tool of pressure" on human
rights, and for them not to sit in judgment of Indonesia's domestic policies."
• Henny Sender, "New Boy's Challenge," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 1, 1993, p.
73.
"2 Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 132.
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The Indonesian government believes that a United States military
presence is necessary to maintain stability in Southeast Asia, but believes
more that the U.S. presence should be in the form of economic and trade
cooperation. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has stated that his
government's view of international security is now often influenced by
economic, social, and ecological issues." Foreign Minister Alatas stated that
the region prefers to see a U S. presence in Southeast Asia in the form of
economic cooperation, trade. investment, and the transfer of technology.
Indonesians feel that the American military presence in the region will be
ineffective if it is not supported by an American economic presence. The
Indonesian government wants an American presence that will assist the
Southeast Asian countries to transform into NICs. Foreign Minister Alatas
has stated that the United States presence is needed in the region to help
facilitate the transformation of countries in this region into industrialized
ones.1
24
Even though Japan may have an overwhelming economic presence in
Southeast Asia, Indonesia still perceives the United States as the major
economic force in the region. An article entitled "The U.S. Election and Us,"
appeared in the October 29, 1992, Jakarta Post, which stated:
Not only is the U.S. the only remaining superpower today, it also remains
the locomotive of the globe's economic activities. Its power to decide where
the world's economy should be directed is still great.'"
", 3,,Alatas Says Trade Preferred Over U.S. Bases," p. 28.
"Q' "What Kind of U.S. Presence Continues To Be Needed in Asia," p. 30.
"12' The U.S. Election and Us," Jakarta Post, October 29, 1992, p. 4. Published in FBIS East
Asia Daily Report, November 9, 1992, p. 40.
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Also, the Indonesian government feels that a healthy U.S. economy has
positive effects for Indonesia. Indonesia's Trade Minister, Arifin Siregar, said
he believes that President Clinton's policies to improve his country's
economy through increased investment and education program for the
workers will bring about positive impacts on the global economy. "If the U.S.
economy improves, that country will buy more of Indonesia's commodity
goods."' 26
Even though the United States is not the dominant economic force in
Southeast Asia, the American economy still is a major factor for Indonesia.
The Indonesian government wants the United States to have an economic
presence in the region and is seeking U.S. investment. A common
Indonesian perception is that the United States' economic presence in
Southeast Asia may have just as much of an effect on regional stabiltiy as an
American military presence. Thus, the United States' economic involvement
in Southeast Asia does enhance the United States' influence with Indonesia.
C. MALAYSIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Malaysia has an export orientated, light industry, economy. Its natural
resources are tin, crude oil, timber, copper, iron ore, natural gas, and bauxite.
Its labor force consist of about 7.2 million people. Malaysia's major industries
are logging, petroleum production and refining, agriculture processing,
rubber and oil palm processing and manufacturing, light manufacturing
126,;Minister: Clinton Not To Adopt Protectionism," Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia,
November 7, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 9,
1992, p. 39.
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industry, electronics, and tin mining and smelting. Malaysia has become the
world's third largest producer of semiconductors.1"
Malaysia's 1991 GDP of $93.7 billion was the second largest in Southeast
Asia. Its 8.8 percent GDP real growth rate in 1991 was the largest in Southeast
Asia. This was the fourth consecutive year Malaysia's growth exceeded eight
percent. Also, Malaysia had the third largest Southeast Asian per capita
income in 1991.
In 1991, Malaysia exported $39.8 billion in goods and services: 77.9 percent
in manufactured goods, including electronics and textiles; 10.2 percent in
petroleum; 4.5 percent in palm oil; 4.1 percent in timber; and 2.5 percent in
rubber. Singapore is Malaysia's largest export market, followed by the United
States, Japan, and the EC. Malaysia's 1991 imports totaled $30.1 billion in
goods and services: 71.7 percent in capital equipment; 21.1 percent in
consumer goods; 6.8 percent in food; and 0.5 percent in crude oil. Its largest
importer is Japan, followed by the United States, Singapore, Germany, and
Great Britain. Malaysian exports to the United States consist of manufactured
goods, electronic component parts, crude oil, apparel and clothing, rubber, and
palm oil. U.S. exports to Malaysian consists of machinery, transport
equipment and chemicals.
Japanese new foreign investment in Malaysia in 1991 totaled $423 million,
which accounted for 20.9 percent of Malaysia's foreign investment. American
new foreign investment in Malaysia in 1991 totaled $159 million, which
accounted for 7.9 percent of Malaysia's foreign investment. U.S. investment
'
2
'Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 212.
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in Indonesia is mainly concentrated in offshore oil and gas production,
manufacturing, electronic components, and insurance.
Malaysia's economic goals are to deepen its manufacturing base; foster
small and medium business links to foreign controlled operations to
overcome Malaysia's "assembler" status; resolve its balance of payments
deficit; and promote government withdrawal from economic planning and
ownership.
Malaysia is suffering from capital shortages, and the rise in the value of
the ringgit has diminished Malaysia's currency advantage. Japan and Taiwan
have reduced their foreign investment going to Malaysia due to their own
troubled economies. Japanese investment has dropped by 25 perc.nt in 1991,
and Japan is putting its plant expansion in Malaysia on hold.
Malaysia's huge economic growth has caused a strain on its infrastructure
and a shortage in skilled labor. Malaysia has suffered large power outages and
bottle necks on its roads and in its ports. Its labor shortage has caused
Malaysia's manufacturing sector to lag behind demands.
Prime Minister Mahathir wants to broaden Malaysia's economic
nationalism to an economic regionalism. He supports the adoption of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and he is the originator of the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC). Mahathir developed the concept of the EAEC to
counter other regional trade blocs such as the EC and the North American
Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
The EAEC was originally proposed by Mahathir as the East Asian
Economic Group (EAEG). This initial proposal made the EAEG a trade bloc.
The Bush administration condemned Mahathir's EAEG in late 1991, because
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of its protectionists overtones. The EAEG was downgraded to a less-
protectionist caucus after it failed to receive support from some ASEAN
members and Japan. Mahathir has stated that the United States' intervention
is the primary reason the EAEG was not able to gain a consensus in the
region."Y Japan offered very little support for Mahathir's proposal because it
desired not to upset U.S.-Japanese relations. Indonesia openly opposed the
EAEG because it felt it was too confrontational. The Indonesian government
did state it would support the establishment of the EAEC as long as it was part
of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process." The EAEC has
not been adopted by ASEAN, but it is being kept under consideration by the
ASEAN leaders.
Mahathir would like to see developing countries less dependent on the
financial institutions of developed countries. He proposed "bilateral payment
schemes" to aid developing countries to outmaneuver the financial
institutions of the United States and Europe (Case, 1993: 192).
Since the late 1980s, analysts have noticed two distinctive trends in
Malaysia: increasing political authoritarianism and rapid economic growth.
The ruling party, the Untied Malays National Organization (UMNO), has
implied that these two trends are tied together. UMNO has increasingly
manipulated polls to strengthen its control. Malaysia's economic success has
earned Mahathir much political support and has spread complacency that has
demobilized strong societal challenges (Case, 1993).
120 Azman Ujang, "Accuses U.S. of Racist Policy," Bernarna, October 14, 1992. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, October 14, 1992, p. 31.
12
"Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 162.
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The United States' opposition to the EAEG and the EAEC has been the
prominent issue in Malaysian-U.S. economic affairs. Malaysian Foreign
Minister Abdullah Badawi said the U.S. should not oppose the EAEC but
instead provide the opportunity for ASEAN countries to discuss the proposal
and decide on the best way of implementing it. He was commenting on a
statement by Secretary of State James Baker's that the U.S. wanted to remain
friendly with ASEAN even though it opposed the EAEC.'"
Malaysians view the United States' opposition to the EAEC as a double
standard. Malaysia's International Trade and Industry Minister, Datuk Sri
Radidah Aziz, said that the United States, which initiated NAFTA, should
not hinder the establishment of the EAEC, which would not be protectionist.
She stated: "NAFTA tends to be protectionist by according special treatment to
every Mexican item entering the U.S. and Canadian markets.. .EAEC is not
designed to become a power but to serve as a forum to promote cooperation
without certain regulations or restrictions." Rafidah said that the U.S. protest
against the EAEC was also groundless because that country is not located in
the region."3'
Malaysia objectes to a strong, direct U.S. military presence in Southeast
Asia, but it acknowledges a need for a U.S. military presence in Southeast
Asia. Malaysia's Defense Minister, Datuk Sri Mohamed Najib Razak, has
stated: "The question of security should not be viewed from a narrow
perspective, such as touching on conflicts, but should be linked to the
1 "Minister: U.S. Stand on EAEC Unacceptable," Bernama, November 15, 1991. Published
in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, Nwember 15, 1992, pp. 22-23.
"13 "U.S. Urged Not to Hinder creation of EAEC," Berita Harian, August 17, 1992, p. 23.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, August 21, 1992, pp. 25-26.
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question of the well-being as well as the social and economic development of
the region.""'32
The dispute over the EAEC has not turned Malaysian opinion against the
country's bilateral economic relationship with the United States. Malaysian
business leaders expressed concerns that economic ties between Malaysia and
the U.S. might be strained by Prime Minister Mahathir's attacks on
Washington for opposing the EAEC."" In March 1992, the Voice of Malaysia
broadcast the following:
According to a U.S. report released by the U.S. Department of Commerce says
that bilateral trade relations between Malaysia and the U.S. are steadily
rising. Malaysia has every reason to feel satisfied with the expansion of its
trade volume with the mighty economic superpower-more so as the U.S.
trade with Malaysia constitutes about 20 percent of its total trade with the six
ASEAN countries."
Even though the EAEC is a heated issue between Malaysia and the United
States, Malaysian officials assure Washington that the atmosphere
surrounding the EAEC issue will not interfere with the substance of bilateral
ties.•'3 Malaysians point out that bilateral trade has expanded tenfold over the
past decade and the United States is one of Malaysia's most important trading
partners. Minister Badawi said he saw no reason why differences over the
EAEC would effect relations. Badawi said the U.S. rejection of the EAEC
proposal would not hurt ties so long as Washington confined its
",32 ,,No Major Threat In Sight,"p. 42.
133
"U.S. Officials Dismiss EAE( Discord Concerns," Hong Kong AFP, January 13, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, Janr arv 14, 1992, p. 43.
'
34 
"Radio Hails Bilateral Trade lies With U.S.," Voice of Malaysia, March 5, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, March 6, 1992, p. 19.
135Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 162.
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disagreement to that issue. He also said the U.S. should be "democratically
sporting and not use the EAEC to launch a confrontational stance against us
in other fields of cooperation.""
D. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC CONCERNS
The Philippines has a market economy, but it is dominated by
monopolies, oligopolies, and corruption. It is the only ASEAN state that has
not benefited in the economic prosperity of the region (Stubbs, 1992: 401). The
Philippines' natural resources are timber, crude oil, nickel, cobalt, silver, gold,
salt, and copper. Its labor force consist of about 24.1 million people. The
Philippines' major industries are textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, wood
products, food processing, electronics assembly, petroleum refining, and
fishing.
The Philippines' 1991 GDP of $45.2 billion was the fourth largest in
Southeast Asia. Its -0.9 percent GDP real growth rate and its per capita income
in 1991 were the second lowest in Southeast Asia.
In 1991, the Philippines exported $8.7 billion in goods and services: 19
percent in electrical equipment; 16 percent in textiles; 11 percent in minerals
and ores; ten percent in farm products; ten percent in coconuts; and four
percent in forest products. The United States market accounted for 36 percent
of the Philippines' 1991 exports; the EC 19 percent; Japan 18 percent; and
ASEAN 7 percent. The Philippines is the world's largest exporter of coconuts
and coconut products."V The Philippines' 1991 imports totaled $12.3 billion: 53
136 U.S. Officials Dismiss EAE( Discord Concerns," p. 43.
'
37 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 275.
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percent in raw materials; 17 percent in capital goods; and 17 percent in
petroleum products. The U.S. accounted for 25 percent of the Philippines
1991 imports; Japan 17 percent; the EC 11 percent; ASEAN 10 percent; and the
Middle East ten percent.
Japanese new foreign investment in the Philippines in 1991 totaled $210
million, which accounted for 26.8 percent of the Philippines' foreign
investment. American new foreign investment in the Philippines in 1991
totaled $87 million, which accounted for 11.1 percent of the Philippines'
foreign investment.
The economic goal of the Ramos administration is to increase economic
relations with its neighboring Asian countries. The government's key
priority is to attract foreign investment, specifically to the former U.S. Navy
base at Subic Bay (Brillantes, 1993: 228). The Philippines hopes to convert this
facility to an industrial area. On President Ramos' visit to Tokyo, he
specifically asked the Japanese to invest in the area under a "build-operate-
transfer" infrastructure project. Ramos is trying to edge his country into the
regional economic race, and avoid being bypassed by the sort of foreign
investment his country's economy needs."' The Philippines' infrastructure is
among the worst in Southeast Asia.
Four factors make the Philippines not attractive to foreign investors: poor
infrastrucrure; local and bureaucratic corruption; high crime rate and
kidnappings; and governmental instability. Filipino corruption is
indigenous, reaching its peak during the Marcos administration. Corazon
Aquino's administration was plagued with coup attempts and kidnappings of
,30 John McBeth, "New Pastures. Nearby: Ramos Looks to His Neighbours in the Post-US
Era," Far Eastern Economic Review April 1, 1993, p. 15.
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foreign nationals by insurgents for political reasons. President Ramos must
solve these problems, as well as corruption, if the Philippines is to attract
foreign investment.
A major problem inhibiting the Philippine's economy is its unreliable
energy production. It is not uncommon in the Philippines to have six to
.eight hour power outages. It has been estimated that these power outages cost
Philippine companies $8 million for a four hour outage, and $16 million for
six hour outages.139 President Ramos's plans to alleviate this problem
includes deregulating the energy sector and privatizing government firms
such as the National Power Corporation. In March 1992, the Philippine
government and Westinghuuse Electric Corporation came to an agreement
on the reconstruction and repair of the nuclear power plant on Bataan. The
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) was completed in 1985, but was declared
unsafe to operate. BNPP ha; never been operational. The Philippine
government hopes to have the 620 megawatt power plant operational in
three years to avert power short,.,cs on Luzon.
The September 16, 1991, Philippine Senate vote to end the United States'
base leases had a detrimental effect on the Philippine economy. The United
States pullout cost 78,000 Filipinos to lose their jobs, and a loss in about $481
million in yearly compensation."" The loss of the bases also reduced the
United States' incentive to provide aid to the Philippines. The initial U.S.
pledge to the Multilateral Aid Initiative (MAI), for the Philippines, was $200
""Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., "The Philippines in 1992: Ready for Take Off?" Asian Survey,
February 1993, p. 227.
Ibid., p. 228.
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million annually. The MAI figure has been reduced since the base closure to
$40 million."'
Amrong the East Asian countries, the Philippines' type of government is
the closest to that of the United States.' The Philippines Businessmen's
Conference asked Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew for advice on
how the Philippines should proceed in order to achieve economic take-off.
Lee told them American style democracy would not work in the Philippines,
and what was needed was more discipline. Filipinos interpreted this to mean
the Philippines should adopt a form of authoritarianism similar to what Lee
had imposed in Singapore (Brillantes, 1993: 228). President Ramos promptly
disregarded this advice because the Philippines had an authoritarian regimc
under Ferdinand Marcos, which proved to be disastrous for the Phi1lppine
economy.
Of the total $8.7 billion in Philippine exports ir 1991, the United States and
Japan combined, accounted for over $4.6 billion. The Philippines aspires to be
less reliant on these two export markets. Philippine Trade Secretary Rizalino
S. Navarro said the Filipino strategy is to develop non-traditional markets,
but at the same time continue to strengthen ties with the Philippines
traditional trading partners. "To me, the two biggest threats to our export
picture are the concentration of almost 50 percent of exports in only two
countries.""
Even though the Philippines is attempting to become less reliant on the
American market, Filipinos are eager to strengthen economic ties with the
"'Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 193.
",,2 "Trade Minister: Cut Dependence on U.S., Japan," Business World, February 11, 1993, p. 1.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daihl Rqeort, February 11, 1993, p. 45.
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United States. Prior to the 1992 U.S. Presidential election, Foreign Affairs
Secretary Roberto Romulo stated that the Philippines will continue to seek
"mutually beneficial relations" with the United States independent of the
outcome of the Presidential elections. "Regardless of who wins the elections,
the Philippines and U.S. have to enhance its mutually beneficial relations,
particularly in trade and economics.""*
After the Clinton victory in the Presidential election, Senators Blas Ople
and Rodolfo Biazon said thev felt that the election of Bill Clinton indicated a
brighter future both for the Philippines and the world. They hope that the
victory would improve United States-Philippine ties and that it would greatly
enhance world trade.'" Philippine Senator Gonzales stated that the Clinton
Administration will be concentrating on resuscitating its country's trade and
fiscal deficits, "and I don't think that it will sacrifice its national priority
interest to give special attention to the Philippines.'""s However, he added
that if the U.S. can be able to "resuscitate" its economy, "it is expected that it
will have a spill-over effect onto the country."""6 Senator Blas Ople, the
chairman of the chamber's foreign relations committee, said:
"'
3Carlito Pablo, "Romulo Sav.- U.S. Ties To Be Maintained," Malaya, November 3, 1992, p.
1. Published in FBIS East Asia Da;ll Report, November 3, 1992, p. 53.
" "Senators, Communist Leader React," ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation DZMM,
November 4, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 4,
1992, p. 46.
"1 Ramoncito P. dela Cruz, "Senators Optimistic for 'Warmer' Ties," Business World,




President-elect Clinton brings to his office in Washington a fresh credibility
and a new clout which, if successfully used, can be applied for restarting the
global economy, and bringing the GAFF (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) Uruguay Round of talks to a successful conclusion... the Philippines,
which is suffering from a flat economic growth rate, will be one of the
beneficiaries."
The Philippine government believes that the United States' ennomy
remains the most influential force in the global economy and any economic
gain in the American economy would directly effect the Philippine economy.
President Ramos' letter of congratulation to Bill Clinton for winning the
Presidential election contained a sentence that said: "As you chart a new
course for the United States, the Filipino people hope that the historic ties
between our two countries will grow even stronger and move toward a new
era of RP-U.S. relations based on economic cooperation, mutual support, and
democratic commitment.""' In Ramos's address at the ceremony marking the
final withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines he said:
...Turning to Philippine-American relations, let me say in plain,
unmistakable terms that we have a continuing community of strategic and
economic interests with the United States. This central fact of life transcends
fluciuations in the political and psychological climate of Philippine-
American relations. It denotes invariable constraints in bilateral affairs,
which neither country can ill-afford to subordinate to transient
considerations and ephemeral exigencies.'49
Pablo Suarez, Philippine Ambassador to Washington, said the Philippine
Foreign Service Institute wa.s preparing a draft of the Philippine position for
the Mutual Defense Treaty's review, that would make economic relations
"? Ibid.
"'"Ramos Comments on Clinton Victory, U.S. Ties," DZXL Radio Mindanao Network,
November4, 1992. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November4,1992, pp. 44-45.
' "Address by President Fidel V. Ramos at the Subic Bay Base Closure Ceremony," p. 38.
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with the United States the Philippine priority. "We should not talk of access
but investments because experience points to the fact that when investment
is made in our country, these companies will flourish.""
Philippine National Security Advisor Jose Almonte stated that the United
States is the largest market for East Asian exports and influences the
economies of the countries in the region."5 ' Secretary Romulo has stated:
We recognize President Clinton's basic concern, for the United States to
regain her economic strength so she can continue leading the world. We do
want Mim to succeed in fully reinvigorating the U.S. economy. A strong
American economy benefits everybody directly, just as a sluggish one
dampens other economies, such as ours, which depend much on the U.S.
market.'52
It should be noted that there remains strong ties between the Philippines
and the United States. The United States is very much a part of Filipino
history, and there still is a positive influence between the two countries
created by the great number of Filipinos in the United States and Americans
in the Philippines.
E. SINGAPOREAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Singapore has an entrepreneurial economy with a vibrant service and
manufacturing sectors. Singapore's natural resources are fishing, its deep
water ports and geographic location on the SLOCs connecting the Pacific to
",50,,Government Ready To Review Treaty With U.S.," Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH, July 28, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, July 29, 1992,
p. 3 1.
"' Liana J. Santos, "Aimonte: L S. Still 'Huge Factor' in Stability," p. 55.
IS2 Jose G. Ebro, "Romulo Sees L S. Economic Growth as Benefit," Business World, January 19,
1993, p. 1. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 21, 1993, p. 52.
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the Indian Ocean. Its labor force consist of about 1.48 million people.
Singapore's major industries are petroleum refining, electronics, oil drilling
equipment, rubber processing and rubber products, processed foods and
beverages, ship repair, trade, financial services, and biotechnology.
Singapore's 1991 GDP of $43.2 billion was the fifth highest in Southeast
Asia. Its 6.7 percent GDP real growth rate was the fourth largest in Southeast
Asia in 1991. Also, Singapore's per capita income in 1991 was the second
highest in Southeast Asia.
In 1991, Singapore exported $57.8 billion in goods and services: 68.7 percent
in machinery and transport equipment; 21.5 percent in mineral fuels; and one
percent in manufactured goods. The United States market accounted for 20
percent of the Singapore's 1991 exports; Malaysia 15 percent; Japan nine
percent; Hong Kong seven percent; and Thailand six percent. Singapore is the
world's largest center for making computer disk drives-5" Singapore's 1991
imports totaled $65.8 billion in goods and services: 57.6 percent in machinery
and transport equipment; 17 3 percent in mineral fuels; and 16.2 percent in
manufactured goods; and 8.9 percent in chemicals. Japan accounted for 21
percent of Singapore's 1991 imports; the United States 16 percent; Malaysia 15
percent; and Taiwan four percent.
Japanese new foreign investment in Singapore in 1991 accounted for 29
percent of the Singapore's foreign investment, and American new foreign
investment in the accounted for 39.4 percent of the Singapore's foreign
investment.
"'Asia 1993 Yea rbook, p. 201.
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Singapore's economic growth and political stability over the last twenty
years has been impressive, but its lack of natural resources, small domestic
market, reliance on foreign trade and investment, and tight labor market
make Singapore vulnerable to external economic developments (Mutalib,
1993: 197). The Singaporean government's primary economic goal is to
sustain high growth rates. It is pursing this through enhancing Singapore's
"competitiveness," strengthening traditional markets, and searching for new
markets.
Singapore sees the means to its goal of increasing its competitiveness as
upgrading the competence level of its people and improving its standard of
living. Approximately 86 percent of all Singaporeans live in public housing
and the government has plans to spend $9.2 billion in improving these
quarters in the next fifteen years.'" Singapore's traditional markets, such as
the United States and the EC, are vital to Singapore's economic growth, but
these markets can inhibit Singapore's economy if they were to experience
contraction. The economic slow down in the U.S. and the slashing of
computer prices has had an adverse effect on Singapore's manufacturing
sector."5 ' Singapore is pursuing new markets in the region, such as Burma,
China, and Vietnam, to diversify its interests. Singapore is now the third
largest foreign investor in Vietnam.
Singapore is being ruled by an authoritarian style, one party political
system. The People's Action Party (PAP) has been the ruling party since
Singapore broke from Malaysia and became its own nation-state. Ironically,
1'" Ibid., p. 200.
"'Ibid., p. 201.
77
Singaporeans want more political pluralism but wild only trust the PAP to
govern the country."M As mentioned previously, when Singapore's "senior
minister" Lee Kuan Yew told the Philippines Businessmen's Conference that
what the Philippines needed to discard American style democracy because it
would not work in the Philippines, the Filipinos interpreted this to mean the
Philippines should adopt a torm of authoritarianism similar to what Lee had
imposed in Singapore. Lee believes that for a country to achieve economic
take-off it needs social planning and discipline, which American democracy
does not provide. Singapore can be classified as a state rule by an
authoritarian regime which achieves its legitimacy by its economic success. If
any state exemplifies the complexities of linking democracy and economic
growth, it is Singapore.
Lee Kuan Yew feels that East Asians must form their own model of
governance, and that Western values can not be applied to Confucian
societies. Lee uses China as an example of why Western values are inert with
East Asian values.
The economy in China is, by and large, capitalist but the polity is not, as in
the West, liberal democratic. To many Westerners, this is a contradiction...
What is improper is to say that East Asia cannot have a model of its own,
there being eventually a single universal pattern of economic and political
development for all countries.. it would be unfortunate if the West were to
view the East Asian political economy as a threat to its power, much as
communism was seen till recently. s
Singapore's economic ties with the United States are strong, and the
Singaporean government believes U.S. economic involvement in Southeast
"Regional Outlook: Southeast 4sia 1993-94, p. 17.
',, "Let Asia Be Asia," The Stroits Tines, May 14, 1992, p. 28. Published in FBIS East Asia
Daily Report, May 18, 1992, p. 31.
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Asia enhances American influence in the region. Singapore relies on the
U.S. economy to support its own, and it feels that the U.S. economy has the
most influence on the global economy. Singapore's Finance Minister, Dr.
Richard Hu, said if President Clinton succeeds in rejuvenating the U.S.
economy, it will bode well not only for Asia but also the rest of the world."'
F. THAI ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Thailand has an export orientated, market economy. Thailand's natural
resources are tin, rubber, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, timber, lead, fish,
gypsum, lignite, and fluorite Its labor force consist of about 30.8 million
people. Thailand's major industries are tourism, textiles and garments,
agricultural processing, beverages, tobacco, cement, and light manufacturing.
Thailand is the world's second largest tungsten producer and third largest tin
producer.'"9
Thailand's 1991 GDP of $92 billion was the third largest in Southeast Asia.
Its 7.7 percent GDP real growth rate was the second largest and its per capita
income in 1991 were the fourth highest in Southeast Asia.
In 1991, Thailand exported $27.5 billion in goods and services: 62 percent
in machinery and manufacturing; 28 percent in food; and seven percent in
crude materials. The United States market accounted for 23.4 percent of the
Thailand's 1991 exports; Japan 17.2 percent; Singapore 7.3 percent; Germany
5.3 percent; Hong Kong 4.8 percent; Great Britain 4.4 percent; and the
Netherlands 4.3 percent. Thailand's 1991 imports totaled $39 billion: 67
"Minister Says U.S. Not ToTurn Protectionist," Singapore Broidcasting Corporation,
November 5, 1992. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 6, 1992, pp. 38-39.
"V"Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 336.
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percent in machinery and manufacturing; ten percent in chemicals; nine
percent in fuels; and six percent in crude materials. Japan accounted for 30.2
percent of Thailand's 1991 imports; the U.S. 12 percent; Singapore 6.9 percent;
Taiwan five percent; Germany 4.8 percent; and China 3.2 percent.
Japanese new foreign inv estment in Thailand in 1991 totaled $272 million,
which accounted for 35.1 percent of Thailand's foreign investment.
American new foreign investment in Thailand in 1991 totaled $109 million,
which accounted for 14.1 percent of Thailand's foreign investment.
The Thai government's aspiration is to become the financial center for
economic developmpnt for the Southeast Asian mainland (Stubbs, 1992: 402).
However, Thailand's political instability and public unrest in 1992 have
restrained Thai ambitions. Protests broke out in Thailand over the
n~mination of army commander General Suchinda Kraprayoon as Prime
Minister. Suchinda resigned from the army and became Prime Minister. In
May, pro-democracy forces clashed with the military forces and these forces
opened fire on the protesters As many as 52 civilians were killed and
hundreds others injured. As a result of this unrest, trade orders were
canceled, offshore financial institutions froze their credit lines and the Thai
stock market fell. With intervention by Thailand's king, Thailand now has a
democratically elected government, but the violence in May has damaged
Thailand's international reputation.'"
The Thai government is making special efforts to lure back foreign
investors and to prevent existing investors from canceling their existing
"'Asia 1993 Yearbook, pp. 215-216.
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plans in Thailand. Thai officials are also making efforts to maintain their
export market from being affected by the May 1992 violence.
Another of Thailand's economic goals is to improve its infrastructure.
Thailand's infrastructure has not been able to keep up with its high economic
growth. The largest problem exists in Bangkok where the streets are always
.filled over their capacity. There are three mass-transit systems being planned,
but they will not relieve Bangkok from its chaotic traffic jams until 1997.'6'
Thailand has a democratically elected government with Chuan Leekpai as
Prime Minister. However, Thailand has spent much of the last three decades
under military rule and martial law, with royal tolerance. The Chuan
government was elected in September 1992, ending another period of military
rule that began in February 1991. The Chuan government is fragile and it is
expected to experience a number of economic problems that could destabilize
the government (Suchit, 1993).
Although Thailand has not had much political pluralism in the past three
decades, it has had much economic success. Thailand's high growth rate is
expected to continue its upward trend and its export market, which is already
large, is expected to expand.
There has been much trade friction between the the United States and
Thailand. Most of this friction centers around intellectual property rights,
pharmaceuticals, Thailand's labor laws, and financial services. Matters
became so tense in late 1991 that Thai Commerce Minister Amaret Silaon
threatened to resign if the National Legislative Assembly rejected the
proposed Thai patent bill, or if the U.S. retained Thailand on its list of
"l Ibid., p. 218.
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countries identified for retaliation. He stated: "Thailand's trading partners
should be satisfied with the improvement in protection of intellectual
property rights here than in the past with the revision of several laws.""6 2
The U.S. was attempting to get Thailand to amend its Patent Act, and
Thailand reciprocated. Afterward, Minister Amaret meet with Carla Hills,
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), about the progress the Thai
Government was making on intellectual property rights. He later said: "The
U.S. Administration should understand that it is impossible to do everything
it has demanded because the (Thai) government must also act in the best
interests of the country.""&
In December 1991, Carla Hills decided to terminate USTR's investigation
into Thailand's protection of U.S. copyrights. Deputy Commerce Minister
Pridiyathon Thewakun stated that "the termination of the investigation on
copyright law enforcement would brighten the trade prospects between
Thailand and the U.S. as the private sectors of both countries will regain
confidence to trade."6'" Agriculture Minister Anat Aphraphirom said the
termination of the investigation had defused tensions between Thailand and
the U.S., which mainly affected Thailand's private sectors."6
The Thai Commerce Ministrv feels that the end of the Cold War and the
increase in trade pressure from the United States justifies adjustment in the
,52 "Amaret To Resign if U.S. 'Pressure' Continues," The Nation, November 19, 1991, p. BI.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 20, 1991, p. 60.
163 "Commerce Ministry Asks L.S. 'Good Faith' Show," Bangkok Post, November 18, 1991, p.
17. Published in FBIS East Asia DailY Report, November 19, 1991, pp. 53-54.
"""Cabinet, Officials Express Elation," The Nation, December 20, 1991, p. B12. Published




Thai-U.S. relationship. The United States signed a treaty with Thailand in
1966 that afforded Americans special trade privileges. The Treaty of Amity
and Economic Relations exempts Americans and American companies from
many of the restrictions of the Thai Alien Business Law, which came into
force in 1972. These exemptions include granting Americans the same
treatment as Thais to engage in some professions and to operate wholly-
owned companies in some service industries. The United States is the only
country that receives these privileges. The Thai Foreign and Commerce
Ministries were considering revising this treaty to make Americans subject to
the Alien Business Law. The request to revise the treaty was motivated by the
resentment of continual U.S. trade pressure, specifically threats on Thai
exports because of the United States' dissatisfaction with Thai intellectual
property rights protection and Thai trade barriers against banking and other
service industries.'"
Thai officials have been searching for ways to increase Thailand's
bargaining power, and the treaty's revision could be one method. Thai
officials are considering how to gain more economic bargaining power by
showing reluctance to grant the United States the military facilities they are
seeking, if the United States continues what Thais perceive as U.S. aggression
on trade issues. Thai officials believe they could do this and minimize
damage to Thai-U.S. trade and investment because the Amity Treaty has had
little impact on U.S. investment in Thailand, which lags far behind Japanese
investment." Thai Secretary -General of the Board of Investment, Stapon
"SPeter Mytri Ungphakon, "Ministries Want To 'Restructure' U.S. Ties," pp. 4849.
""'"Ministries' Plans Could End Treaty Privileges," Bangkok Post, November 309, 1992, p.
21. Translated in FBIS East Asia D.iliy Report, December 2, 1992, p. 59.
83
Kawitanon, said that Thailand will not be alarmed if President Clinton's
policies divert American investment from Thailand.
The U.S. invests only 0.4 percent of its total foreign investment in Thailand
and only eight percent in all of Asia, so we are not seriously concerned by
reduced American investment. The problem for us is that, if Clinton makes
the U.S. market tougher to get into, this will have spill o er consequences
for other countries like Japan and Taiwan who invest heavily here in
producing goods that are exported to America.'"
Deputy Prime Minister Suphachai Phanitchaphak feels that President
Clinton's policies will create problems in . de negotiations between Thailand
and the United States. He said the U.S. President is more of a protectionist in
terms of national economy, therefore trade negotiations will not be better
than those in the past, especially when it concerns the enforcement of Section
301. Suphachai wants Thailand to be prepared and look for new markets.
However, Suphachai does feel that if President Clinton keeps his campaign
promise to revive the U S. economy, it will benefit the world economy."
Thai Foreign Minister Prasong Sunsiri stated that President Clinton's
emphasis on giving highest priority to tackling the United States' domestic
economy is a policy that will riot only benefit the United States but also the
entire world. He said the size of the U.S. economy is so large that a strong
U.S. domestic economy will bring an end to the world recession. Foreign
Minister Prasong said it is unlikely that there will be any change in Thai-U.S.
relations and he is confident that political relations between the two countries
,41 Thitinan Pongsudhiwak, "Preparedness for Clinton Trade Measures Urged," The
Nation, November 18, 1992, p. B3. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 18,
1992, p. 29.
" "Deputy Premier Views Impact on Trade," Bangkok Voice of Free Asia, November 3, 1992.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 4, 1992, p. 52.
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will be strengthened because Thailand is now a democratic country." He
points to the Thai September 1992 election as the beginning of a new era of
democracy in Thailand.
Commerce Minister for the Chuan administration, Uthai Phimchaichon,
said he feels Thai economic relations with the Clinton Administration will
stable.
The American people will have higher purchasing power if the U.S.
economy improves. The U.S. is a big market for the world, including
Thailand. From the economic point of view, I believe that it will be good for
Thailand if the American people have higher purchasing power. But, on the
other hand, the new president may have to protect the country's economy by
being protectionist against some products since the U.S. is suffering a trade
deficit. This may have some impact on Thailand. The U.S. has big trade
problems with its major trade partners such as Japan, China, and the EC.
Thailand is not that significant, compared to the problems the United States
is facing. Thailand's relations with the U.S. are very close although
Thailand is a small country So, I believe the U.S. will take its good relations
with Thailand into account in making any decision."'
In December 1992, The Thai government announced that it sees no need
to review the Thai-U.S. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. The Thai
Foreign ministry will not be taking any action to review or revoke the
treaty."2 The Thai government also announced it intends to restore basic
"1,0,,Prasong Congratulates Clinton," Bangkok Voice of Free Asia, November 4, 1992.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 4, 1992, pp. 51-52.
"' "Commerce Minister 'Not W, rried,"' Radio Thailand Network, November 4, 1992.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 5, 1992, pp. 45-46.
,?2 "Surin: No Plan To Review Amity Treaty With U.S.," Siam Rat, December 11, 1992, p. 3.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, December 11, 1992, p. 66.
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rights to laborers so to avoid sanctions against Thailand through cancellation
of its General System of Preferences (GSP)."
G. BURMESE ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Like the Burmese government, the Burmese economy is controlled by the
military. For instance, the control of money supply rests with the Ministry of
Defense. The military may have control of the official economy, but the state
exists on an informal, non-regulated, private economy (Steinberg, 1993).
Burma has been economically isolated because of its military government.
Burma's natural resources are crude oil, timber, tin, antimony, zinc,
copper, tungsten, lead, coal, marble, limestone, precious, stones, and natural
gas. Its labor force consist of about 16 million people. Burma's major
industries are agricultural processing; textiles and footwear; wood and wood
products; petroleum refining; mining of copper, tin, tungsten, and iron;
construction materials; pharmaceuticals; and fertilizer. Burma is the world's
largest producer of opium."74
Burma's 1991 GDP of $7.72 billion was the fourth smallest in Southeast
Asia. Its 2.7 percent GDP real growth rate was the third lowest in Southeast
Asia, and its per capita income in 1991 was the fifth lowest in Southeast Asia.
In 1991, Burma exported $568 million in goods: 37 percent in forest
products; 30.8 percent in agricultural products; 5.7 percent in minerals and
gems; and 5.5 percent in animal and marine products. These goods were
exported to Southeast Asia, India, Japan, China, the EC, and Africa. Burma's
"1 "Government ToTell U.S. of Labor Plans," Bangkok Post, December 3, 1992, p. 13.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, December 4, 1992, p. 4 1.
"'Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, p. 56.
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1991 imports totaled $812.95 million: 34.6 percent in capital goods; 28.9 percent
in raw materials, and 8.8 percent in consumer goods. These goods were
imported from China, Japan, India, the EC, and Southeast Asia. China is
Burma's greatest source of economic aid ant trade. It is estimated that as
much as 23 percent of Burma's 1991 imports came from China."' China has
also been Burma's main supplier of military equipment since the
establishment of the SLORC ' 7
New foreign investment in Burma totaled $831.5 million by June 1992.
The United States accounted for 30.6 percent of Burma's foreign investment;
Thailand 19.4 percent; Japan 14.7 percent; the Netherlands 9.6 percent; and
Singapore 2.1 percent."' The United States' investments were in oil, gas, and
fisheries.
From 1962 to 1988 Burma had a socialist economy. Burma's economic
performance was so poor by 1987 that the United Nations labeled Burma a
"Least Developed Country." Burma's economic growth was less t' an
negative six percent. This was the major reason for the 1988 uprising, from
which SLORC was formed. Once in control of the country, SLORC initiated a
series of development programs. SLORC has past a very liberal foreign
investment law which allows foreigners 100 percent ownership of enterprises
in Burma, and if the enterprise was a joint venture with a Burmese company
the foreign investor had to maintain a minimum of 35 percent ownership.
Socialism was replaced by free market enterprise, but government repression
'SAsia 1993 Yearbook, p. 94.
Ibid.
"" David I. Steinberg, "Myanmar in 1492: Plus Ca Change ... ?" Asian Survey, February
1993, p. 181.
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of human and civil rights remained. SLORC is concerned about its poor
international reputation and is anxious to give the appearance that the
regime is liberalizing its policies, so that it could receive greatly needed
foreign aid (Steinberg, 1993: 183).
SLORC is encouraging foreign engagement in the Burmese economy. It is
interested in developing joint ventures with foreign companies and
promoting foreign investment. The Burmese government is hoping to
develop its petroleum industry. It has given concessions to ten foreign firms
for oil exploration in Burma, but thus far none of these concessions have
produced any economic return.
SLORC has implemented changes to rejuvenate Burma's private sector.
These changes are important for achieving higher economic development.
However, the Burmese economy will be limited by SLORC's tight control of
the political system (Neher, 1991: 152).
H. CAMBODIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Cambodia has an agrarian based economy. The country is very poor and
its economic progress has been retarded because of Cambodia's political and
social upheaval. Cambodia's natural resources are timber, gemstones, iron
ore, manganese, and phosphates. Its labor force consist of about 2.5-3.0
million people. Cambodia's major industries are rice milling, fishing, wood
and wood products, rubber, cement, and gem mining.
Cambodia's 1991 GDP of $930 million was the smallest in Southeast Asia.
Its GDP real growth rate and its per capita income in 1991 were the lowest in
Southeast Asia. Data on Cambodia's imports and exports is unreliable due to
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unregulated border trade amongst the various factions and Cambodia's
neighbors. Most of Cambodia's trade occurs with Thailand on their shared
border.
Cambodia's economic goals are: (1) ending internal conflict; (2)
establishing a state government; (3) developing a domestic economy; (4)
controlling inflation; (5) attracting foreign aid and investment; (6) rebuild its
infrastructure. Until a Cambodian government is formed, UNTAC has
control over the country's ministries of finance, planning, and trade.
Countries that are attempting to send foreign aid to Cambodia are finding it
difficult to deliver this aid due to the restrictions on giving direct support to
any one faction. The SOC has controlled the government structures necessary
to run the economy, but they are not allowed to receive the aid. All aid is
being received for Cambodia by UNTAC.
I. LAOTIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Laos is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. It has a communist
government and has had a centrally planned economy with government
control of all enterprises. However the Laotian government its attempting to
reform the country's economy. As of June 1992, the government had sold 105
of its 604 state-own enterprises. The Laotian government is encouraging
private ownership of enterprises and is decentralizing economic planning.
Laos's natural resources are timber, hydroelectric power, gypsum, tin, gold,
and gemstones. Its labor force consist of about 1.5 million people. Laos's
major industries are tin and gypsum mining, timber, electric power,
agricultural processing, and construction.
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Laos's 1991 GDP of $550 million was the second smallest in Southeast Asia.
Its 3.1 percent GDP real growth rate was the fifth lowest, and its per capita
income in was the fourth lowest in Southeast Asia in 1991.
In 1991, Laos exported $54.6 million in goods and services: 60.9 percent in
logs and wood products; 31.1 percent in electricity; and 7.8 percent in coffee.
These exports went to Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The collapse of the
Soviet Union caused Laotian exports to fall by $146 million from the previous
year. 78 Laos's number one export, timber, is facing problems from
environmental policy. The Laotian government has placed a ban on logging
to prevent further deforestation of the country's woodlands. Laos's 1991
imports totaled $210 million in food, fuel oil, consumer goods, and
manufactured goods. These goods were imported from Thailand, the Soviet
Union, Japan, France, Vietnam, and China; no goods are imported from the
United States.
Laos received approximately $120 million of aid in 1991 from the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.N., and various Western
countries. Before 1991, Laos relied on the Soviet Union as its primary source
of foreign assistance.
The Laotian government's goal is to decentralize its economy. The
legitimacy of the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party is endangered
because Laos has lost its economic ties and material support from the Soviet
Union and the Eastern European countries (Johnson, 1993: 75). Laos has
adopted an "open door" foreign investment policy, and is now seeking
economic growth through foreign trade, aid, and investment from the West.
"1Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 155.
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A limitation to Laos's economic revival will be its poor infrastructure and
lack of major industry. Laos is receiving assistance from Australia to build a
bridge across the Mekong River to connect Laos to roads in Thailand.
However, there are few other roads that will be able to handle significant
volumes of traffic. Other infrastructure problems inhibiting the Laotian
economy are telecommunications, power, and railroads. Telephone
connections are sparse and unreliable. Hydroelectricity is available only in
limited areas and is unreliable due to low water levels in Laos. Also, there
are no railroads in Laos.
Laos is a communist country that has been forced to open its society to the
West in order to survive economically. To protect their rule, Laotian leaders
are apprehensive about exposing the Lao people to this outside stimulus. As
a result, Laos's political reform has not been in step with its economic reform.
However, political change in Laos is underway in the form of a government
structure reorganization and preparations for a National Assembly election.
The United States economic involvement in Southeast Asia is now
welcomed by Laos.
J. VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Vietnam is a country with a communist government and a centrally
planned economy. Its economy has been very weak, but in 1992 the
Vietnamese economy started to show signs of recovery. The U.S. has a trade
embargo against Vietnam. It was first implemented against North Vietnam in
1965, and then applied to the entire country when it was reunified in 1975 by
the North. This trade embargo is having debilitating effects on Vietnam's
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economy. The Vietnamese government is attempting to reform its economy
while maintaining its political status quo. Vietnam's natural resources are
phosphates, coal, manganese, bauxite, chromate, offshore oil deposits, and
forests. Its labor force consist of about 32.7 million people. Vietnam's major
industries are food processing, textiles, machine building, mining, cement,
chemical fertilizer, glass, tires, oil, and fishing.
Vietnam's 1991 GDP of $q.5 billion was the fifth smallest in Southeast
Asia. Its 3.8 percent GDP real growth rate was the fifth highest, and its per
capita income was the third lowest in Southeast Asia in 1991.
In 1991, Vietnam exported $1.97 billion in goods and services: 35.6 percent
in crude oil; 13.5 percent in marine products; 9.5 percent in rice; 6.4 percent in
forestry products; 1.9 percent in coal; 1.2 percent in coffee; and 0.8 percent in
rubber. These exports went to Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand,
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. The IMF estimates that Vietnam's
exports to free market countries increased by 73 percent in 1990 and 1991.
Vietnam's 1991 imports totaled $2.24 billion: 23.4 percent in oil products; 18
percent in fertilizers; four percent in steel; and 3.8 percent in raw cotton.
These imports came from Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Eastern
Europe, and the Soviet Union.
Despite the United States' trade embargo, the U.S.' friends and allies are
providing economic aid and trade to Vietnam. Singapore and Japan are
Vietnam's number one and number two trading partners, respectively. In
November 1992, Japan announced that it was resuming $370 million in
commodity credits to Vietnam. Australia, France, Great Britain, and Italy are
also providing aid to Vietnam. Thailand has signed an agreement on trade,
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economic, and technical cooperation with Vietnam, and has offered Vietnam
$5.8 million in credits to purchase Thai goods and services. Malaysia has
become Vietnam's largest foreign investor. The two countries have signed an
agreement to conduct joint oil exploration in the area in the Gulf of Thailand
where Vietnam's and Malaysia's maritime claims overlap. Most of all,
Vietnam wants U.S. investments; and help.
Although Vietnamese leaders remain committed to building a socialist
state under the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), these leaders feel that if the
VCP is to remain in power, it must pursue non-socialist economic policies to
improve the Vietnamese economy (Avery, 1993). Vietnam began introducing
free market reforms in 1986. In April 1992, the National Assembly passed a
new constitution. This constitution reorganized and streamlined Vietnam's
government structure, and it also institutionalize Vietnam's economic
reform. These measures includes liberalizing private economic activity, and
safeguards against nationalization of industries. Vietnam is also revamping
its legal, taxing, and banking systems to make the country more attractive to
foreign investors. It has taken steps to privatize the state-own enterprises,
and make the remaining state-owned enterprises more efficient by not
protecting them against market forces.
Vietnam has adopted a foreign policy of establishing foreign relations with
any nation, regardless of ideology. This strategy is not based on promoting
international socialism, but on maximizing economic opportunities for
Vietnam. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam said the
Vietnamese government's foreign policy aim is "to broaden its relations with
all the countries in the world in service of peace and development in
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Vietnam, as well as of peace and stability in the region and elsewhere in the
world.""' Vietnam's Ambassador to the U.N., Trinh Xuan Lang, said that
Vietnam's economic policy has been "renovated" since their Seventh
National Party Congress. He stated that the Vietnamese people are dedicated
to continue this policy by "expanding all economic ties w,-:.th all international
organizations, foreign companies, and individuals on the basis of respect for
independence, sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit.""l
Vietnam is hoping to attract trade, aid, and investment from the West, but
it is concentrating its attention on its East Asian neighbors. In July 1992,
Vietnam signed the Bali Treaty, which gained Vietnam "observer status" in
ASEAN. This is the first step for Vietnam in becoming a member of ASEAN.
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia are encouraging Vietnam to
privatize its economy, and the Vietnamese government has abandoned its
previous ambition of forming an Indochina bloc as an alternative to ASEAN
(Simon, 1993: 14).
Vietnam is a country with tremendous economic potential. The United
States' trade embargo against Vietnam is the major road block preventing
Vietnam's economic success. In order for Vietnam to achieve economic take-
off, it needs aid from international lending institutions, foreign investment,
and the ability to trade freely in the international market.
The Vietnamese government wants to put aside the memories of the
Vietnam War and establish full diplomatic and economic ties with the United
"1"'More on Nguyen Manh Cam-Baker Meeting," Hanoi VNA, October 24, 1991. Published
in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, (Xtober 25, 1991, p. 38.
",
0
,,Commentary Views Investment, U.S. Embargo," Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, September 16,
1991. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report. September 16, 1991, p. 68.
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States. Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai, has said: "Vietnam
maintains that the U.S. Government should soon change its decision, shake
off the past, and lift the embargo in order to create favorable conditions for
American investors to do business with Vietnam at a time when Vietnam's
policy on economic cooperation is highly favorable to foreign investors."'1 •
Phan Van Khai has also stated:
Vietnam's policy vis-a-vis the United States is clear and consistent.
Vietnam's foreign policy is an open-door policy aimed at establishing
friendly relations with all countries in the world. The United States is a
major power with an important role in the world. Vietnam is prepared to
establish and maintain relations of equality, mutual respect, and mutual
benefit with all countries.8"
On December 14, 1992, the United States Government gave permission to
U.S. firms to sign contracts with Vietnam. The Vietnamese Foreign Affairs
Ministry said:
...this is a positive step toward normalization of the U.S.-Vietnamese
relations. However, in the view of Vietnamese companies, they feel it
difficult to deploy practical relations with the U.S. partners if the comracts to
be signed cannot take immediate effects. Vietnam hopes that the U.S.
Government will take further steps to create conditions for companies to
really do business from the Vietnamese market. That will not only benefit
the U.S. companies but also meet the interests of the two people's.1-
"' "Phan Van Khai Meets U.S. Businessmen," Hanoi Vietnam Television Network,
November 4, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 12,
1992, p. 62.
82 " Deputy Premier Comments on U.S. Ties," Hanoi Voice of Vietnam," November 6, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 6, 1992, p. 55.
1 3
1,,Hanoi Radio Comments," Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, December 16, 1992. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, December i6, 1992, p. 55.
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K. ECONOMIC SUMMARY
The United States does still play an influential economic role in Southeast
Asia. It may appear that Japan might be overtaking the United States in
economic involvement in the region, but most Southeast Asians admit that
it is the U.S. market that is the motive force for both the regional and global
economies.
Several of the United States' "friends and allies" illustrate that linking
political pluralism and economic success is complex, and that there are no
"black and white" cases where type of government can be directly attributed to
a country's economic success This shows that U.S. policy makers must be
careful not to overgeneralize economic assumptions.
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IV. POLITICAL CONCERNS
During the Cold War American perceptions were that Southeast Asia was
strategically vital, but now that tensions have eased this importance has
diminished (Crowe and Romberg, 1991: 136). In the post-ColdWar era the
Lnited States policy makers place Southeast Asia on the periphery of
concerns to other regions because of their confidence that the countries in
Southeast Asia are relatively supportive of U.S. political, economic, and
security interests in the region. American policy makers are not likely to
view the region as a whole, but are more disposed to focus their attention on
each individual state. Thus, U.S. security commitments in Southeast Asia are
regarded as secondary to those in other regions of the world (Neher, 1991).
The problem is that American policy makers are assuming the United States'
friends and allies in Southeast Asia are dedicated to the leadership of the
United States.
As Southeast Asia becomes strategically less important to the United
States, so will the United States' importance be to the Southeast Asians. The
United States' friends and allies in Southeast Asia are not tightly bound to the
United States by political ties. Asians are now less willing to submit to
A.merican views because the region is no longer dependent on the United
States to protect the region from Soviet aggression, and East Asians are no
longer waiting for the United States to provide leadership on matters
affecting East Asian countries' national interests (Bosworth, 1993: 107).
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The United States' friends and allies in Southeast Asia are ambivalent
about any tightening of their alliances with the United States. In the view of
some, the military threat in East Asia has diminished to a level that makes
the United States' system of security alliances essentially obsolete (Ellings and
Olsen, 1992: 117). Political integration in East Asia is less likely now that the
Cold War is over because the region lacks a common threat (Ellings and
Olsen, 1992: 118). The United States must not assume that its friends and
allies in Southeast Asia will build an international environment conducive
to perceived American values, but that the American view will build upon
their own perceptions of "good government," regardless if it meets the
United States' definition of a democracy. Southeast Asian policy makers do
not share the American view that the nondemocratic regimes in the region
should be isolated. Pro-democracy political forces exist within most
nondemocratic countries. The idea that one promotes democracy and greater
political openness by limiting diplomatic contacts with such countries is arn
error (Scalapino, 1991: 28).
The United States' friends and allies in Southeast Asia do not necessarily
want to strengthen and extend the current United States system of defense
arrangements. They may not even want to change it. The system of security
alliances may be essentially obsolete (Ellings and Olsen, 1992: 117), but there is
still no agreement on anything better. A multilateral approach to security
issues in the region similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) will not be formed easily, and any concept as grandiose as a
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) will have to be
approached incrementally over an extended period. Unlike Europe, in East
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Asia there is a wide difference in perceptions of the nature and sources of
threats by individual states (Johnston, 1992: 106; Baker 1991: 5). The basis for
these diverse security concerns is intra-regional fears and suspicions (Baker,
1991: 3). The differential impact of the security changes caused by the end of
the Cold War on the Southeast Asian states is tending to divide the members
of ASEAN (Stubbs, 1992: 398).
It is unlikely that in the post-Cold War era Southeast Asian leaders want
the United States to be the leader in encouraging cooperation in the region.
The United States' security role in East Asia during the Cold War gave it
tremendous political influence in the region. Now that the Cold War has
ended the United States' political influence has declined (Bosworth, 1993).
The United States' leverage in East Asia is insufficient to allow it to play the
role of leader in the region (Ellings and Olsen, 1992: 128). In the East Asian
view, the importance of the United States in the region is declining (Oxnam,
1993).
The United States needs to rise above its Cold War strategies and develop
innovative security policies suited to the post-Cold War situation in East Asia
(Scalapino, 1991). America's Cold War strategy for East Asia was based on a
"eurocentric" world view. The United States' current security strategy for East
Asia is not formulated to meet the post-Cold War environment in the region,
but adapted from these "eurocentric" policies (Ellings and Olsen, 1992: 116).
The United States' foreign policy is still based on concepts formulated during
the Cold War (Bosworth, 1993: 107). The challenge now is to formulate an
Asian policy based on the realities of the East Asia/Pacific world. A first step
in that direction is the consideration of East Asian concerns and perceptions.
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One significant addition to U.S. security policy in the post-Cold War era is
the issue of human rights. Fostering the growth of human rights in East Asia
has become a primary security interests (Department of Defense, 1992; and
1993). However, many of the United States' "friends and allies" do not share
America's interpretation of human rights. If the U.S. Government chose to
do so, it could target these "friends and allies" as human rights violators.
On broader national security concerns, the United States has added such
concerns as narcotics trafficking, environmental issues, and refugee problems.
The effects of drug trafficking to the United States are well known, and U.S.
military forces started being used to stem the flow of narcotics to the United
States during the Bush Administration. Particularly in Southeast Asia, the
flow of refugees and environmental problems have caused regional
instability that has potential for affecting U.S. national interests.
A. BRUNEIAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
Brunei became a sovereign state on January 1, 1984, when it gained its full
independence from Britain. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brunei is
being ruled by a monarchy. There are no functioning political parties and
there have been no elections in Brunei since 1962. There is very little
prospect for democracy developing in Brunei in the near future and the
sultan is taking further steps to consolidate the country's absolute
monarchy.'" However, the people of Brunei live a very comfortable life.
Brunei has the second highest per capita income in East Asia and its
'" Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 89.
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government provides for all medical services and subsidizes food and
housi.rg.'1
Brunei has no alliances with the United States. The only security proposal
that exists between the two countries is Brunei's offer to provide access for
U.S. military forces. It is not bound to the United States by any political ties.
The Bruneian government encourages the United States to remain engaged
militarily in the region, but does not want any formal alliance to be formed.
There are currently no external threats to Brunei's national security that
would require it to seek an alliance with the United States.
As for Brunei's role in the region, its diplomatic strategy is to survive by
playing a neutral role in ASEAN and not offending any of its neighbors.
Brunei has adopted a low-key foreign policy that is not proactive (Neher, 1991:
138). Malaysia and Singapore have been urging Brunei to join the Five Power
Defense Arrangement (FPDA) which includes Australia, Britain, Malaysia,
New Zealand, and Singapore. But Brunei hesitates because of offense that
might be given to its powerful but jealous neighbor-Indonesia. At the same
time Brunei is building its ties with Malaysia and Singapore."' Also, the
Bruneian government has decided to join the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM).
Brunei's use of diplomatic initiatives to deter and neutralize threats is
equally important to the country's national security as its military (Menon,
1989). Brunei does not believe that isolating communist countries
diplomatically will make the region more stable. Brunei established
"'
t Centrai Intelligence Agency, The World Factl'ook 1992, 51.
'" From an Observer, "Brunei Darussalam in 1992: Monarchy, Islam, and Oil," Asian
Survey, February 2, 1993, p. 202.
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diplomatic relations with Vietnam and China at the ambassadorial level.
Both Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and China's Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen have made official diplomatic visits to Brunei.
In the post-Cold War era, Brunei is less motivated to agree with U.S.
political views because the threat of regional domination by communism no
longer exists. The Bruneian government wants the United States to maintain
its military presence in East Asia and increase its economic involvement in
the region, but Brunei does not feel Southeast Asia needs the United States'
political leadership. Brunei's unique form of government and its foreign
policy is based on taking a neutral role and it is not likely that Brunei will
seek political integration with other East Asian countries. If Brunei will not
join the FPDA because it will offend one of its neighbors, it is unlikely that
Brunei will be willing to join something as grandiose as a CSCA.
The United States' stance on communism, democracy and human rights
in Southeast Asia differs from that of Brunei's. It is evident that Brunei does
not agree with the United States' policy of isolating Vietnam. Also, based on
Brunei's lack of a democratic government it is unlikely that it will support
the United States' stance of promoting democracy and human rights in the
region.
B. INDONESIAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
The origins of the current Indonesian government are authoritarian and
militarily based. Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch in 1949
after a revolutionary struggle. President Sukarno became Indonesia's first
leader. Initially, the country moved towards Western-style democracy, but it
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eventually ran into difficulties because it was not compatible with Indonesian
culture. Sukarno referred to Western democracy as "chatter box" democracy.
Sukarno moved his country's ideology towards socialism and strengthened
the military. He was one of the founders and active leaders of the
Nonaligned Movement. Sukarno adopted the Nationalist Party of Indonesia
-(PNI) as the state party and he banned most of the opposition parties. In 1965,
the Gestapu coup occurred when a group of army officers attempted to
overthrow Sukarno. General Suharto took command of the army and put
down the coup. The two year period following the Gestopu coup, large
numbers of Indonesians were killed in an attempt to purge dissidents. At
first the killings were mostly aimed by the army at suspected communists, but
eventually it crossed ethnic and religious lines. Suharto actually ran
Indonesia after the coup and he took an anti-communist stance and greatly
reduced Sukarno's powers. Sukarno died in 1970.
General Suharto's first step in solidify his leadership position was to purge
all supporters of Sukarno in the military. Then he established the Golkar
party to oppose communism in Indonesia. All government officials were
forced to join Golkar. Suharto did allow opposition parties, but they were
manipulated so that they could not challenge Golkar. Suharto forced four
Muslim parties to merge into the Un~ited Development Party (PPP), and five
other parties to merge into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Suharto's
authoritarian government has gained legitimacy from the people of
Indonesia through Suharto's success in developing Indonesia economically.
Suharto did allow presidential and parliamentary elections in the 1970's and
1980's, but Golkar consistently received the majority of votes. Golkar's
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success can be attributed to its access to resources that the opposition parties
did not have, and Indonesia's sustained economic growth under Suharto
leadership (Neher, 1991: chap. 5).
Indonesia is not bound to the United States by any political ties. There
exists a large gap between Indonesia and the U.S. caused by the U.S. human
rights policy. Indonesians claim that the United States tends to follow an
interventionist policy, and even though American policy makers claim they
do not want to be the world's policeman, Indonesians feel that U.S. actions
prove otherwise.'", Indonesians also feel that U.S. influence in the region has
declined in the past several y'ears primarily because the United States'
negligence of its Southeast Asian policy."'
Indonesia remains a strong supporter of ZOPFAN and the Southeast Asia
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Indonesia does not want to form
a security alliance in the region. It is promoting ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ to
ASEAN so the region will become a sovereign and stable zone free from
external threats, conflicts and foreign interference. Indonesia points to
Singapore and Thailand as the ASEAN members not in compliance with
ZOPFAN because of their support for U.S. military presence in Southeast
Asia.'8 Also, Indonesian interests in the Nonaligned Movement will
override any considerations of forming alliances. In 1992, Suharto became
the chairman of the NAM.
1"7 "Fresh Air and Uncertainty Dominate U.S. Foreign Policy," Kompas, January 29, 1993, p.
4. Translated and published in FBIP East Asia Daily Report, February 11, 1993, pp. 40-41.
tM Ibid., p. 41.
" "The ZOPFAN Concept Shotuld Be Reviewed," Merdeka, February 17, 1993, p. 4.
Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, February 26, 1993, pp. 4041.
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In the post-Cold War era, Indonesia does not fear external (communist)
backing for its own insurgency threats. Indonesians are ready to accept
Indochina into ASEAN, partially to strengthen a collective defense against
China (Buszynski, 1992: 833)
Indonesians feel that the United States' policy of promoting democracy
and human rights interferes in other countries' internal affairs. It is viewed
as interventionist and unfair because it appears to some Indonesians that the
United States is holding other countries to a double standard-"
The United States cut $2.3 million in military training assistance after the
1991 East Timor incident. In January 1993, members of the Indonesian House
Commission I said Indonesia did not expect the United States to resume its
military education assistance to Indonesia. Theo Sambuaga, a member of
House Commission I, said:
In my opinion, the U.S. policy of stopping its military assistance to Indonesia
last year because of the East Timor affair was a mistake. Indonesia's step in
dealing with the Deli case was in keeping with the national as well as
international laws.'9'
Indonesian officials claim that the United States should not impose its
values on East Asian countries, and accuses the West of linking foreign aid to
human rights issues. President Suharto said developed countries should not
put economic pressures on lesser developed countries by tying their foreign
aid with human rights, because the concept of human rights in the developed
countries are entirely different from human rights as defined and insisted
upon in the third world. President Suharto also said that every nation
'""Fresh Air and Uncertainty Dominate U.S. Foreign Policy," p. 41.
"Resumption of Aid Not Expected," Antara, January 22, 1993. Published in FBIS East
Asia Daily Report, January 22, 1993, p. 34.
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should be allowed to take its own initiative for human rights according to its
own values and institutional system."2 Indonesians feel that most charges of
human rights violations are not based on genuine concerns, but are
politically taken advantage of in order to gain leverage in international
relations.'93
Despite obvious rifts in Indonesian-U.S. relations caused by human rights
issues, the relations between the two countries are stable and cordial. Nine
months after the East Timor incident President Suharto described relations
with the United States in positive terms. "The friendly relationship of both
nations and states has created mutual and deep understanding of their
respective position and interest, despite divergence of views over a number
of issues."'"
On a final note: Indonesians are Moslems, and may recent the close ties
between Israel and the United States. Indonesians believe that this pro-Israel
bent accounts for American claims to leadership in the Middle East.
Indonesia, along with China and a good many other Asians, want no part of a
"new world order" based on American hegemony.
C. MALAYSIAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
Malaysia current head of state, Dr. Datuk Seri Mahathir bin Mohamad, is




1"Suharto Warns Against Linking Aid, Human Rights," Antara, January 26, 1993.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 27, 1993, p. 39.
193,,Official Urges 'Balanced' Human Rights Approach," Antara, March 30, 1993.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, April 1, 1993, pp. 30-31.
10,,,Suharto Hails 'Closer' Ties With U.S.," Antara, August 11, 1992. Published in FBIS
East Asia Daily Report, August 12. 1992, pp. 37-38.
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leadership by stretching the limits of a democratic process. When Prime
Minister Tun Hussein Onn became seriously ill in 1981, he resigned and was
succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir. Mahathir has been able to
retain his power by winning in three consecutive mostly free and open
elections.
Mahathir's rule was threatened following Malaysia's 1986 election. The
political party that Mahathir belongs to, the United Malay National
Organization (UMNO), suffered from vehement factionalism. An opposing
faction challenged Mahathir's leadership. That following April, UMNO held
an election in which Mahathir barely won. In reaction to this challenge to his
authority, Mahathir purged all the opposition faction's members in his
cabinet and from UMNO. Then Mahathir invoked Malaysia's Internal
Securities Act to have peoplh that were critical of the government arrested,
and closed down several newspapers. The political trend in Malaysia is
moving away from pluralism and towards authoritarianism as Mahathir and
UMNO continues to dampen political contention (Case, 1993: 184).
Malaysia does not want any formal alliances or defense arrangements with
the United States. The Malaysian government is the originator of the
ZOPFAN concept and, like Indonesia, still has ambitions of implementing it.
Malaysia values the presence of the United States military as a way of
contributing towards a greater framework of cooperative peace, but the
Malaysians feel there is no need for any larger or more formal arrangement."
Malaysia's Defense Minister Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak has said that Malaysia
was preparing to strengthen bilateral military cooperation with the United
",
95
"No Major Threat In Sight," p. 41.
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States, but it would not involve a new agreement. He has also stated that the
end of the Cold War has made ASEAN leaders feel that conventional security
pacts are obsolete, and there would be no need for an ASEAN military pact to
further strengthen regional security. Minister Najib Razak said the best way
to do this was through bilateral or multilateral cooperation."'
Minister Najib Razak said Malaysia will continue to have defense
cooperation with the United States as both parties benefit from it, but he
made it absolutely clear there would be no misinterpretation of Malaysia's
intentions by stating: "It (the servicing arrangement) is not a defense pact and
will not become one."'97 Najib said the arrangement of servicing American
military aircraft and ships at Malaysian facilities was a commercial
undertaking. Najib was also sure to point out that Malaysia's cooperation was
different from that between the United States and Singapore, which is a more
elaborate agreement, including the stationing of personnel and hardware
such as aircraft.' 98
Malaysia does not want to build an international environment dominated
by perceived American values. Prime Minister Mahathir desires to lead the
developing countries in refuting the West's imposition of its democratic
values, human rights, labor protection standards, and environmental issues
on the developing countries (Case. 1993: 192). Mahathir is a firm proponent
of regional cohesiveness, without dependence upon the United States. He
"""Minister on Expanding U.S Military Cooperation," Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia
Network, September 11, 1 )91. Tran-lated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report,
September 12, 1991, p. 40.
'9 ",Minister Reaffirms Defense Cooperation With U.S.," Bernama, May 5, 1992. Published
in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, September 12, 1991, p. 27.
"'Ibid.
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has developed a "Look East" policy that maintains that the West in not an
appropriate model for Malaysia. Mahathir professes to prefer Japan to the
United States as a role model. This policy states that Malaysia should follow
the examples of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs),
because their values are similar to those of Malaysia's (Neher, 1991: chap. 6).
Referring to the United States' stand on human rights, democracy, and the
environment, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi
stated that the United States inclination for making rules for other countries
will discourage international trust and confidence in its relations with other
countries.
What causes deep resentment that sometimes borders on humiliation is that
an informed body like (U.S.) Congress could pass a resolution or a law that
impinges on the sovereigntv of another country without caring two hoots
about the conditions prevailing in that country... But some of these bills and
resolutions, even if they are not adopted, create uncertainties and ill-feeling
between our countries."
Malaysia does not want the United States to be the leader in encouraging
cooperation in the region. Minister Badawi said the United States should not
oppose the EAEC but instead provide the opportunity for ASEAN countries
to discuss the proposal and decide on the best way of implementing it. He
was commenting on Secretary of State James Baker's statement that the
United States wanted to remain friendly with ASEAN even though it
opposed the EAEC. Minister Badawi stated:
"""Badawi Criticizes U.S. 'Rules for Others,"' Bernama, October 1, 1992. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, October 1, 1992, p. 23.
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However, if the United States opposes the proposal at the outset, in my
opinion it has no confidence in the political stability of ASEAN and in its
capability to decide on what is best for itself and Asia. In this respect, I find it
difficult to reconcile their attitude of friendliness towards ASEAN and at the
same time display a lack of confidence in ASEAN's ability to decide on the
EAEC.O
Minister Badawi is concerned that the United States, as the sole superpower,
was using its influence to interfere in other countries' affairs. "This will be
particularly so if such interference indicated that it did not respect and
acknowledge the ability of small countries to manage their own affairs."2 °"
In the Malaysian government's view, the EAEC issue has damaged the
United States' reputation as being an unbiased benign power. Referring to the
United States' rejection of the EAEC, Prime Minister Mahathir said:
That country (the U.S.) will not just stop there. It may resort to a certain
form of action and this means violating the concept of a free and
independent nation... If the U.S. objects to the EAEC concept mooted by
Malaysia, it should decide so on its own accord and not force other countries
to back its decision."22
Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba urged the United States to allow
East Asian countries to determine the fate of the proposed EAEC without
having its influence bearing on them. Ghafar Baba said the anxiety of the
United States over the setting up of the EAEC was baseless because he did not
think that any country would want to confront it, and even if any member of
"2"Minister: U.S. Stand on EAEC Unacceptable," p. 23.
201 Ibid.
202
"Mahathir: U.S. Disrespectful of Others' Rights," p. 45.
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the EAEC wanted to go against the United States the others would not follow
suit.1n
To compound things further, Malaysian officials view NAFTA as another
U.S. tool to exert its influence in the region. Foreign Minister Badawi has
criticized the United States for trying to divide Asian countries and described
the Washington policy as a "divide and influence" strategy. He said that the
United States' proposal to include Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan in
NAFTA amounted to an attempt to divide Asian countries. He urged fellow
Asian countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation to counter the U.S.
policy.' Like many others, Malaysia would prefer a universal trading system
like GATT, but if regionalism is to be chosen, Malaysia wants its own region.
Malaysia may want a United States military presence in Southeast Asia,
but the Malaysian government does not trust the United States to solve
conflicts in the region. Prime Minister Mahathir said any United States
interference in the claims to the Spratly Islands would undermine
negotiations to settle the situation.
We have agreed that the issue must be settled through negotiations. I think
that such negotiations will be undermined if the United States interferes.2
"
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D. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL CONCERNS
The current leadership of the Philippines has been democratically elected,
but Philippine history has been marred with corrupt and authoritarian
leadership in the period following its independence from the United States.
The processes and principles of democracy in the Philippines are
fundamentally flawed. Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the
Philippines in 1965. In 1972, President Marcos declared a state of emergency
due to civil unrest and plots against the regime, and imposed martial law that
lasted for nine years. In 1977, Marcos announced measures to ease martial
law, but he retained power to rule by aecree. In November of that year it was
estimated that there were fifty thousand civilian deaths since 1972, due to
fighting between the Philippine government and rebels.' Marcos directed
the end of martial law in 1981, but he was reelected for another six year term
under questionable circumstances.
In 1985, President Reagan sent Senator Paul Laxalt to the Philippines to
persuade Marcos to make economic and political reforms. Marcos decided to
hold another election and invited United States personnel to observe it.
Corazon Aquino, wife of Senator Benigno Aquino, announced her intention
to run for president. Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino was Marcos' most ardent
political opponent and had much of the popular support in the Philippines.
He was imprisoned when Marcos declared martial law; spent almost eight
years in jail; and then was exiled to the United States for reasons of poor




'Stanley Karnow, In Our hina le: Americas Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random
House, 1989) p. 440.
112
A new election was held on February 7, 1986. President Marcos declared
an early victory. The next day, Corazon Aquino claimed her own victory in
the election and charged Marcos with massive fraud. Both sides charged that
the votes were manipulated and denied any tampering by their respective
supporters. President Reagan, supporting the Aquino claim, offered Marcos
political asylum in the United States. Marcos was persuaded to resign and
was given asylum in Hawaii.
President Aquino had faced six coup attempts during her presidency, all of
which failed. The first occurred on August 28, 1987, staged by a Colonel in the
AFP. The last occurred on December 1, 1989, attempted by army rebels.
President Bush ordered American F-4 fighters to take to the air as a token of
his support for President Aquino.
The American bases in the Philippines became a point of friction between
the United States and the Philippines in the 1990's. The new Philippine
Constitution, adopted during the Aquino Administration, prohibited the
stationing of foreign military personnel in the Philippines unless it was
covered under a treaty. The United States' lease on Clark Air Force Base and
Subic Bay Naval Station was going to end in 1992. Negotiations for continued
American use of these facilities became a means for the Philippine
government to manipulate the United States for increased foreign aid.
The value of the bases was greatly diminished in June 1991, when Mt.
Pinatubo erupted. Both Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay were heavily
damaged. It was determined that it would not be cost effective to rebuild
Clark Air Force Base. Pessimistic that the base leases were not going to be
extended, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, chairman of the House Armed
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Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, reasoned:
"...What's the point of spending a fortune to put it all back together if it's all
going to come apart again?""
By September 1991, the United States negotiators had made their final
offer for the bases. The Philippine Senate then proceeded to vote down the
.extension of the leases. The last American Military personnel stationed in
the Philippines left that country in November 1992.
The May 1992 election in the Philippines ended two decades of uncertainty
over political pluralism. The election had seven different parties contending
for the presidency, vice-presidency, and congressional posts. It was one of the
most peaceful and fair elections in the Philippine post-independence period.
Fidel Ramos, a graduate of West Point and presumably friendly to the United
States, won the presidential election, but he received only 23.4 percent of the
popular vote, which can scarcely to be considered a mandate from the
Philippine people.
The Philippine government is now shifting its emphasis in foreign policy
from the United States to its East Asian neighbors. The "special relationship"
it had with the United States ended with the closure of American facilities on
Philippine bases. The Ramos administration realizes that many of its
problems can not be resolved with only domestic policy. President Ramos has
visited five other East Asian countries in his first seven months in office. In
the entire time as president, Corazon Aquino visited only four East Asian
countries, all of which were members of ASEAN.
"" Pamela Fessler, "Mount Pinatubo May Reshape Debate Over Military Bases,"
Congressional Quarterly, June 29, 1491, p. 1771.
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After almost an entire century of being under the political leadership of
the United States, the Philippine government now insists on asserting itself
in international relations without the United States. Former Philippine
Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus described the United States as a
stumbling block to the Philippine's independent foreign policy initiatives. He
said Washington and majority of the European governments even
"discourage international foundations from extending support to it (Filipino
independent foreign policy).,"" When the Ramos administration was
assumed leadership, Roberto Romulo replaced Raul Manglapus as Foreign
Affairs Secretary. One of Secretary Romulo's first statements concerning the
United States was that the good days of Philippine-U.S. relations were over.
He said the Philippines' interests are now with Japan which not only helps
the Philippines but other Asian countries as well.' President Ramos also
called for stronger ties with Europe and Southeast Asia following the
Philippines' departure from its old ally the United States."'
Filipinos feel that with the Clinton Administration in office, political
relations between the two countries have a more solid, yet independent
future. Philippine Senator Orlando Mercado, the Senate chairman on
national defense and security committee, stated that Philippine-U.S. relations
"could see a rebirth of a new type of relationship between our countries based
"' ,Manglapus: U.S. Blocking Diplomatic Initiatives," Philippine Daily, June 7, 1992, pp.
1, 13. Published in FBIS East Asia Dailiy Report, June 8, 1992, p. 42.
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on post-military bases concerns; it may be easier to do that under a new
leadership in the United States.""' In March 1993, President Ramos referred
to the Philippine-U.S. relationship by saying: "Despite the enormous
transformation that the world had undergone, the basic relationship between
our two governments, countries, and peoples remains firm and
cooperative.""2
The Philippine government does not believe that a bilateral mutual
defense agreement is necessarily the best relationship in the post-Cold War
era. Ramos would prefer a broader treaty of mutual cooperation. While on a
visit to Singapore in March 1993, President Ramos stated publicly that: "the
present approach to regional security is not military alliances, but sustained
economic progress and political stability.""'
Filipinos do not want to make their security alliances with the United
States the primary focus of U.S.-Philippine relations. Secretary Romulo said
that Philippines is willing to renegotiate with the U.S. over a new treaty of
friendship and cooperation but which will supersede security arrangements.
He said the new treaty should concentrate on trade and economic matters.
"The objective is to improve mutual relations on a complementary basis.""21"
2,, Ibid.
2,2 Bert Castro, "Ramos Wants 'Hiih.!, Level' Review of U.S. Ties," The Manila Chronicle,
March 8, 1993, p. 1. Published in Fils Eaýt Asia Daily Report, March 8, 1993, p. 43.
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The Ramos administration is not willing to scrap the current security
agreement with the United States. President Ramos has stated:
... it should be pointed out that the Mutual Defense Treaty, which lies at the
core of security arrangements between the Philippines and the United States,
cries for a new bracing breath of life. Framed and adopted at the height of
the Cold War, when American and free world strategy was based on the idea
of surrounding the Soviet empire with bases of military and economic
strength, the Mutual Defense Treaty has now to be reexamined in the context
of the post-Cold War era. Its concept, its thrust, and its scope have to be
attuned to the realities of a world tormented by new conflicts and rivalries
and faced with new trials and challenges."'1
Senior Philippine defense and military officials have said they support the
Ramos administration's plan to review and amend the MDT to meet the
"prevailing regional security situation.""2 ' Many Philippine officials feel there
is a need to update the MDT because "it was formulated to combat
communism in the region." After the Cold War ended, security officials
believed there was a need to improve the existing bilateral security
arrangements between Manila and Washington.21 7
The Ramos administration does share the United States objectives of
democratization and the protection of human rights. President Ramos said
in a January 1993, letter to President Clinton:
"Address by President Fidel V. Ramos at the Subic Bay Base Closure Ceremony," p. 38.
2,6 Manny Mogato, "Military, Defense Officials Back MDT Review," The Manila






We share likewise your commitment and support for a better world order
where democratic values reign and where ideological conflicts are replaced
by cooperative efforts for enduring peace and development.. .In behalf of the
government and the Filipino people, I extend to you our heartfelt and
warmest wishes as you assume the highest office of the nation whose single
leadership in the world will greatly influence its course in the next
millennium."1 8
E. SINGAPOREAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
On May 9, 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia and became its own
nation-state. However, Singapore had been a self-governing state since 1959.
Singapore has always had a one-party dominated political system and an
authoritarian type government with a high level of social planning. The
Singaporean press is censored and its people do not enjoy the right to
freedom of speech. Singapore's economic success has, thus far, exceeded the
people's need for political pluralism. It would be foolish for the United States
to push for democracy and human rights and expect to keep on good terms
with Singapore.
Singapore is linked with the United States by security, economic, and
political bonds. The political ties though, are based less on a common
ideologies, but more on common interests. Singapore views its relationship
with the United States as based on the common interest of a commitment "to
a world order in which the rule of law prevails and free trade creates
prosperity all around.""21 Singaporeans see the U.S. as a benign power that has
played the leading role in trying to bring about such a world order, not least in
"
2 
"Ramos Congratulates Clinton on Inauguration," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 21,
1993, pp. 1, 9. Published in FBIS Eist Asia Daily Report, January 21, 1993, p. 50.
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East Asia. The ties between the two countries are based on a sense of
continuity, heightened by the need to face the challenges of the post-Cold War
world.'
An area where it is clear that the U.S. and Singapore separate on ideology
is Singapore's view of nondemocratic regimes in the region. Singapore sees
the non-ASEAN states in Indochina as having having great potential for
extending the opportunity to develop trade and economic ties (Buszynshi,
1992: 833). This is by no means inconsistent with Singapore's stated interests.
For the most part, developing trade and economic ties is Singapore's ideology.
Where the United States' ideology conflicts the most with Singapore's
interests is the U.S. insistence on tying human rights and democracy issues to
economic policy. Singaporean leaders do feel that an East Asian country can
have a market economy and a nondemocratic polity. Lee Kuan Yew has said
that it would be a mistake for the Clinton Administration to "make a strong
push for democracy and human rights in Asia.""z Lee said Indonesia and
China could not be made to change overnight. "Mr. Clinton should not
meddle with the situation by bringing in the politics of democracy and
human rights and pressing it too hard." 2" Lee believes it is difficult for
American policy makers to understand that East Asian governments operate
under their own style of political/economic systems. Lee has stated:
•2o Ibid.
"2 "Minister Cautions Clinton on Democracy Push," Singapore Broadcasting Corporation,
January 19, 1993. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 21, 1993, p. 36.
222 Ibid.
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The economy in China is, by and large, capitalist but the polity is not, as in
the West, liberal democratic To many Westerners, this is a contradiction...
What is improper is to say that East Asia cannot have a model of its own,
there being eventually a single universal pattern of economic and political
development for all countries.. .it would be unfortunate if the West were
tovview the East Asian political economy as a threat to its power, much as
communism was seen till recently."
Singapore feels that the United States is making a grave error in
pressuring China over human rights issues. The Singaporean government
believes the pressure by the U.S. is creating instability in the region. Lee Kuan
Yew has openly warned that this is an impending mistake of "historical
proportions," saying it would have far-reaching implications for all Asian
countries. Lee said if China's trading privileges with the United States were
withdrawn, it would affect Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN.
Without the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, Lee believes that China
would have less incentive to maintain peace in the region.2 "4 Singapore is
very relieved that in 1993, the Clinton Administration has extended MFN to
China for another year.
Singapore's opinion is that the United State's policy towards China is
wrong. Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng said that the U.S. should not
constantly push China over human rights issues and subject it to annual
battles over MFN status.2" Singapore feels that China will be more stable and
less aggressive if the United States were to enhance its economic ties with
"
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China regardless of China's internal problems. Defense Minister Dr. Yeo Ning
Hong said:
...if China continued with her economic reforms and becomes further
enmeshed in the international economy, the incentive for her to behave
responsibly and preserve the world order would grow. This signals that
China wants to concentrate on modernizing her economy. A stable and
prosperous China, at peace and cooperating with its neighbors, will add to
the momentum of growth in the region."'
Singaporean officials feel that President Clinton's human-rights stand -,n
China is the biggest problems East Asia presently faces.' They do not think
that American policy makers understood that China would have "lost face" if
its MFN status was revoked, or if China was forced to comply with
humiliating conditions concerning its domestic policies.2" This loss of face
will make China resentful and non-cooperative. A non-cooperative China
may not be able to hit back economically, but it can do so in other ways, such
as in the United Nations Security Council where it holds veto power.'
Singapore is dependent on the benign power of the United States, to
maintain stability in the region. For this reason Singapore has strengthened
its military and political ties with the United States. However, Singapore's
national interests come into conflict with the U.S.' human rights policies.
Singaporean policy makers do not share the American view that the
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nondemocratic regimes in the region should be isolated. They feel this runs
counter to security and economic concerns in the region.
F. THAI POLITICAL CONCERNS
Thailand has spent much of its post-World War II history under military
leadership. Thai Army commander-in-chief, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, became
Prime Minister in 1957, and he declared martial law and ran the country as a
dictator until 1963. He was succeeded by Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who
continued to rule Thailand militarily. In October 1973, the Thai people
revolted against Thanom and forced his administration into exile. Thailand
was under civilian rule for only three years before the military overthrew it.
The Thai military again declare martial law and annulled the Thai
constitution. Thailand remained under a military government until 1988.
General Prem Tinsulanond was Prime Minister of Thailand from 1980 to
1988. During his reign, he progressed Thailand from a dictatorial society to a
democratic one. General Prem voluntarily relinquished his power in 1988.
Thailand held a presidential election and the party that Chatichai
Choonhavan led received the most votes. Chatichai became Thailand's first
civilian prime minister since 1976. The transition from Prem to Chatichai
was smooth and without interference from the military. However,
democracy in Thailand was not stable. Internal factionalism, corruption, and
dissent undermined the government. The Chatichai regime was overthrown
by the Thai military, led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon, in February 1991.
Elections were held in March 1992, in which the pro-military party,
Samakkitham, won the majority of the votes. Narong Wongwan, the leader
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of the Samakkitham party was named prime minister. However, he was not
able to assume the post because it had been revealed in a press conference by
U.S. officials that Narong had been denied a visa to enter the U.S. in 1991 due
to his suspected ties with narcotics trafficking. Finally General Suchinda was
nominated as prime minister. Public protests ensued from Thais who did not
want the government to be run by military officials. The military used force
to suppress these protests and many Thai civilians were killed, injured, or
arrested. The King stepped in and ordered Suchinda and the military to end
the violence and reconcile with the protesters. Suchinda was obligated to
retire from politics.
A new election was conducted in September 1992. Two anti-Suchinda
parties, the Democrat party and the New Aspiration party, won the most seats
in the election. The leader of the Democrat party, Chuan Leekpai, was
appointed as Thailand's prime minister.
Thailand does not feel it is necessary to have its alliances and defense
arrangements with the United States strengthened. As mentioned
previously, the Thai Foreign Ministry no longer believes, Thailand is being
threatened by its neighbors, and the end of the Cold War has made some Thai
officials feel that the alliances with the United States may no longer be
necessary. For this same reason, Thailand does not feel there is a need for a
regional security pact either.
Thailand no longer views nondemocratic regimes in the region as threats
to Thai interests. Thai official also believe that isolating these regimes will
not encourage them to open up politically and economically. In March 1993,
Thai Foreign Minister Prasong Sunsiri told U.S. Pentagon officials that
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Thailand would continue its policy of "constructive engagement" with
Burma's military government in hopes of gradually influencing the regime.
He said the measures imposed by the international community are hurting
the Burmese people and not SLORC.2 3
Thailand, along with Singapore, sees the non-ASEAN states in Indochina
as having great potential for extending the opportunity to develop trade and
economic ties (Buszynshi, 1992: 833). Thailand is negotiating with Vietnam to
establishing a joint commission to facilitate economic ties between the two
countries, and Thailand is also having discussions with Laos uver closer
Thai-Laos cooperation. The Thais are working on their own relations with
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia without too much regard for the position of
the United States.
Thai Foreign Ministry officials agree with Singaporean officials concerning
the United States' policies towards China. The Thais feel that even if
President Clinton takes a tougher stand on China, it will not cause the
Chinese leaders to think twice before cracking down on pro-democracy
citizens, and it would make China take a more aggressive stance in the
region." However, Thailand is not against the policy of promoting its own
version of human rights and democracy. Foreign Minister Prasong Sunsiri
told members of both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate that
the Thai government attached importance to promoting democracy and
"
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human rights and promoting good relations between the two countries."'
Thai Foreign Ministry officials believe Thailand has a good record on human
rights and democracy despite the political violence that occurred in May 19ý2,
and they are confident that with the Chuan government will improve
Thailand's image in the eyes of the Clinton Adr-2nistration.' Prime
Minister Chuan has expressed his support for human rights policies. "The
U.S. should continue its role in support of democratic developrnvnt world-
wide."'
Foreign Minister Prasong has said he does not foresee any problems with
Thai-U.S. relations because the Chuan administration operates under a
democratic system and, therefore, there should be no obstacles to working
together to solve problems. He said he was confident that political relations
between the two countries would be strengthened because Thailand is a
democratic country.' Following the 1992 U.S. Presidential election, Thai
House Foreign Affairs Committee spokesman Sutham Saengprathum staled:
The (Thai) government's clear emphasis on issues such as human rights and
child abuse will enhance Thailand's ties with the U.S. under President-elect
Clinton because of his special interest in these areas... The committe?
believes good relations in both economic and social terms will continue
under the Democratic president. This is because Mr. Clinton has given
special attention to human rights, the environment and unfa.r trade
practices.'
"232 "Meets U.S. House, Senate Members," Bangkok Radio Thailand Network, March 12,
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Prime Minister Chuan expects the Clinton Administration to pursue close
ties with Asia and the Pacific, support for democracy, domestic economic
recovery and support for free trade. Chuan would like to see the United
States maintain its close political, economic and military ties with countries
in Asia and the Pacific.'
G. BURMESE POLITICAL CONCERNS
The State Law and Order Restoration Council was established in 1988 after
the Burmese people revolted against the military in an attempt to secure
political rights. Since gaining its independence from Britain in 1948, Burma
has spent much of its time under military rule. Burma's first head of state
was U Nu. His government was bureaucratically weak, which resulted in
political and economical problems for the country. Burma was in such
turmoil by 1958, that U Nu turned over the functioning of the government to
the military. The Burmese military, under the leadership of General Ne Win,
stabilized the country's economic and political problems. U Nu returned to
leadership by 1960, but the country's problems returned under his leadership.
The current era of military rule in Burma began in March 1962, when
General Ne Win led a military coup to oust the U Nu government. Ne Win
felt that Burmese culture was not compatible with the West's systems of
government, so he disbanded the Burmese government, outlawed all
political parties, and repressed Burmese civil liberties. Ne Win centralized
the government and socialized the economy. There was only one legal
political party, called the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). The BSPP
"
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was controlled by the military and was formed to mobilize support for the Ne
Win government.
In 1974, Burma adopted a socialist constitution that transformed Burma
into the Socialist Republic ot the Union of Burma. The military initiated this
constitution to hand all of Burma's political power to the BSPP. The BSPP
was used by the military as a means to legitimize its political domination of
the country. Burma's repressive military government, socialist style
economy, and isolationist foreign policy combined to retard the development
of the country. Burmese citizens staged a massive demonstration in 1988 in
protest of the military government's policies. The military brutally
suppressed the revolt, which came to be known as the "Rangoon Spring." To
restore order to the country, the military established the State Law and Order
Restoration Council. SLORC consisted of generals who were loyal to Ne Win
and were given the task of administering the state. Ne Win resigned as
president in 1981, but remained chairman of the BSPP.
SLORC organized an election in May 1990, to select a legislative body for
the People's Assembly. By this time SLORC had legalized political parties in
Burma. However, if opposition parties criticized the military regime, or its
policies, the opposition leaders were arrested and stripped of any civil liberties
they might of had. SLORC enforced total censorship to control the election to
ensure only candidates that supported the military regime would be elected.
Unexpectedly, the opposition party, the National League for Democracy
(NLD), won almost all of the seats in the election. As a result, the winner of
the Nobel prize, Aung San Suu Kyi, emerged victorious, but the military
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regime refuse to turn the government over the reins to the properly elected
winners.
The military attempted to legitimize its continued direct rule of Burma by
drafting a new constitution in 1992. A National Convention assembled in
January and February 1993, to amend the constitution. The convention
consisted of over six hundred delegates representing ethnic groups, political
parties, and professional groups in Burma. The new constitution was similar
to the 1974 constitution with the exception that socialism would not be
mentioned; more than one party will be allowed; and the military will have
the constitutional right to lead the Burma. The outcome of the National
Convention was that the new constitution was not approved. The
convention produced a written statement that said the people of Burma
desire to build democracy, and military leadership of the country would not
be in "harmony" with developing democratic principles.'
SLORC is changing its domestic policies with the intention of changing
international perceptions of Burma. Burma's state of martial law, that began
in July 1989, was ostensibly ended in September 1992. Also in 1992, Burma
rejoined the Nonaligned Movement and singed the 1949 Geneva
Convention. SLORC has agreed to admit U.N. officials into the country, but it
continues to reject the U.N. over human rights violations.
At the July 1992 ASEAN meeting in Manila, U.S. Secretary of States, James
Baker, requested ASEAN memvers to take a stand against human rights
violations in Burma. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have criticized Burma for
its abuses against Arakanese refugees, but these statements were inspired by
... Bertil Lintner, "Conventional Wisdom," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1993,
p. 20.
128
the fact these refugees are Muslim. ASEAN decided not to follow Baker's
request, but to engage SLORC in a constructive dialogue concerning human
rights.
Burmese leaders do not want the United States to play any political r'ole in
the region. The U.S. is SLORC's most vocal critic concerning human rights
and democracy. SLORC does not want to submit to American views or
values. Although Burma is breaking from its isolationism, it is far from
seeking political integration with the rest of the region. Burma's opening up
is not inspired by political reasons, but by economic concerns. These are the
facts with which the American government must accord.
H. CAMBODIAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
Cambodia's political future is uncertain. The May 1993 election can not be
expected to yield political stability in Cambodia. The factionalism in this
country may serve as a source of instability that will undermine the elected
government. It appears that the Khmer Rouge will be the greatest instigator
of instability if it does not hold the leadership position. KR guerrillas have
been very active in opposing UNTAC forces and will not cease their
operations after the May election.
Regardless of which faction wins the majority of votes in the May election,
insurgency will be the prominent problem facing the new government. The
Cambodian government will not have reached a level of self-sufficiency that
would enable it to put down insurgency. It will require huge amounts of aid
from the international community.
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The Cambodian government will require more than just military aid to
suppress insurgency. It will need aid to rebuild its society if there is to be less
impetus for insurgents. In October 1992, Prince Norodom Chakkrapong, Vice
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the State of Cambodia, received U.S.
envoy Charles Twining. He told Twining that the SOC needs assistance from
the U.S. in three areas: education, social and public health, and agriculture.
These are the major sectors where Cambodia's progress and prosperity could
be quickly promoted.' Prince Norodom Sihanouk has called on the U.S. not
to interfere in Cambodia's internal affairs, but he has asked the U.S. to devote
attention to the restoration of Cambodia's economy.2 '0 Different from his own
son, Prince Sihanouk knows he needs U.S. support, but he still begrudges the
United States for the coup that overthrew his government in 1970.
Sihanouk, who is chairman of the SNC, has stated that he thinks the United
States can play an important role in Cambodia, but he does not want
interference in Cambodia's political affairs. "I wish the United States would
avoid something like the happening in 1970 when President Nixon and his
advisor Kissinger supported Lon Nol against Sihanouk.""'
Regardless of the election outcome, Cambodians will want a United States
to join with others in providing support for the country. However, Phnom
Penh will not be willing to submit to American views and will not want the
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United States to provide leadership on matters affecting Cambodia's national
interests. Cambodia will not be bound to the United States by political ties,
but it may seek a multilateral defense arrangement because of Cambodia's
vulnerability.
I. LAOTIAN POLITICAL CONCERNS
Laos was a colony of France from the late nineteenth century until the
Laotians received their independence in 1954. During World War HI Laos was
occupied by the Japanese. After the Japanese were defeated, France reclaimed
Laos as its colony. The French then encountered insurgency from a pro-
communist, anti-French nationalist group called the Neo Lao Hak Sat
(NLHS). The military arm of the NLHS was the Pathet Lao. After Laos
gained its independence, there was much competition between the Pathet Lao
and Laotian right-wing Royalist forces for control of the country. The United
States sponsored a failed coup attempt against Lao Premier Souvanna
Phouma. Washington believed Souvanna Phouma was too much of a
neutralist and could not be depended on to take a stance against the Lao
communists. After the coup attempt failed, the United States continued to
give support to right-wing military officials and went so far as to back
Souvanna Phouma after his policies opposed the NLHS.2`
Laos became swept up in the Vietnam War, and the struggle between right
and left wing forces in Laos became a higher priority for the United States.
This led to further U.S. intervention in Laotian internal affairs. At the end of
the war, a peace accord was signed that established a provisional government
"2Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New7 International Era, p. 198.
131
in Laos that was divided between the Pathet Lao and Royalists. In 1975, the
Pathet Lao gained complete control of the government and declared the
establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). Vientiane
then centralized the economy and stopped free market practices in the
country. Laos also became an ally of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.
The ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party's legitimacy is becoming
increasingly unstable due to Laos's poor economic performance. The LPDR
has recognized this and has made economic prosperity its major political
concern. The Laotian government fears that what occurred in the Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe might happen in Laos. Vientiane is now
seeking wider relations with the West, primarily for aid and investment
purposes. Laos adopted a new constitution in 1991 that indicated that changes
would be made in the centralized government. Thus far, changes have been
made only in the economic rniistrls.
In July 1992, Laos signed the Bali Treaty, which enable the country to be
granted "observer status" in ASEAN. Vientiane is seeking better relations
with its neighbors to develop potential investors and sources of economic aid,
because Laos no longer has the financial backing from the Soviet Union or
Vietnam. Laos still receives aid from China, but it is not sufficient to meet
Laotian economic requirements.
Although the United States had not had an ambassador to Laos since 1975,
the U.S. had never broken relations with Vientiane. In August 1992, the
American charge d'affaires to Laos was upgraded to an ambassadorship. The
United States' primary interests in Laos have been stemming the opium trade
and resolving Missing In Action (MIA) issues. Laotian leaders desire
132
increased trade, aid, and investment from the United States, but still fear
America as the principle treat to the LPDR's continued rule (Johnson, 1993).
Vientiane believes that the United States will attempt to undermine the Lao
government by "peaceful evolution," but the LPDR realize that it will not get
aid from the IMF and the World Bank unless the United States is
-accommodated.2"3 Americans must ask themselves if the time has come to
change their stance towards Laos.
The LPDR welcomed the upgrading of diplomatic relations with the
United States and is hopeful that it will lead to stronger bilateral ties. In
August 1992, the Lao Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA),
Nouhak Phoumsavan, received the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to
Laos, Charles Salmon. The SPA chairman said that the upgrading of
diplomatic relations represents another step toward escalating and promoting
the bilateral relations and cooperation between the two countries and their
governments.'" Lao Party Secretary of the Vientiane Prefecture and Mayor of
the city Oudom Khatthi-gna congradulated Ambassador Salmon for his
appointment and hoped that during his diplomatic post the friendly relations
between the two countries would further prosper for the benefits of Lao and
Americans.24"
Laos does remain wary of the United States' foreign policy intentions.
Laotians feel the Americans have been using Southeast Asia as a
"2'3Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 153.
"
2
""Assembly Chairman Receix es U.S. Envoy," Vitthayou Hengsat Radio Network, August
29, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, August31, 1992, p. 26.
"
2
"'U.S. Envoy Meets With Vientiane Mayor," Vientiane KPL, September 5, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, September 8, 1992, pp. 30-31.
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"springboard" to defend the Umted States' national interests and to
"suppress" the people of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.`' They assert the
United States has been trying to use ASEAN as a tool to implement American
policy against the states of Indochina.2"7 Laos is also suspicious of the Clinton
administration's motive behind its human rights policy. Laotians feel
President Clinton puts more emphasis on the issues of democracy and
human rights than his predecessor, and Clinton regards them as a bargaining
chip in dealing with other governments.'
J. VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CONCERNS
Vietnam began the twentieth century as a colony of France. During World
War II, the Japanese occupied Vietnam but the French continued in the
administration of the country. After the Japanese surrender, the leader of the
communist Vietminh, Ho Chi Minh, declared Vietnam's independence from
France. However, France regained its rule of Vietnam until French military
forces were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The 1954 Geneva Agreement
divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel to temporarily separate the Vietminh
and French forces. Upon national elections the country was to be reunified,
but an anti-Vietminh regime formed in the South that blocked the election
and declared itself an independent country. After years of fighting that
"
2
"'Southeast Asia-the Path to Establishment of Lasting Security," p. 41.
2" Ibid.
"" "Commentary Views Clinton'.* Election Victory," Vientiane Vitthayou Hengsat Radio
Network, November 5, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report,
November 5, 1992, p. 41.
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included U.S. intervention on the side of the South, the North defeated the
South in 1975, reunifying the country as a communist state.
Vietnam has remained a communist state and is facing difficult economic
times because the United States has placed an embargo on Vietnam. Vietnam
has lost its economic and political support from China and its communist
allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese leaders
realize that if they are going to retain power, they must pursue economic
policies that are contradictory to their goal of maintaining Vietnam's
socialism (Avery, 1993: 67).
The goal of Vietnam's foreign policy has changed from promoting
international communism and isolating its society from Western influences,
to maximizing good relations with any country, especially if it will benefit
Vietnam economically. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam
said the Vietnamese government's foreign policy aim is "to broaden its
relations with all the countries in the world in service of peace and
development in Vietnam, as well as of peace and stability in the region and
elsewhere in the world.""' 9 Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam stated that
Vietnam's new foreign policy of diversifying and multilateralising relations
to be friends with all countries in the world community including the U.S.,
on the principles of respecting independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity and non-interference into internal affairs of each other.'
Vietnam's new foreign policy has paid particular attention to the members
of ASEAN. It is using its withdrawal from Cambodia as a signal to the
"249 "More on Nguyen Manh Cam-Baker Meeting,"p. 28.
"25O"Foreign Minister's Activities in U.S. Reported," Hanoi VNA, October 10, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, October 16, 1992, p. 55.
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ASEAN states that they should no longer view Vietnam as a threat, but as a
country willing to cooperate with ASEAN to enhance regional stability.
Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co emphasized Vietnam's
determination to contribute toward peace, stability, friendship, and
cooperation in Southeast Asia. He said that Vietnam is ready to establish
relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries in the region and
the world, including the US, on the basis of respect for each other, equality,
and mutual benefit.'1
In January 1993, the Voice of Vietnam Network broadcasted the following
statement in reference to its relations with ASEAN:
...It is Vietnam's position to respect Cambodian sovereignty on the basis of
respect for the sovereignty and security of nations. Vietnam wishes to see
the return of peace and independence in Cambodia in order to meet the
desire of the Cambodian people, and also the Vietnamese people, to live in
peace and friendship."2
Premier Vo Van Kiet has stated that in pursuance of Vietnam's foreign policy
of independence, sovereignty, diversification of relations and friendship with
all countries, Vietnam has relations and strengthened its relations with the
countries of ASEAN and Northern and Western Europe and Japan, and now
wishes early normalization of relations with the U.S. in the interests of the
two peoples and to regional peace and stability.'
"Deputy Minister's Activitie.s in U.S. Reported," Voice of Vietnam Network, May 27,
1992. Translated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, June 2, 1992, p. 54.
"
252Tieu Lien, "No Preconditions for Normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese Relations," Voice of
Vietnam Network, January 30, 1993. Transi.ited and published in FBIS East Asia Daily
Report, February 1, 1993, pp. 66-67.
"2S3 "Vo Van Kiet Receives Former U.S. Officials," Hanoi VNA, March 21, 1992. Published
in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, March 25, 1992, p. 35.
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Vietnam further strengthened its ties with ASEAN by signing the Bali
Treaty, which enable ASEAN to grant Vietnam "observer status." This is a
significant step towards integrating Vietnam into the international
community, but Vietnamese leaders still see the major obstacle to their
foreign policy goal's as the United States' refusal to normalize diplomatic
relations with Vietnam-or more importantly, lifting the trade embargo
against Vietnam. Vietnam's First Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai has
stated:
Vietnam's policy vis-a-vis the United States is clear and consistent.
Vietnam's foreign policy is an open-door policy aimed at establishing
friendly relations with all countries in the world. The United States is a
major power with an important role in the world. Vietnam is prepared to
establish and maintain relations of equality, mutual respect, and mutual
benefit with all countries. 4
Phan Van Khai said that he believed President Clinton would "certainly
continue to cooperate with Vietnam with regard to better resolving
humanitarian problems and promoting the process of normalization with
Vietnam.""s He also stressed the benefits the U.S. would gain by normalizing
relations. "Vietnam maintains that the U.S. Government should soon
change its decision, shake off the past, and lift the embargo in order to create
favorable conditions for American investors to do business with Vietnam at a
time when Vietnam's policy on economic cooperation is highly favorable to
foreign investors."'
"S,"'Deputy Premier Comments on U.S. 'ies," p. 55.
"'s "Deputy Premier Proposes Normalization With U.S." Hong Kong AFP, November 5, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 5, 1992, pp. 53-54.
216 "Phan Van Khai Meets U.S. Businessmen," p. 62.
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Vietnam feels the MIA issue is the major obstacle to lifting the embargo
and normalizing relations with the United States. Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman Ho The Lan said: "...what we could do, we have already
fulfilled."'" The spokeswoman has also said:
Vietnam acknowledged some positive steps taken by the U.S., including the
reopening of telecommunications links with Vietnam, lifting restrictions on
nongovernmental organizations' aid to Vietnam, and granting permission
to private U.S. companies and organizations to export necessities to
Vietnam. But these moves are few as compared with requirements of both
countries and with Vietnam's own efforts.'
Vietnamese Party General Secretary Do Muoi has stated that in the past
Vietnam has always shown its goodwill toward the United States. He said
that in recent years, Vietnam has cooperated with the U.S. to solve
humanitarian questions left behind by the war waged by the United States.
However, there are still numerous obstacles to friendly relations between the
U.S. and Vietnam imposed bv the United States, the biggest of these concerns
is the MIA issue. He stated that public opinion in both Vietnam and the U.S.
supports the lifting of the United States' embargo against Vietnam and the
normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam is "in the interests of the two
peoples and of peace, cooperation and development throughout the world."'
2
.
7 Anurat Maniphan and Phai'.an Siricharatchanva, "VN Watching U.S. Election With
Raised Hopes," Bangkok Post, October 27, 1992, p. 4. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily
Report, October 27, 1992, pp. 65-66.
"
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"'Further on Relations With China, U.S.," Voice of Vietnam, July 3, 1992. Published in
FBIS East Asia Daily Report, July 3, 1992, pp. 52-53.
"
2
"'Hanoi Hails U.S. Presidential Envoy's Visit," Voice of Vietnam, February 7, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report. February 7, 1992, pp. 52-53.
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Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai said that the best, most constructive way
for the United States to accelerate humanitarian cooperation with Vietnam
would be to lift the trade embargo. As long as the embargo is there, he sail,
an atmosphere of hostility remains. He criticized the U.S. for preventi g the
ASEAN Support Gioup from helping Vietnam pay its debts to the IMF and
World Bank, saying: "This action runs against conscience and is
unacceptable. "26
Premier Vo Van Kiet has sail the Vietnamese government, prompted by
its humanitarianism and responsibility for hundreds of thousands of
Vietnamese families as well as families of Americans missing in action, has
cooperated and is cooperating fully with the United States in solving MIA
issues and other humanitariain questions left behind by the war. He stresses
that the MIA issue has to be considered merely a humanitarian issue, and not
be related to any political issues. Vo Van Kiet also feels that the early
normalization of relations between the two countries will benefit the people
of both countries, and conforms to peace and stability in the region."
However much Vietnam wants to normalize relations with the United
States, it does not want to build an international environment predicated
upon American values. Vietnam is leery of the United States because it has
told Hanoi it should abandon communism and undertake political reforms if
Vietnam truly wanted to normalize rlations. The Vietnamese have also said
that Washington's pursuit of the issue of accounting for U.S. MIAs had the
"Deputy Foreign Minister Views Solomon Visit," Voice of Vietnrim, March 6, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, March 9, 1992, p. 54.
", "Vo Van Kiet, Nguyen Mardi Cam Receive Solarz," Voice of Vietnam Network, January 3,
1992. Translated and published in cBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 6, 1992, pp. 69-70.
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ulterior motive of forcing Hanoi to abandon socialism.' The Vietnamese
government interprets this as a strategy of "peaceful evolution," in which
antisocialist forces with the targets being Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and
China.23
Vietnam does not want the United States to be the leader in encouraging
cooperation in the region. In November 1992, a Vietnamese government
spokesman said that Vietnam considers the U.S. policy of sanctions against
Vietnam as:
...an action running against the world's common trend for peace,
cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes. U.S. policy tramples upon
international law, independence and sovereignty of all nations and the right
to free trade of all countries in the world.2'
Hanoi feels that the United States' decision to extend its trade embargo against
Vietnam shows a lack of goodwill and a move unsuitable to-the present
international situation.' Vietnam feels this is an outdated policy emanating
.:rom a "hostile attitude" which runs counter to the interests of the people of
Vietnam and the United States and does not conform to the trend of
development of the situation in the world and region."
2 Ibid.
263 "The United States Plans To Set Up More Radio Stations Against Socialist Countries in
Asia," Voice of Vietnam Network, September 19, 1992. Translated and published in FBIS East
Asia Daily Report, September 30, 1992, pp. 36-37.
", "Statement Deplores Tighter U.S. Embargo on Cuba," Hanoi VNA, November 2, 1992.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, November 2, 1992, p. 53.
265 Duong Quang Mio-i, "Hanoi Criticizes U.S. Trade Embargo Decision," Voice of Vietnam
Network, September 16, 1992. Tran'dated and published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report,
October 8, 1992, p. 38.
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The Vietnamese government believes the United States' political objective
is to maintain a single superpower world. The main course of the United
States' strategy is to achieve its global supremacy through multilateral
mechanisms, especially through the U.N. and other multilateral
organizations such as the G-7 group, the World Bank, the IMF, and the like.2"
The Vietnamese government does not share the United States' objectives
of democratization and the protection of human rights. Vietnam feels the
U.S. uses the tactic of condemning the governments of those remaining
socialist countries for human rights violations to incite the masses to rise up
to fight, using this as a pretext for external intervention to set up an
administration under U.S. influence.2 "
It feels the U.S. Government is using human rights and the MIA issue as
an excuse to maintain the trade embargo, to produce the effect of ruining the
Vietnamese economy to overthrowing the Vietnamese administration and
discarding its socialist path. Vietnam maintains that by maintaining the trade
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This chapter shows that the United States political assumptions for
Southeast Asia need further reevaluation in the post-Cold War era. U.S.
military and economic influence in the region may still be substantial, but
U.S. political influence in Southeast Asia may have lessened as a result of the
end of the Cold War. Some of America's "friend's and allies" in the region
state that they believe that security alliances are obsolete. This could prove
detrimental to the U.S. strategy of strengthening and building security
alliance in Southeast Asia.
Another major obstacle for United States policy in Southeast Asia may be
human rights and democracy issues. East Asians state that their values are
different from those of the West and it is not appropriate for the developed
countries to apply their values on the developing countries. U.S. security
policy makers must be very clear in defining when human rights and
democracy issues abroad become threats to U.S. national interests.
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V. WHERE DOES THE UNITED STATES GO FROM HERE?
As the United States changes its strategy from global to regional, so should
it adapt its policy assumptions from global to regional. If the United States is
to truly have an effective regional policy in East Asia, American policy
makers should overcome their Cold War policy tendencies and formulate
U.S. policy fit for the geopolitical situation in each region. This survey shows
a single policy towards Southeast Asia is misguided. Each state in the region
has its own interests, and American policies must be formulated with each
individual state, one by one. For U.S. national security policy in Southeast
Asia, policy makers should first define the "ends" they seek to accomplish in
each region. Once the objectives have been defined, it must be implicit that
the "ends" should never be subordinate to the "means."
In the post-Cold War period, American security policy makers must
broadly define what the United States' national interests are in Southeast
Asia, and formulate security policy to support, promote, and protect these
interests. The fundamental part of all American national interests should be
derived from the following: "to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty and prosperity for the
Unite.States."' If U.S. policy makers define national interests that are
something other than what is included in the above statement, then these
`The Constitution of the United States.
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new interests should be thoroughly examined to determine if they will
encroach on other U.S. national interests.
For security policy purposes, national interests should not be subordinate
to the "means" used to accomplish and protect them, nor for other domestic
and international political gains. The intent of this chapter is not to identify
,each specific U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia, but to point out where
Southeast Asian perceptions are different from what American policy makers
believe them to be, and provide policy makers with information that could be
used to effectively adjust for these differences to accomplish security policy
goals in Southeast Asia.
A. BRUNEI
The United States' military policy assumptions are correct with reference
to Brunei. The Bruneian government does feel that the United States'
military presence in Southeast Asia is critical to maintaining stability in the
region. Without the benign power of the United States to ensure stability in
the region, Brunei's national interests could be in jeopardy. Due to its small
size and relatively weak military, Brunei needs the United States to maintain
a significant military presence in the region to provide a disincentive for any
regional hegemon, thus averting the potential for a "power vacuum."
For Brunei, communism remains a threat in the region, but not for
ideological reasons. The largest threat to Bruneian interests is Chinese
expansionism in the South China Sea. China's form of government has been
defined as communist by the international community. Therefore,
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communist forces present a threat to Brunei. However, the form of
government in China is irrelevant to the treat it poses to Bruneian interests.
American national security e assumptions pertaining to Brunei
need to be reevaluated. The United States economic involvement in Brunei
does little to enhance the United States' influence with that country. America
does not account for any significant portion of Brunei's exports, and only nine
percent of its imports come from the United States. Brunei's economic ties to
the United States are very thin.
As pointed out previously, Brunei has no democracy in its political
system. However, it has the highest per capita income in Southeast Asia, and
the needs of its people are well taken care of. This does not fit the American
assumption that nondemocratic regimes are incompatible of sustained
economic reform for the general welfare of its citizens.
Brunei does not conform to American policy makers' political
assumptions either. Brunei is not bound to the United States by political ties,
nor does it desire an alliance with the United States. If the Bruneian
government is reluctant to join the FPDA because it is afraid of offending its
neighbors, then it will most certainly not want to go out on a political limb by
joining in a security agreement with the United States.
Due to the fact that Brunei has a nondemocratic regime, it is most unlikely
that it would base its threat criteria solely on whether another country's
political system is democratic or nondemocratic. It does not view
nondemocratic regimes as threats, simply because these regimes do not have
democracy. "-i this context, Brunei is not inclined to build an international
environment conducive to American values. Also, the Bruneian
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government does not share the United States objectives of democratization
and the protection of human rights.
From the perspective of security policy making, it would not behoove the
United States to push Brunei on democracy and human rights issues, as long
as the lack of the Bruneian people's civil rights does not pose a threat to other
American interests in the region. Pressing democracy and human rights
issues as "ends" in themselves to U.S. security policy would do more harm to
American security interests in the region than it would support them.
Brunei's dependence on America maintaining stability in the region gives the
United States influence and leverage with the government of Brunei. If, in
the future, the United States defines nondemocratic regimes as threats to
American security, then Brunei fits the description of a threat. The United
States could easily loose its influence with Brunei, and its offer of access, if
Americans become more of a threat to the Bruneian regime's legitimacy than
regional military threats.
B. INDONESIA
The Indonesian government does believe that the United States' military
presence in Southeast Asia is important to maintaining stability in the region.
However, a dominant U.S. military presence in the region is not desired by
Indonesian leaders. The Indonesian government feels that stability in the
region will be more enhanced by an increase in U.S. economic involvement,
not through an increase in U.S. military involvement.
For the Indonesian government, communists remain a threat in East
Timor. The Timorese rebels are fighting for their independence and not for
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the promotion of international "communism." Beyond East Timor,
Indonesia sees little threat from "communism." However, Indonesians are
concerned about a power vacuum in the region. This concern is not that a
power vacuum might be formed if the the United States were to withdraw its
military forces from the region, but that the other regional states' anxieties
about a power vacuum could create instability in the region. Indonesian
officials have reasoned that the United States should maintain some form of
military presence in the region to alleviate fears of other countries in the
region.
The United States' economic involvement in Southeast Asia does
enhance the United States' influence in Indonesia. The United States is
Indonesia's second largest export and import market. Although Japan in the
leading foreign investor in Indonesia, U.S. investments in Indonesia are
substantial.
Indonesia has extensive economic ties to the United States, but Indonesia
is more bound to its economic ties with Japan. As stated previously, Japan is
the leading foreign investor in Indonesia and holds over 75 percent of
Indonesia's foreign debt. However, American security policy makers can use
this situation to their advantage. Indonesian officials are hungry for foreign
investment, but do not want to be reliant on Japan as the primary source of
Indonesian foreign investment. Also, Indonesia feels that an increase in U.S.
economic involvement in the region is a greater source of stability than a U.S.
military presence.
Indonesia is an excellent case to illustrate how the United States should
integrate its economic policy with its security policy. An increase in U.S.
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economic involvement in Indonesia would make that county's national
interests more aligned with those of the United States.' The more similar the
two countries national interests are, the more inclined Indonesia will be to
cooperate with the United States on security issues in the region.
The largest hindrances to U.S.-Indonesian political relations are the issues
of human rights and democracy. For this reason Indonesia is not bound to
the United States by political ties. Thus far, the U.S. reaction to the East Timor
incident has had little effect on U.S.-Indonesian security ties. This was made
evident by the fact that although the United States cut in military training
assistance to Indonesia in protest of the Indonesian military's actions in East
Timor, Indonesia continued to offer access to U.S. military forces.
Indonesia will not want a security alliance with the United States if the
United States were to make such a proposal, and Indonesia does not openly
state that it needs any defense arrangements with the United States.
Indonesian officials are very specific in making it known that their offer of
access to the United States is for commercial purposes only. However, this
presents another opportunity for U.S. policy makers to integrate economic
and security policies. The United States can further its endeavors to gain
access for its military forces in Southeast Asia by contracting indigenous
repair facilities and shipyards for the upkeep of deployed units.
It would not be consistent with Indonesia's political history for that
country to view other regimes as threats simply because they are
nondemocratic. Indonesia feels that it is unfair that developed countries
apply Western democratic and human rights values on the developing
countries. Thus, Indonesia does not want to build an international
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environment conducive to American values, but build an environment that
will promote the economic growth of the developing countries. This is also
the reason the Indonesian government feels the United States should not be
the leader in encouraging cooperation on matters affecting East Asian
countries' national interests.
From a security perspective, unless the lack of American democratic and
human rights values in Indonesia presents a threat to other U.S. interests in
the region, democracy and human rights issues concerning Indonesia, in
themselves, do not present a threat to U.S. security in Southeast Asia.
Security policy makers must safeguard against making human rights and
democracy issues into "means" to achieve some other "end."
C. MALAYSIA
The Malaysian government does not think that the U.S. military presence
in Southeast Asia is critical to maintaining stability in the region. Malaysia
supports a continued U.S. military presence, but Malaysian officials believe
that other regional powers will not assert themselves if the U.S. presence was
no longer there. From a Malaysian perspective, the threat of regional
domination by communist forces no longer presents a threat to Southeast
Asia. Therefore, Malaysia is not concerned about regional power vacuums.
The Malaysian government has stated it supports a U.S. military presence
in the region, but Malaysians feel that this presence should not be a strong
one. Instead, the Malaysian government desires the United States to
broadened its regional presence economically. Malaysian officials have stated
that regional security should not only be viewed upon from a military
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perspective, but should also be linked to the economic development of the
region.
The U.S. import market is important to Malaysia and does provide the
United States with some influence. American investment in Malaysia is
approximately one third of that of Japan's. However, Japan is reducing its
investment in Malaysia. Although Malaysians do not want to become
dependent on the financial institutions of developed countries, they are very
hungry for foreign investment. From a security standpoint, if the United
States were to increase its foreign investment in Malaysia, then the two
countries' national interests would become more similar. The more similar
economic interests of two countries are, the greater the likelihood that both
countries' security interests will be similar.
The Malaysian government wants to strengthen bilateral. cooperation with
the United States, but Malaysian officials do not feel that formal agreements
or alliances are necessary. Malaysians point out that the Cold War is over and
their opinion is that conventional security pacts are now obsolete. Malaysia
does not want to be bound to the United States, or any other Western country
by political ties.
Malaysia will oppose any attempts to build a regional environment
dominated by perceived American values. Prime Minister Mahathir believes
that Western values are not suitable for East Asians and the region should be
permitted to develop a value model of its own. It would be inconceivable to
Malaysians that United States could be an effective leader in encouraging
cooperation in the region when Americans do not fully understand the
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values of East Asians. Malaysia does not share the United States objectives of
promoting American styled democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia.
United States security policy makers should take advantage of the
opportunity presented by the decrease of Japanese economic involvement in
Malaysia. The Malaysian government will not conform to the American
policy objectives of building and strengthening security alliances in East Asia.
However, increasing U.S. economic involvement in Malaysia can contribute
the American policy "end" of enhancing stability in the region.
D. THE PHILIPPINES
The Republic of the Philippines is the Southeast Asian country that best
fits U.S. assumptions concerning security policy in the region. The Philippine
government strongly supports a continued U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia, and feels it Is critical to maintaining stability in the region.
Although domination by "communism" does not present a threat to the
region, insurgency does remain a threat for the Philippine government.
The Philippine government agrees that without a United States military
presence there would be instability, or a "power vacuum," in the region.
Also, the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian country that has overtly
stated that the United States should play the role of "policeman" in the
region. This is so because the Philippines is weak militarily and is dependent
on the United States to provide for Philippine security.
Although the Philippine government is attempting to diversify its sources
of trade, aid, and investment away from the United States and Japan.
However, American economic involvement in the region continues to
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provide the United States with influence in the Philippines. The Philippines
sees the U.S. economy as having the most impact on the global and regional
economies, and the Philippine government continues to encourage U.S.
economic involvement in the republic.
As for the U.S. assumption that nondemocratic regimes are incompatible
of sustained economic reform for the general welfare of its citizens, the
Philippines is a case where a democratic regime is also seemingly
incompatible with providing economic growth. It must be pointed out that
the Marcos regime was democratic in name only, and the Aquino
administration suffered problems created by the Marcos regime. This should
provide American policy makers with a valuable lesson that Western style
democracy alone can not overcome the indigenous problems of non-Western
societies.
The goal of the Philippine government is to be less bound to the United
States by political ties. Filipinos value the current security alliances they have
with the United States, but they do not want these security alliances
strengthened. Instead, the Philippine government wants these Cold War
arrangements modified to meet the current regional situation, and promote
mutual relations on a more equal basis. The Philippines wants its defense
agreements with the United States adapted to protect Filipino interests in tha
South China Sea, and a large number of Filipino's feel the Philippines has
been "getting the short end o' the stick" when it comes to Philippine-U.S.
relations.
The country that is the closest to sharing the American style of
government and human rights values in Southeast Asia is the Philippines.
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However, American policy makers should not assume that because the two
countries share similar political ideologies, the Philippines will want the
United States to be the leader in encouraging cooperation in the region.
Filipinos are beginning to question the disadvantages of maintaining
Western values, particularly when they compare the Philippines' economic
progress to the economic successes of other countries in the region. This is
not to imply that the Philippines will discard its avowed dedication to
democratic government, but does suggest that the Philippine government
might adopt policies more similar to those of its neighbors, and not want the
United States to assume leadership on matters affecting Filipino and East
Asian interests. American policy makers need to modify U.S. security policy
to adapt to the evolving Philippine perceptions in the post-Cold War period.
E. SINGAPORE
The Singaporean government feels that the U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia is critical to maintaining stability in the region. For
Singapore, the threat is not regional communism, but any antagonistic force
in the region. When it comes to professing the dangers of "power vacuums,"
Singapore is the most vocal country in the region. Singaporean officials feel
that it is most vital for stability in region that the United States maintain its
security alliance with Japan.
Singapore has strong economic ties to the United States. America is
Singapore's largest export market, and Singapore is the only ASEAN country
where U.S. foreign investment exceeds that of Japan's. This economic
involvement enhances the United States' influence in Singapore. The
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republic is not only bound to the United States by security ties, but by
economic ties as well.
If any country proves that nondemocratic regimes are capable of sustained
economic reform for the general welfare of its citizens, it is Singapore.
Singapore is a case where an authoritarian regime maintains its legitimacy
through economic success and by providing for the needs of its people.
Singaporean officials openly state that American democracy lacks the
efficiency and the social discipline that a developing country needs to achieve
economic take-off.
Singapore does not view nondemocratic regimes as threats simply because
they lack democratic values. The Singaporean government does not believe
that the American version of democracy is adequate in providing East Asian
countries with political stability. Singapore believes that East Asians must
have their own style of political and economic systems because Western
values are not compatible with East Asian values.
Singapore does not want to build an international environment
conducive to American values. The Singaporean government feels that the
United States' imposition of its values on East Asian countries is doing
nothing more than creating instability in the region. Singapore strongly
disagrees with the U.S. policy of tying human rights and democracy issues to
economic policy. It feels that the United States is doing great harm to regional
security by economically and politically isolating countries that do not
conform to American human rights and democratic standards. The
Singaporean government does not feel the United States is correct in tying
China's MFN privileges to its human rights record. They feel that if the
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United States revoke's China's MFN, it will cause China to "lose face," and
then China will have little incentive not to take aggressive action in the
region. From a Singaporean perspective, this shows America's lack of
understanding of East Asian societies, and greatly hampers the United States
ability to be the leader in encouraging cooperation in the region.
If the United States were to apply its stated security policy of promoting
democracy and human rights to all countries in East Asia with equal
commitment, Singapore would iurely become a target. American security
policy makers must strongly consider the ramifications of applying a
universal human rights policy to all the East Asian countries, regardless if
they are "friends or allies." If the lack of democratic values in Singapore
threatens other national interests in the region, then American policy makers
then should take appropriate measures. However, Singapore's lack of
democracy has, thus far, not presented a threat to American security interests
in the region. The U.S. should not forfeit its security gains with Singapore
simply to enforce a political agenda.
F. THAILAND
Thailand does not feel a U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia is critical
to maintaining stability in the region. The Thai government supports a
continued U.S. military presence in tle region, but in the post-Cold War era,
Thai security concerns require less contributions from U.S. secuirity assets.
Thai officials believe their country is no longer threatened by its communist
neighbors. These countries' economies are in such poor condition that they
can not afford to take aggressive actions in the region.
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The Thai government has made it clear that it does not want U.S. military
bases in Thailand. However, Thailand does want to continue military
cooperation with the United States. Thais are not concerned with a power
vacuum forming without the U.S. military presence, but they do rely on the
United States for Thai military development and training.
The United States economic involvement in Thailand enhances the
United States' influence with that country. America is Thailand's largest
export market and although the United States is not Thailand's largest foreign
investor, American investment in Thailand is significant.
Economic relations between the United States and Thailand have been
strained because of issues such as intellectual property rights and
pharmaceuticals. The tensions created by these issues have crossed over into
the security realm. Thai officials have considered limiting U.S. military
access to Thailand in response to U.S. pressure on trade issues. However, the
Thai government will probably not take such action because it would further
aggravate trade relations.
Thailand does not want its defense arrangements with the United States
strengthened. Thai officials feel that the post-Cold War geopolitical situation
has made security alliances unnecessary. The change in the regional situation
has made Thailand less bound to the United States by political ties. Thailand
no longer views nondemocratic regimes as security threats, reducing the
significance of political and security ties with America.
The Thai government does not feel the United States is correct in
pressuring China over human rights issues. Like the Singaporeans, Thais
feel that this will have a destabilizing affect on the region. Thailand does feel
156
that human rights is an important issue and should be promoted throughout
the region. However, the Thai version of human rights is much different
from the American version. The values of the two societies are very different
and Thailand has no desire to build an regional environment conducive to
American values.
Thailand feels that U.S. security and political contributions to the region
have diminished in importance in the post-Cold War era. For U.S. security
policy makers, this means American influence in Thailand has diminished as
a result of the Cold War ending. However, U.S. economic influence in
Thailand has not decreased. This is the one area of relations the United States
should place more emphasis on. The U.S. market still plays an important
role in Thailand's economy. By increasing U.S. economic involvement in
Thailand, both countries' national interests will become analogous. If two
countries national interests are similar, then both countries will be more
likely to cooperate on security issues.
G. BURMA
Burma does not fit any of the U.S. security policy makers assumptions
concerning American military presence in Southeast Asia. The reason for
this is that Burma is viewed as a potential threat to America's interests in the
region and has been the target of U.S. security policy. The Burmese
government sees the United States as the destabilizing force in the region
because the United States possesses a threat to the survival of Burma's
military regime.
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The United States does play a role in the Burmese economy. Although the
American market does not account for any of Burma's imports or exports,
with the exception of drug exports, the United States is the leading foreign
investor in Burma. This presents the United States with an opportunity to be
a motivating force in opening up Burma's society.
Burma is a case where a nondemocratic regime is incompatible of
sustained economic reform for the general welfare of its citizens, but Burma's
poor economic performance can directly be attributed to its government's
decisions to isolate its economy from the global economy. The Burmese
government now knows that it must improve Burma's economy by breaking
from its isolation.
The Burmese people continue to show assertiveness in attaining more
political rights from the military government. The opposition to the latest
military proposed constitution by the 1993 Burmese National Convention
indicates that SLORC's grip on domestic politics is slipping. Burma is
becoming less repressive of its people for economic, not political reasons.
SLORC is attempting to improve its international image to attract trade, aid,
and investment. American security policy makers must be aware that this is
the most lucrative "means" to accomplish U.S. policy objectives in Burma.
To pursue the "means" of isolating Burma economically and politically,
would only contribute to the further repression of the Burmese people and
give SLORC less incentive to reform its domestic policies.
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H. CAMBODIA
Cambodia hopefully is on the verge of becoming a self-governing state and
ending its civil war. It is presently the most unstable country in Southeast
Asia. This instability not only effects U.S. interests in the region, but the
interests of our friends and allies. Although it may not be in U.S. national
interest to use unilateral military force to ensure that an elected Cambodian
government stays in power, it is in U.S. interest to support international
organizations in ensuring that an elected Cambodia government is installed
and given a chance to succeed.
America can play an integral part in the rebuilding of the Cambodian
society and assisting the elected government in attain a level of self-
sufficiency. However, the United States must be cautious of imposing
American values on the fledgling Cambodian government, so as to not
appear to be interfering in Cambodian internal affairs. Individual American
action would send signals not only to the other countries in the region, but
also to the other factions in Cambodia that would be counterproductive to the
process of establishing the legitimacy of the elected Cambodian government.
I. LAOS
Like Burma, Laos does not fit any of the U.S. security policy assumptions.
Since the communist take over of Laos, it has been viewed as a threat to
American interests in the region and has been the target of U.S. security
policy. Unlike Burma, Laos has been more open to U.S. economic and
political endeavors in Southeast Asia.
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The Laotian government recognizes that its legitimacy is threatened by
Laos's poor economic performance. The communist government is making
every effort to improve the Laotian economy, to include adopting non-
communist economy philosophies. Laotian officials are concerned that U.S.
influence will undermine the communist party's rule, but they also realize
that they must accommodate the U.S. government if they are to receive aid
from international organizations. The United States must continue to assert
its influence on the Laotian government, but U.S. policy makers must be
careful not to go to far. A balanced approach must be implemented where
Laos is continued to be brought into the regional and international fold,
while at the same time not exerting so much influence on the Laotian
government that it chooses to revert to isolationism for self-preservation.
J. VIETNAM
Vietnam has been the main target of U.S. security policy in Southeast Asia.
During the Cold War, Vietnam was ,een as a surrogate for the
implementation of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia. Vietnam has been
viewed as possessing the greatest potential for causing instability in the
region. The communist goernment of Vietnam has been in dire straits since
it has lost its political and economic support from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Vietnam still maintains the largest armed forces in
Southeast Asia, but the state of readiness of its military is suspect because the
military's technical and supply support lines from its former allies have been
severed.
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Vietnam and ASEAN are now being drawn together by a common threat
from Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea. ASEAN's economic
success has given Vietnam further impetus to better relations with its
ASEAN neighbors. Vietnamese officials apparently have changed their goals
of subregional domination to making Vietnam an economic success.
The largest obstacle to Vietnam's economic recovery is the U.S. trade
embargo imposed on Vietnam. America's friends and allies in East Asia and
the rest of the world have been forgoing this embargo in the post-Cold War
era. This is gradually lessening the political effectiveness of the U.S. embargo.
The impression one gets from Washington is that the main impediment to
lifting the embargo and normalizing relations with Vietnam is the MIA issue.
It should be pointed out that the United States also has unresolved MIA cases
with Laos, yet the United States has normalized relations and has no trade
embargo with Laos. It should also be pointed out that the MIA issue is a very
emotional issue with many Americans and remains a political "hot potato"
in Washington.
U.S. security policy makers must reevaluate America's policy objectives
towards Vietnam because the situation in Southeast Asia has dramatically
changed since the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe. Specific attention must be paid to the policy of isolating
Vietnam. The questioned that should be asked is: does American policy
towards Vietnam in the post-Cold War era meet the national interests of
United States? Specifically, isolating Vietnam may actually be detrimental to
post-Cold War security interests in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese
government may be less likely to threaten U.S. interests, and more likely to
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cooperate with the United States in Southeast Asia if both countries begin
sharing common economic interests in the region.
K. SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLICY
Post-Cold War U.S. security policy documents stress that in modern
history no democratic governments have ever gone to war with each other.
This may be true, but it should not be assumed that democratic governments
will never resort to using military force against each other in the future. A
more sound policy assumption is: a government will be more reluctant to
use military force against another government with which it shares common
national interests.
In the post-Cold War era, all of the Southeast Asian states have declared
that economic success is their number one priority. Southeast Asia already is
one of the most economically successful regions in the world. This region-
wide concentration on economic prosperity should be of interest to U.S.
policy makers, because it is making the national interests of individual
Southeast Asian countries more aligned with each other. American security
policy makers should focus on this aspect of regional concerns to implement
U.S. policy in the region. Bringing the non-ASEAN states into the Southeast
Asian economic design will do more for regional stability than overthrowing
the remaining communist governments in the region. The post-Cold War
trend in Southeast Asia of placing economic concerns above all others should
indicate to American security policy makers that the United States should
place more emphasis on economic involvement in the region, and less
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emphasis on a dominant military presence and the consideration of forming
security alliances within the region.
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